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This book explores the emergence and development of the legal concept of fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing, and its application in agriculture.
Developed in the 1990s, the concept of fair and equitable benefit-sharing has 
been deployed in an ever-wider variety of international instruments, including 
those on biodiversity, climate change and human rights. A lack of clarity 
persists, however, on what fair and equitable benefit-sharing requires and 
entails, and whether its implementation supports or eventually undermines 
equity and justice. This book examines these questions in the area of land, food 
and agriculture, addressing for the first time several instances of the agricultural 
production chain, including research and development, land governance and 
land use and access to markets. It identifies challenges regarding implementation 
of the concept as enshrined in environmental treaties and soft-law instruments, 
with a focus on the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture, the Voluntary Guidelines on Tenure and the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Peasants. It investigates its role, enabling conditions and limita-
tions, in a contradictory policy context involving environmental, food security 
and human rights objectives but also a growing web of multilateral and bilateral 
trade and investment agreements. Linking international law research with a 
socio-legal analysis, the book addresses four grassroots examples, which offer 
ideas for institutional and legal innovation from the local to the global level.
This interdisciplinary title will be of great interest to students and scholars of 
international environmental law, agriculture, land law, development studies and 
global governance, as well as policymakers and practitioners working in these 
fields.
Elsa Tsioumani is a post-doctoral Research Fellow at the School of Inter-
national Studies, University of Trento, Italy. An international lawyer and 
consultant based in Thessaloniki, Greece, she has been following international 
negotiations on biodiversity since 1999 as a writer for the Reporting Services of 
the International Institute for Sustainable Development.
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Introduction
This book is the outcome of research conducted as part of the five- year- long 
BeneLex project,1 which investigated the conceptual and practical dimensions of 
fair and equitable benefit- sharing in different areas of international law. Research 
included a desk study of relevant international law and academic literature; ana-
lysis of and contribution to various streams of international negotiations; and 
local- level field work to identify priorities and challenges for indigenous peoples 
and local communities in benefit- sharing implementation, and the interface 
between local, national, regional and international law. It involved an 
interdisciplinary research team of three international lawyers and a political 
sociologist. My part of the research focused on the area of land, food and agri-
culture, and the outcome is reflected in the following chapters.
The concept of fair and equitable benefit- sharing was developed in the 1990s 
in international biodiversity law, and particularly the field of genetic resource 
utilization for research and development, following adoption of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD).2 Bioprospecting – the search for plants and 
animals from which commercially valuable compounds can be obtained for use 
in agriculture, medicine or cosmetics – is often a transnational activity; it 
involves situations where genetic resources are found in one state but are used in 
another. Most of the world’s biodiversity is found in developing countries, 
whereas developed countries usually host research institutes and companies that 
make commercial use of this biodiversity. The concept of fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing concerns the fair and equitable allocation of benefits arising from 
the use of genetic resources among providers (countries rich in biodiversity and 
genetic resources and indigenous peoples and local communities holding related 
knowledge) and users (companies and institutions using such resources to 
develop marketable products). Benefit- sharing was thus conceived as a tool for 
ensuring equity and sustainable development given the asymmetries in terms of 
power, information and finances that often persist between states providing and 
those using genetic resources. The idea was quite simple: developing countries 
host most of the world’s biodiversity and thus genetic resources; commercial 
products developed on the basis of these genetic resources mostly benefit com-
panies and consumers in developed countries; some of these benefits should 
flow back to the countries of origin of genetic resources and to their peoples and 
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communities who have contributed to their conservation (Morgera, Tsioumani 
and Buck 2014). This inter- state dimension of benefit- sharing was accompanied 
by its intra- state dimension, with regard to a state obligation to return part of the 
benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge to the indigenous peoples 
and local communities who were the stewards of such knowledge (Morgera and 
Tsioumani 2010).
Since then, the concept has been deployed in several international treaties and 
soft- law instruments, including on food and agriculture, climate change and 
human rights. In addition, the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit- Sharing,3 
adopted under the auspices of the CBD, operationalized the CBD objective on 
fair and equitable benefit- sharing through provisions on benefit- sharing obliga-
tions arising from the use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, access 
to genetic resources upon prior informed consent and mutual agreed terms and 
compliance. In the field of agricultural research and development, the Inter-
national Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA)4 established the Multilateral System on access and benefit- sharing, 
explored in detail in the following chapter. Lack of clarity persists, however, on 
the main elements of the concept of benefit- sharing in different areas of inter-
national law, as well as its requirements and preconditions. Another fundamental 
question is whether its implementation in practice supports or eventually under-
mines equity and justice.
In the following chapters, I track and assess the emergence and application of 
fair and equitable benefit- sharing in land, food and agriculture in several 
instances of the agricultural production chain, including research and 
development, land governance and land use and access to markets. Through a 
series of conceptualizations and illustrations reflected in specific case studies or 
examples of national- level implementation efforts, I explore its role, enabling 
conditions and limitations in promoting global objectives such as food security, 
sustainable agriculture and environmental sustainability, as well as more general 
principles such as legal empowerment and social justice. Concluding that the 
concept falls short of its promises to inject fairness and justice in agricultural 
development due to a contradictory policy context, I then explore four examples 
coming from the grassroots, which offer ideas for institutional and legal innova-
tion. The analysis is based on a desk study of international law and a literature 
review, empirical analysis of several sessions of intergovernmental negotiations 
under the CBD and the ITPGRFA and some interviews with actors involved in 
the grassroots initiatives explored.
In the first chapter, I start by exploring the emergence of the concept of fair 
and equitable benefit- sharing in the context of the evolving principles of 
governance of agricultural biodiversity. I analyse the structure and application of 
the Multilateral System (MLS) of the ITPGRFA for access to, and fair and 
equitable benefit- sharing (ABS) from the use of, plant genetic resources. I place 
this analysis in the context of intellectual property rights (IPR) and human rights 
instruments, starting from the lack of benefit- sharing applications in IPR instru-
ments and exploring human rights concerns and discourses related to political 
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and ethical considerations. These overlapping regimes result in a complex legal 
and policy landscape of conflicting objectives, rights and policies. To illustrate 
this complex landscape, I use a case study: the case of patent applications 
submitted by the International Rice Research Institute on breeding methods 
associated with a rice gene isolated in an Indonesian farmers’ variety.
In the second chapter I investigate use of the concept of benefit- sharing in 
land governance for food and agriculture purposes, with a particular focus on 
farmers’ rights and benefit- sharing from public lands, including in the case of 
large- scale agricultural investments. I start by outlining fundamental elements 
that differentiate the regulation of benefit- sharing from land use compared to 
benefit- sharing from genetic resource use for research and development, 
related to the nature of the resource, the scope of the regulation and the 
determination of beneficiaries. I draw a general picture of the trends behind 
land governance, including linkages between land distribution and social 
justice, gender as a decisive element of land poverty, the central role of 
national law and interactions between formal and customary tenure systems 
and the emergence of international regulation, including human rights and 
investment law. I then trace the emergence of the concept of fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing of relevance to land governance in environmental treaties, 
including the CBD and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification 
(UNCCD). I explore in detail specific applications of benefit- sharing with 
regard to farmers’ rights in the context of the ITPGRFA, human rights 
including the right to food and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants, 
and implementation challenges in view of seed and variety certification and 
marketing regulations. I propose a broad construction of farmers’ rights to 
include supporting elements and enabling conditions, including land rights and 
access to markets. I conclude the analysis with a case study on the inter-
national policy framework on access to markets and linkages with farmers’ 
rights and benefit- sharing. I then pass to applications of benefit- sharing from 
the use of public lands. I present basic categorizations and challenges arising 
from overlapping formal and customary tenure systems and the trend of large- 
 scale agricultural investments, and focus on the emerging legal basis, including 
the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure and 
human rights instruments, and specific implementation efforts. I conclude the 
analysis with a discussion of competing land uses and benefit- sharing on the 
isle of Ikaria, Greece.
In the third chapter, I distil a series of linkages, key lessons and challenges 
related to the conceptualization and implementation of fair and equitable benefit- 
 sharing, as arising from the first two chapters. I conclude that the concept falls 
short of its promises to inject fairness and justice in agricultural development, at 
least as currently applied in the current contradictory policy context, which fails 
to support user- based innovation and poses a host of obstacles to smallholders. I 
argue, however, that it has the potential to contribute to sustainable agriculture 
and rural livelihoods objectives, if constructed broadly to cover a series of 
supportive elements and enabling conditions. I thus stress the need to move 
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beyond narrow or strictly monetary understandings of benefit- sharing, highlight 
the role of social movements as driving forces of international law development 
and call for drawing inspiration from the sharing ethos of grassroots com-
munities to enrich the concept of fair and equitable benefit- sharing in inter-
national law.
The fourth chapter explores four examples coming from the grassroots, which 
enrich the concept of fair and equitable benefit- sharing, offering ideas for 
institutional and legal innovation: the concept of participatory plant breeding; 
open- source applications in agricultural research and development, with a focus 
on the Open Source Seed Initiative; the Peliti community in Greece, a network 
of local groups working on the conservation and exchange of traditional vari-
eties; and the Potato Park in the Peruvian Andes, an indigenous biocultural heri-
tage area based on a sui generis legal system combining customary laws with 
concepts of international environmental law. The discussion of the case studies 
marks the beginning of upcoming research on the legal context enabling or not 
such initiatives, legal tools used and conditions for their success. In this context, 
I identify trends and ask questions involving the role of law, community- 
 building and enabling conditions and elements linking the local to the global and 
vice versa.
In the final chapter, I outline a series of considerations arising from the ana-
lysis of the international legal landscape on fair and equitable benefit- sharing in 
land, food and agriculture, including challenges and shortcomings in its 
implementation in various contexts. I further highlight lessons learnt from the 
preliminary analysis of the grassroots- level case studies presented in the 
previous chapter, with focus on the role of law, legal and institutional 
prerequisites for benefit- sharing and the concept of community. A series of ele-
ments arising from the grassroots could provide inspiration for various 
intergovernmental processes within and beyond the international environmental 
law realm. I finally propose a research agenda towards agrarian justice, integ-
rating and re- imagining global objectives concerning sustainable agriculture, 
rural livelihoods and environmental sustainability.
Notes
1 Benefit- sharing for an equitable transition to the green economy – the role of law, 
European Research Council Starting Grant 335592 (November 2013 – October 2018) 
led by Elisa Morgera. Project webpage is available at: www.strath.ac.uk/research/strath
clydecentreenvironmentallawgovernance/benelex/ (last accessed 1.3.2020).
2 Convention on Biological Diversity of 5 June 1992, entered into force on 29 December 
1993, 1760 UNTS 69.
3 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity of 
29 October 2010, entered into force on 12 October 2014, UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/
DEC/X/1.
4 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture of 3 
November 2001, entered into force on 29 June 2004, 2400 UNTS 303.
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1  Fair and equitable benefit- sharing 
in agricultural research and 
development
Introduction
In this chapter, I first explore the emergence of the concept of fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing in the context of the evolving principles of governance of 
agricultural biodiversity. I then analyse the structure and application of the 
Multilateral System (MLS) of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) for access to, and fair and 
equitable benefit- sharing (ABS) from the use of, plant genetic resources. I place 
this analysis in the context of intellectual property rights (IPR) and human rights 
instruments, starting from the lack of benefit- sharing applications in IPR instru-
ments and exploring related human rights concerns and discourses related to 
political and ethical considerations. The result showcases a complex legal and 
policy landscape of conflicting objectives, rights and policies. To illustrate this 
complex landscape, I use a case study: the case of patent applications submitted 
by the International Rice Research Institute on breeding methods associated with 
a rice gene isolated in an Indonesian farmers’ variety. This exploration will 
eventually assist in assessing the potential of the concept of fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing in promoting and operationalizing fairness and equity in 
agricultural research and development.
The evolution of the global governance of plant 
genetic resources
Informal seed systems and public agricultural research
Since the earliest crop domestications, agricultural development has been based 
on farmers’ traditional varieties, developed through collective systems of 
innovation and conservation through seed saving, sharing and use (Halewood 
et al. 2013a). Exchanges were regulated on a customary basis, largely at the 
community level, and included both informal ones and more organized systems, 
such as seed fairs and community seed banks (Garine et al. 2018).
The literature on the historic events which led to the global redistribution of 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) and the emergence 
of international regulation is vast, so I make a very schematic reference. 
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Colonization resulted in a vast flow of agricultural species from the Americas 
to Europe and from South to North. Ex situ facilities were established in the 
North, such as botanic gardens and genebanks, which stored samples of 
agricultural varieties coming mainly from developing countries, the centres of 
domestication of major agricultural crops. These samples provided the basis 
for the high- yielding varieties of crops developed during the green revolution 
in the twentieth century.
The green revolution dramatically transformed agriculture through scientific 
and technological advances, and led to increased food production at least in 
some regions. It also marked the emergence of professional plant breeding and 
the commercial seed sector, leading to the marginalization of customary farmer 
practices and varieties and traditional seed systems, in favour of scientific, 
public or corporate- led research, in cases putting at risk the livelihoods of 
smallholder farmers (Tsioumani et al. 2016; De Schutter 2009; Mooney 1998). 
Such socio- economic impacts were accompanied by environmental ones. The 
spread of monocultures of high- yielding, genetically uniform crop varieties led 
to the erosion of agricultural biodiversity, making agricultural production vul-
nerable in the face of threats such as pests and extreme environmental conditions 
(FAO 1993; Dahlberg 1979; Glaeser 2011).
It was the need for continued exchanges of PGRFA samples to develop the 
varieties to fuel the green revolution, as well as the realization of the risks of 
genetic erosion, that provided the rationale for the international regulation of 
PGRFA (Halewood et al. 2013a; Scarascia- Mugnozza and Perrino 2002). The 
first technical conference, which placed PGRFA on the international agenda, 
was held by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) in 1967. 
Following arduous debates, the conference expressed preference for ex situ 
conservation methods (thus conservation of samples in genebanks) over on- farm 
management, referring to the sustainable management of local diversity by 
farmers as part of their agricultural practices (Maxted et al. 2011). However, it 
reached no agreement with regard to coordinated actions (Pistorius 1997; 
Halewood et al. 2013a).
The first institutionalized international structure on PGRFA conservation and 
management, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR), was created in 1971 as a result of a World Bank initiative, and 
eventually gathered several international agricultural research centres under its 
auspices, with the co- sponsorship of FAO and the UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) (Özgediz 2012). With a focus on ex situ conservation of crops of agro- 
 economic value, the CGIAR centres stored a large percentage of the world’s 
PGRFA, which under various circumstances had flowed from the developing to 
the developed world (Fowler 1994; Fowler et al. 2000; Chiarolla 2012).
At the time, international law was silent with respect to the conditions for 
access to and use of PGRFA, both in situ (on-farm and in nature in general) and 
in the CGIAR system; similarly, most national legislations did not regulate access 
to PGRFA, either in situ or in genebanks. PGRFA were thus considered to be in 
the public domain, available to anyone for any purpose, without benefit- sharing 
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or conservation obligations (Halewood et al. 2013a). In turn, most agricultural 
research at the time was conducted by public institutions, and the results of the 
work were shared (Rose 2004). The CGIAR committed to the free circulation of 
both original and improved material and the full sharing of information (Byerlee 
and Dubin 2009), with the belief that the benefits of such a system would flow to 
humanity at large in the form of agricultural development and scientific pro-
gress. Data indicates that developing countries were the main recipients of 
germplasm samples from the CGIAR centres and thus beneficiaries of the 
system (Fowler et al. 2000).
The CGIAR approach can be criticized for its focus on ex situ conservation, which, 
apart from its own technical problems (Louafi et al. 2013), resulted in marginalizing 
on- farm management, thus farmers’ knowledge, varieties and practices, and in 
promoting monocultures in the name of increased productivity. In addition, what 
remains into question (and partly addressed later in this book) is whether such a 
narrow, centralized model of agricultural innovation based on a Western type of 
agricultural knowledge and development can fit the needs of all users, particularly 
smallholders, and whether it can promote localized objectives related to livelihoods 
and biodiversity conservation. At the time, though, what eventually challenged the 
CGIAR practices was the growing application of intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
and the gradual privatization of agricultural research and development.
The first wave of privatization
The introduction and continuing strengthening of IPR protection for modern 
agricultural varieties catalyzed multiple changes in the course of international 
regulation of PGRFA. IPRs are supposed to foster and reward creativity and 
innovation, including to address global challenges such as food security. The 
IPRs mainly in use in the field of agricultural innovation are plant breeders’ 
rights (PBRs) and patents. I briefly introduce them below, in turn.
PBRs were established at the time of the green revolution by the 1961 Inter-
national Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV 
Convention), later amended in 1972, 1978 and 1991. According to its mission 
statement, the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV), established by the UPOV Convention, aimed to encourage the 
development of new varieties of plants for the benefit of society. PBRs provide 
protection to novel (in terms of prior commercialization), distinct, uniform and 
stable plant varieties. These standards were specifically developed to support 
protection of modern varieties. Farmers’ varieties are generally neither uniform 
nor stable, and the existing ones (those used for the development of modern vari-
eties) do not satisfy the novelty requirement and are considered as ‘prior art’ 
within the public domain. In addition, the uniformity criterion in particular has 
been subject to criticism because it reinforces trends towards genetic uniformity, 
and a higher degree of genetic vulnerability (Silva Repetto and Cavalcanti 2000).
The 1978 version of the UPOV Convention (UPOV 78) provided for two 
exemptions to plant variety protection, aiming to guarantee the continued 
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exchange of material for further research and to protect smallholder farmers’ 
livelihoods: the breeders’ exception and the farmers’ privilege. The breeders’ 
exception permitted the use of protected varieties as the source material of 
further breeding; the farmers’ privilege allowed the re- use of saved seeds by 
subsistence farmers. However, as examined below, these exemptions were 
restricted in the 1991 version of the UPOV Convention (UPOV 91). UPOV 
membership was further boosted with the adoption of the Agreement on Trade- 
 Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, and later through bilateral and multi-
lateral free- trade agreements, as addressed below.
Patents in the field of plant breeding were first allowed through the 1930 US 
Plant Patent Act. They gradually took off following the 1980 US Supreme Court 
case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,1 which opened the way to the patenting of 
genetically modified organisms (Kevles 1994; Carolan 2010; Jasanoff 2001) and 
expanded dramatically following adoption of the TRIPS Agreement and the 
breakthrough of modern biotechnology in the 1990s, although they remain 
controversial from a political and ethical point of view, as examined below. 
Protecting plant- derived innovations under patent regimes requires an applicant 
to demonstrate novelty, an inventive step and the potential for industrial applica-
tion. Farmer varieties obviously do not satisfy these requirements. Patents 
provide the strongest form of intellectual property protection, in the sense that 
they normally allow the patent holder to exercise the greatest control over the 
use of patented material. Thus, exceptions aiming to protect farmers’ and 
breeders’ activities are usually more limited under patent law than under PBR 
legislation. At the moment, to my knowledge, patents on conventional plant vari-
eties are only allowed in the USA, Japan, Australia and the Republic of Korea.
Privatization was a major attack to the previous treatment of PGRFA and 
related knowledge as public goods. In the words of Charlotte Hess, ‘IPRs 
appear to slow the free flow of germplasm exchange, slow the diffusion of new 
knowledge, upset the balance between basic and applied research, and erode 
scientific integrity’ (Hess 1993: 128), posing obstacles to public research. 
Alongside concerns regarding commodification of PGRFA, the beginning of 
privatization of genetic resources resulted in a major asymmetry between the 
stewards of these resources and those who benefitted more from their use, argu-
ably private companies in developed countries. Farmers’ varieties and PGRFA 
originating in biodiversity- rich developing countries were to be exchanged 
freely as the basis for development of modern varieties, while the availability of 
the resulting varieties was restricted by IPRs (Mooney 1983: 24). This was con-
sidered as unfair and inequitable or at least morally unjust from the perspective 
of provider countries and farmers, and was at the core of the tensions that 
challenged CGIAR practices. These concerns have been exacerbated by the 
(mis)application of the IPR system, dubbed as ‘biopiracy’.2 Patents have been 
granted on genetic resources obtained from developing countries, often without 
the knowledge and consent of the country of origin and hardly any 
demonstration of an inventive step.
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There has been extensive documentation of IPRs being sought over resources 
in the form they are found in nature or in farmers’ fields, without further 
improvement, or on products based on plant materials and knowledge developed 
and used by indigenous peoples and local communities. Examples concern the 
Mayocoba (or Enola) bean, quinoa, neem tree and turmeric (Mooney 1998; Aoki 
1998). In the case of the Mayocoba bean, for example, a US patent was granted 
on a bean variety widely cultivated in Mexico, originating from the CGIAR 
centres, which it took nine years of litigation to revoke (CIAT 2009). There are 
no specific standards of what is considered a ‘novelty’ or an ‘invention’ for the 
purpose of patent registration. Assessment of the level of inventive step required 
to grant a patent is crucial to determine the extent to which patents on genetic 
resources may be lawful or not. In addition, a basic issue has been whether iso-
lated genes and other biological materials may be deemed ‘invented’ and thus 
eligible for patent protection. Approaches differ among national jurisdictions, 
along with debates on ethical considerations (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
2002). From a global perspective, these points have increased significance.
In the context of rising tensions about the potential impact of IPRs on the legal 
status of the CGIAR collections, the need for some form of legal arrangement 
regarding access to and use of samples from these collections was acknowledged. 
This resulted in the adoption of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture, examined in the next section.
The attempt for a common heritage approach
Adopted by the FAO Conference in 1983, the non- binding International Under-
taking (IU) attempted to apply the principle of common heritage to PGRFA, 
declaring that ‘plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently 
should be available without restriction’ (IU Art. 1). Significantly, the principle of 
common heritage would cover all plant genetic resources, including ‘newly 
developed varieties’ (Art. 2(1)). The initial strategic and legal response was thus to 
make all PGRFA, including improved varieties, freely accessible to farmers and 
breeders around the world (Kloppenburg 2014; Aoki 2009), attempting to bypass 
IPRs. This – retrospectively radical – approach can be explained in the light of the 
asymmetry introduced by IPRs: the main problem was not that seed companies 
were using PGRFA for free, but that they were restricting access to the improved 
varieties that, as a matter of reciprocity, ought to have been shared.
The ‘common heritage of mankind’ is an ethical concept and (controversial) 
international law principle establishing that some spaces and resources belong to all 
humanity and are available for everyone’s use and benefit, taking into account 
future generations and the needs of developing countries for sustainable 
development (Taylor 2012). Application of the concept in the framework estab-
lished by the Undertaking sought to benefit humanity as a whole, and ‘to support 
major increases in agricultural production, especially in developing countries’ (IU 
Art. 7(h)(ii)). Distribution of the benefits was left to national governments’ respons-
ibility, and no mechanism was established to address the needs of specific fractions 
Benefit-sharing in agricultural research  11
of humanity, importantly the most vulnerable or developing countries less equipped 
for agricultural research and development. An internationally coordinated network 
of centres, including the pre- existing CGIAR centres, would operate under the 
FAO auspices and assume the responsibility to hold PGRFA collections ‘for the 
benefit of the international community and on the principle of unrestricted 
exchange’ (IU Art. 7(a)). The absence of formal benefit- sharing arrangements lies 
in the strong belief that benefits would flow to developing countries in the form of 
distribution of PGRFA and related information. Noble in its intentions, the 
architecture seemed to ignore the global inequities regarding distribution of the 
infrastructures, knowledge and skills, which are necessary to make use of an open 
system such as the one created by the Undertaking (Louafi and Welch 2014). It 
further revealed the central weakness of the common heritage approach in inter-
national law: that it is largely motivated by states’ desire for access to resources 
rather than by genuine community interest in their protection (Brunnée 2008).
The International Undertaking did not resolve the impasse between developed 
and developing countries largely associated with IPRs and equity- related concerns. 
Despite its non- binding nature, it was revolutionary enough to provide reasons to 
eight developed countries to sign it with reservations,3 reluctant to allow the prin-
ciple of common heritage to apply to modern varieties, and concerned it would 
undermine plant breeders’ rights. Developing countries, in turn, considered 
impractical the attempt to apply the principle of common heritage against IPRs. 
Identifying themselves as providers and thus owners of genetic resources, they 
pushed for application of the principle of national sovereignty over natural and 
genetic resources. It came as no surprise that the principle of common heritage was 
rejected in the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) (addressed in the next section), which affirms instead that the 
conservation of biodiversity is a common concern of humankind, indicating that it 
is an issue involving global responsibilities and requiring global cooperation.
If IPRs created a major enclosure to the previous systems of exchange, the 
principle of national sovereignty over natural and genetic resources aimed to 
defend the rights of countries providing such resources by creating a second, 
defensive enclosure. In the words of Michael Halewood and his colleagues, 
‘if developed countries were able to exercise restrictive control over advanced 
biologically based technologies using intellectual property rights, developing 
countries could exercise their sovereign rights to regulate and restrict access to 
the biological and genetic resources within their borders’ (Halewood et al. 
2013b: 6). Aiming to ensure some portion of the benefits arising from the use of 
their resources, developing countries pushed for a major shift in the regulation 
of access to such resources. This shift was embedded in the CBD, addressed in 
the following section.
The nationalization trend
The CBD, a legally binding treaty adopted in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit, 
recognizes that the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests 
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with national governments and is subject to national legislation. The CBD 
includes prominently among its objectives the fair and equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising from their commercial or other utilization. Aiming to 
establish a system for bilateral exchanges of genetic resources between 
providers and users, it subjects access to the prior informed consent of the 
country providing such resources, and to mutually agreed terms for benefit- 
 sharing. Benefit- sharing is thus linked to the principle of national sovereignty, 
and appears to have a balancing function against the privatization of genetic 
resources via IPRs.
The shift in principles can be further justified due to the growing expectations 
of the commercial value of biodiversity (Petit et al. 2001; Batta Bjørnstad 2004) 
and the potential use of such gains for development purposes (Raustiala and 
Victor 2004). The emergence of the biotechnology industry in the 1990s and of 
a market for biodiversity- based products was at the centre of these expectations. 
Arguably marking the emergence of market- based approaches to biodiversity 
management (Morgera 2016), benefit- sharing can thus be conceptualized as a 
development tool, to reap part of the gains of the biodiversity market, as well as 
an incentive for stewards of biodiversity, including biodiversity- rich developing 
countries, indigenous peoples and smallholder farmers, to reward them and 
enable their continued contribution to conservation.
The influence of the CBD on the FAO realm was immediate; even before 
finalization of the CBD negotiations, the 1991 FAO conference adopted 
 Resolution 3/91 endorsing that nations have sovereign rights over their plant 
genetic resources, and recognized that the concept of common heritage as 
applied in the International Undertaking is subject to the sovereignty of the 
states over their plant genetic resources. At the same time, it implicitly addressed 
benefit- sharing by stating that the availability of plant genetic resources and the 
information, technologies and funds necessary to conserve and utilize them are 
complementary and of equal importance, and by establishing an international 
fund to support plant conservation and utilization programmes and implement 
farmers’ rights.
In addition, conflicts about the legal status of the CGIAR collections con-
tinued. In the early 1990s, widely publicized rumours had it that the World Bank 
may appropriate the collections, or that the host countries may seek to control 
them, or that the centres themselves may seek to do so. Under pressure to end 
such controversies, in 1994 the CGIAR centres eventually signed agreements 
with the FAO, placing their collections within the international network of the 
International Undertaking. They affirmed that they held their collections ‘in trust 
for the benefit of the international community’, and that they would not claim 
legal ownership or IPRs over the germplasm (Halewood et al. 2013a).
Adoption of the CBD was considered a major victory for the global South, 
but were developing countries accurate in their expectations? Would adoption of 
the TRIPS Agreement mean that many of these gains were weakened (Aoki 
2009)? The next section will explore the second wave of privatization, marked 
by a strengthening of PBRs, a continuous expansion of the patentable subject 
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matter and bilateral and multilateral pressures on developing countries to ratify 
IPR- related treaties.
Privatization 2.0
As explained above, the IPRs mainly in use in the field of agricultural 
development are PBRs and patents. A series of interlinked policy and technolo-
gical developments in the 1990s marked the beginning of their dramatic 
expansion: the restriction of exemptions to PBRs in UPOV 91; adoption of the 
TRIPS Agreement by the WTO in 1994; the breakthrough of modern 
biotechnologies; and the proliferation of bilateral and multilateral free- trade 
agreements. These are briefly addressed below.
As noted above, the model of PBRs as epitomized by UPOV 78 clearly 
permitted the use of protected varieties as the source material of further breeding 
(breeders’ exception) and the re- use of saved seeds by farmers (farmers’ 
privilege) (Correa 1999). Both are important mechanisms to protect farmers’ 
livelihoods, allow for farmer- led innovation based on traditional seed- saving and 
exchange practices and in general guarantee the continued exchange of material 
for public research and global food security purposes. These exceptions, 
however, were restricted in UPOV 91. As explored in detail below, the plant 
breeders’ exception was preserved, acts done ‘privately and for non- commercial 
purposes’ or ‘for experimental purposes’ were also exempted, but the farmers’ 
privilege for replanting was restricted while the scope of protection for the PBR 
holder was extended beyond the propagating material of protected varieties to 
include ‘essentially derived varieties’. According to this amendment, farmers 
were required to limit the amount of saved seeds or to pay an equitable 
remuneration to the PBR holder. In addition, use of protected varieties by 
farmers is permitted only for propagating and planting on their own holdings, 
but not for informal sale, thus also restricting exchanges among farmers 
(Chiarolla et al. 2013).
UPOV membership was boosted with the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. 
According to TRIPS Agreement Article 27(3)(b), WTO member states are 
required to provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an 
effective sui generis system, a Latin term which refers to a system that is unique, 
of its own kind. According to the option regarding a sui generis system, coun-
tries should be free to identify an IPR system to suit their particular agricultural 
and socio- economic conditions and priorities. However, the UPOV Convention 
provides a ready- made sui generis framework; it therefore appears as an 
obviously easy choice (Correa et al. 2015). Ratification seems to be promoted 
also by technical advice provided to developing countries (De Schutter 2009). 
Developing- country membership is thus constantly increasing, despite the fact 
that the UPOV system is tailored to the needs of the commercial seed sector and 
the commercialized farming systems of the developed countries rather than the 
diversified agriculture of the developing ones, often supporting subsistence 
purposes (Yamin 2003; Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002).
14  Benefit-sharing in agricultural research
Patentability of living organisms, including plant varieties, has always 
involved political questions and ethical considerations, and is rejected in several 
jurisdictions, while the global discussion remains open (see below). The 
breakthrough of modern biotechnologies marked a dramatic expansion of the 
patent subject matter, with an ever- increasing number of patents to cover not 
only transgenic plants but also particular plant traits and parts, components such 
as genes, plant breeding methodologies and vectors and processes involved in 
the production of transgenic plants (Aoki 2009). Geographical application also 
expanded, as transgenic plants became patentable in Europe under the terms of 
the Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions 
(Crucible II Group 2000; Dutfield 2010).4
Some examples can usefully illustrate the breadth of patents currently granted 
(Tsioumani et al. 2016). In February 2010, US- based company Mendel 
Biotechnology won a patent in the USA on plant transcriptional regulators, a 
class of genes that control the degree to which other genes in a cell are activated. 
These genes reportedly confer improved stress tolerance in genetically 
engineered plants, not for a single abiotic stress, but for drought, shade and low- 
 nitrogen conditions, and extend to virtually any transgenic plant and seed 
encoding a specified DNA sequence. The BASF’s patent in the USA on ‘tran-
scription factor stress- related proteins and methods of use in plants’ lays claim 
to transgenic plants transformed with isolated DNA sequences that confer 
increased tolerance to environmental stress, including salinity, drought and tem-
perature, and covers virtually all flowering plants, such as maize, wheat, rice, 
soybean, potato and tomato, to mention only some. Monsanto’s international 
patent application, published by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) in February 2010, describes novel proteins derived from bacterial cold- 
 shock proteins, which, upon expression in transgenic plants, provide the plants 
with enhanced stress tolerance to heat, salt and drought. The application makes 
extremely broad claims, not just to the modified plant cells that exhibit improved 
stress tolerance but also the processed product derived from the transgenic plant. 
All these extremely broad patents refer to plant components and processes 
which could be relevant for adapting agricultural research and production to the 
challenges of climate change (ETC Group 2010).
Furthermore, while the number of patent applications is increasing annually 
in both the USA and Europe, the number of applicants is decreasing. Dozens of 
mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances since the 1980s have resulted in a 
dramatic concentration of control in a handful of companies, sparking concerns 
regarding undue control of global food production, privatization of agricultural 
research and, as a result, risks for food security (Tsioumani et al. 2016). The 
degree of concentration in the agrochemical sector is described in the literature 
as ‘dramatic’, leading to a ‘pervasive restructuring’ of the plant breeding sector 
(Aoki 2009). According to research by the ETC Group published in 2010, the 
top ten seed companies at the time accounted for 67% of the global proprietary 
seed market; the world’s largest seed company alone, Monsanto, accounted for 
23% of that market; the top three companies (Monsanto, DuPont and Syngenta) 
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accounted for 47% (ETC Group 2010). In addition, a handful of big firms own 
most key enabling technologies. Ownership of patents on enabling technologies 
enhances their market power, ties smaller companies to them and also acts as a 
barrier to market entry (Hope 2004). More recent developments show progressive 
growth of corporate consolidation, particularly following the 2015–2016 wave of 
mergers and acquisitions: the two US corporations DuPont and Dow Chemical 
merged; ChemChina bought the Swiss company Syngenta; the German chem-
ical giant Bayer took over the US company Monsanto. This means that three 
conglomerates would control more than 60% of the market for commercial seed 
and agricultural chemicals, supply almost all genetically modified (GM) vari-
eties and own the majority of patent applications for plants (Bonny 2017; 
Moldenhauer and Hirtz 2017). In fact, literature suggests that the two phe-
nomena of patent expansion and market concentration may be more tightly 
linked than one thinks. Janet Hope, for instance, argues that the ‘merger- mania’ 
has been driven primarily by the need to avoid high transaction costs associated 
with clearing multiple IPRs (Hope 2004). As explored in the fourth chapter, 
researching and negotiating the IPRs that potentially surround the material and 
methods of their work in order to obtain ‘freedom to operate’ is a substantial 
transaction cost for breeders, often prohibitive for public- sector ones.
Finally, in recent years, developed countries, particularly the EU and the 
USA, have exerted bilateral pressure to developing countries to ratify 
UPOV 91, adopt UPOV- complying legislation, or even introduce patent 
protection for plants, animals and biotechnological innovations that exceeds 
the TRIPS standards (Helfer 2004). To provide some examples, according to 
their free- trade agreements (FTAs) with the EU, Morocco and Lebanon must 
join UPOV 91. The USA–Morocco FTA contains an obligation to make 
patents available for plants and animals, while the FTAs of the USA with 
Chile, Peru and Colombia include ‘best endeavour clauses’ to make available 
patents for plants (Heath and Kamperman Sanders 2007; GRAIN 2014; Correa 
2009; Brennan and Kilic 2015).
These developments illustrate the dramatic change of the legal, political and 
economic landscape that has taken place since adoption of the CBD. The 
following section will explore the status and applications of the concept of fair 
and equitable benefit- sharing in the environmental and IPR- related instruments 
governing agricultural research and development.
Status and applications of fair and equitable benefit- 
 sharing in agricultural research and development
The current picture of the international governance of agricultural research and 
development is largely defined by the CBD, the ITPGRFA and IPR- related 
instruments. While fair and equitable benefit- sharing is an objective of environ-
mental treaties and the focus of sophisticated regulation efforts, the concept is 
not enshrined in the IPR instruments. This section will thus examine and assess 
critically the structure, implementation and review process of the ITPGRFA 
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Multilateral System (MLS) of access and benefit- sharing, which was negotiated 
to respond to the adoption of the CBD and developed to address the specificities 
of agricultural biodiversity. It will also explore the lack of benefit- sharing 
applications in IPR instruments, the status of relevant ongoing negotiations in 
the WTO and WIPO and related human rights concerns, together with political 
and ethical considerations.
The ITPGRFA Multilateral System of access and 
benefit- sharing
As noted above, the CBD negotiations had an immediate influence on the FAO 
realm. With the adoption of the CBD, the Nairobi Final Act5 recommended 
adjusting the International Undertaking in line with the CBD, providing the 
basis for the negotiations of the ITPGRFA.
Rationale and structure
Why a treaty specifically on PGRFA? The rationale is to some degree described 
in the preamble to the Treaty. The MLS aimed to respond to the specificities of 
agricultural biodiversity and the ‘public good’ nature of PGRFA and basic 
scientific research in general (Cooper et al. 1994; Halewood et al. 2013b), for 
which the CBD bilateral system of exchanges was considered unsuitable 
(Chiarolla et al. 2013). Continued PGRFA exchange is indispensable for the 
continuation of agricultural research for sustainable agriculture and food 
security, as well as for the adaptation of key crops to the new conditions brought 
about by climate change, and plant pests and diseases. Moreover, when it comes 
to crop genetic resources, all countries are interdependent and identification of 
the country of origin is often difficult, given the millennia of agricultural history. 
In addition, genebanks all over the world now have collections of all major 
crops, making the search for genetic resources in situ less necessary. Finally, 
another crucial characteristic of PGRFA is that conservation and use are linked: 
conservation is performed through use, and unless an agricultural variety is 
used, it cannot be conserved for more than a few decades before it is eventually 
lost (ITPGRFA Secretariat 2012).
The objectives of the ITPGRFA are the conservation and sustainable use of 
PGRFA and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use, 
in harmony with the CBD, for sustainable agriculture and food security 
(ITPGRFA Art. 1). The core of the Treaty is the MLS, which facilitates access 
to, and exchange of, a list of 64 crops and forages considered vital for food 
security and agricultural research, listed in Annex I of the Treaty. Importantly, 
exchanges of such crops and forages should serve solely the purpose of 
utilization and conservation for research, breeding and training for food and 
agriculture and not other uses such as chemical or pharmaceutical ones. Such 
uses would fall under the scope of the 2010 Nagoya Protocol on ABS, adopted 
under the CBD. The MLS also institutionalizes the sharing of the benefits 
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arising from the utilization of these resources; the Treaty regulates both 
monetary and non- monetary benefit- sharing (Arts 10–13). Monetary benefit- 
 sharing refers to the return to the Treaty system of a portion of the gains of 
commercialization of products developed on the basis of material accessed 
through the MLS, under conditions detailed below. Non- monetary benefit- 
 sharing, according to the Treaty provisions, involves exchange of information, 
access to and transfer of technology, capacity- building, as well as facilitated 
access to Annex I resources, which is recognized as a benefit in itself 
(Tsioumani 2004, 2018).
The MLS thus operates as a virtual common pool of PGRFA held by 
various national and international institutions. The users of such PGRFA 
exchange resources and assume benefit- sharing obligations. A review of aca-
demic and grey literature shows that it is among the most sophisticated ABS 
systems in international law (Halewood et al. 2013b; Kamau and Winter 2013; 
Guneratne 2012; Biber- Klemm and Cottier 2006; Chiarolla 2012; Correa 
1999; Helfer 2004; Raustiala and Victor 2004; Oberthür et al. 2011; 
Oguamanam 2006; Cabrera Medaglia et al. 2013; Chiarolla et al. 2013; 
Morgera et al. 2014) and, together with the system established under the 
World Health Organization (WHO) Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) 
Framework (briefly addressed in comparison below), among the few opera-
tional ones. It includes collections of Annex I crops that are under the 
management and control of parties and in the public domain, those held by 
the CGIAR centres and other international institutions that have signed agreements 
with the Treaty’s Governing Body, as well as those included voluntarily by 
other holders, such as private companies or indigenous peoples and local com-
munities. Such voluntary contributions have been modest, with examples 
including certain Swiss and French associations, and association ANDES on 
behalf of the Potato Park in Peru (explored in the fourth chapter), which con-
tributed the Park’s collection of 1300 potato varieties, but no private company 
(López Noriega et al. 2013).
Exchanges of MLS material take place in accordance with the terms of the 
Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA), which is a standardized 
private- law contract between a provider and recipient (user) of material, negoti-
ated and adopted by the Treaty’s Governing Body.6 While providers are usually 
public or international genebanks, users can be organizations, private entities or 
individuals. In practice, as noted below, mostly public- sector breeders use the 
MLS (López Noriega et al. 2013; ITPGRFA Secretariat 2015). The SMTA 
provides for mandatory payments by users to the Treaty’s Benefit- sharing Fund 
according to two monetary benefit- sharing options:
(1) a default scheme, according to which a recipient that commercializes a plant 
product incorporating material from the MLS that is not available to others 
for further research and breeding (i.e. it is patented) will pay 1.1% of gross 
sales to the Treaty’s Benefit- sharing Fund, less 30% (to cover expenses), 
i.e. 0.77% (SMTA Art. 6(7) and Annex 2; Moore and Goldberg 2010); and
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(2) an alternative, whereby recipients pay 0.5% of gross sales on all products of 
the species they accessed from the MLS, regardless of whether the products 
incorporate the material accessed and regardless of whether or not the new 
products are available without restriction (SMTA Art. 6(11)).
Furthermore, voluntary payments are encouraged when a recipient 
commercializes a plant product that incorporates material from the MLS if that 
product is available without restriction to others for further research and 
breeding (SMTA Art. 6(8)).
The distribution of user- based payments accumulated through the SMTA and 
other funding such as country donations is operated through the Benefit- sharing 
Fund, established as part of the Treaty’s Funding Strategy (FAO 2006). Under 
the direction of the Governing Body and through a project- based approach 
(FAO 2007), the Benefit- sharing Fund allocates the accumulated funds to par-
ticular activities designed to support farmers and breeders in adapting crops to 
changing needs and demands in the face of climate change, giving priority to 
farmers in developing countries who still conserve and manage sustainably crop 
diversity in their fields. Priority areas include: information exchange, technology 
transfer and capacity- building; management and conservation of plant genetic 
resources on- farm; and the sustainable use of plant genetic resources. For 
instance, the third project cycle, launched in 2014, consisted of 22 projects 
implemented in 45 developing countries from all regions, under the overall aim 
to build resilience in the face of climate change and food insecurity through the 
sustainable use, conservation, development and study of genetic diversity to the 
benefit of the most vulnerable communities.
As noted above, non- monetary benefit- sharing is accomplished through facil-
itated access, information sharing, technology transfer and capacity- building. 
Facilitated access enables agricultural research for global food security. 
Information exchange may encompass catalogues and inventories, related 
technologies and research results. It may concern both documentation of the 
resource as well as information about its potential uses. The information thus 
adds value to the resource exchanged through the MLS. Technology transfer 
may be achieved through participation in crop- based or thematic networks and 
partnerships, commercial joint ventures and availability of research facilities. 
Mechanisms for capacity- building include scientific education and training in 
the conservation and use of PGRFA, development of relevant facilities and joint 
scientific research.
Two preliminary observations can be made at this stage with regard to illu-
minating the concept of fair and equitable benefit- sharing. First, a lack of 
conceptual clarity is observed with regard to terminology. Monetary benefit- 
 sharing refers both to the accumulation of monetary benefits through the SMTA 
(user- based benefit- sharing) and to the distribution of monetary benefits through 
the Benefit- sharing Fund. This lack of clarity may lead to confusion when it 
comes to policy development and implementation. Second, the line between 
monetary and non- monetary benefit- sharing is blurred for multiple reasons, 
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highlighting the close interlinkages among relevant mechanisms. For instance, 
while the funds distributed through the Benefit- sharing Fund are the outcome of 
the monetary benefit- sharing mechanism of the Treaty, the funded projects 
produce both improved genetic resources – which are to return to the system 
enriching the MLS – and non- monetary benefits, such as information, training 
or partnerships between farmers and breeders. In fact, as noted above, informa-
tion exchange, technology transfer and capacity- building, namely three of the 
mechanisms of the Treaty for non- monetary benefit- sharing, are priorities for 
the Benefit- sharing Fund. The brief history of the Benefit- sharing Fund 
(launched in 2008) shows that non- monetary benefits are also being generated 
and shared despite the fact that parties’ obligations to share non- monetary bene-
fits are linked to other mechanisms and not to the Benefit- sharing Fund directly 
(Galluzzi et al. 2014). The Global Information System, for instance, is the 
mechanism specifically built for information exchange (ITPGRFA Arts 13(2)(a) 
and 17; Ker et al. 2013). The Global Information System aims to integrate and 
augment existing systems to create the global entry point to information and 
knowledge for strengthening the capacity for PGRFA conservation, 
management and utilization. It is still at an infant implementation stage, as the 
Governing Body adopted its vision and the first programme of work in 2015.
Although it is difficult to assess the exact economic value of non- monetary 
benefit- sharing activities, it can be argued that they serve as a precondition to 
monetary benefit- sharing. Non- monetary benefit- sharing mechanisms can be 
used to build the capacities required for facilitated access to, and use of, 
PGRFA, which could potentially result in the development of new varieties and 
product commercialization (Louafi 2013). Non- monetary benefit- sharing, in the 
form of information exchange, technology transfer and capacity- building, is thus 
instrumental in addressing the unequal capacities of countries and communities 
to benefit from the ITPGRFA and genetic resource use in general, and thus 
bridging the capacity, fairness and equity gap in agriculture and agrobiodiversity 
conservation.
A set of challenges have, however, arisen with regard to the ability of the 
MLS to generate and share monetary benefits (Frison et al. 2011). As a result, 
very limited user- based payments have been realized since the Treaty’s entry 
into force, and the Benefit- sharing Fund has been operating solely on the basis 
of donor country voluntary contributions (ITPGRFA Secretariat 2013; 
Tsioumani et al. 2017). In fact, the first user- based payment realized since the 
Treaty’s entry into force took place in June 2018, and concerned the 
commercialization of vegetable varieties not included in the MLS; the payment 
was made on the basis of national legislation, which made the use of the SMTA 
mandatory for all PGRFA (ITPGRFA Secretariat 2018). Therefore, while it was 
certainly a reason for celebration, it can safely be considered an exception to the 
rule. A series of studies undertaken in the ITPGRFA framework has explored 
obstacles to the realization of monetary benefits and confirmed that projections 
of benefit flows will be ‘moderate at best’, and will take even longer than 
expected (Moeller and Stannard 2013). Consequently, a working group was 
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specifically mandated in 2013 to ‘enhance the functioning of the Multilateral 
System’.
The sub- sections below address legal and policy challenges related to the 
accumulation and distribution of monetary benefits, as well as the intergovern-
mental negotiations on the revision of the MLS.
Accumulation of benefits
The lengthy time period required for research, development and commercia-
lization partly explains the failure to generate and share commercial benefits 
from the SMTA (ITPGRFA Secretariat 2013). There is more than that though. 
The first challenge regarding accumulation of benefits concerns the relationship 
between benefit- sharing and IPRs. As noted above, mandatory monetary 
benefit- sharing is linked to patenting; it serves as compensation when there is a 
restriction in use associated with the patenting of a PGRFA product incorpor-
ating MLS material, i.e. when the outcome of the research and development 
process does not return to the MLS to be made available for further research 
and breeding. It has been argued that this causal relationship between patenting 
and mandatory monetary benefit- sharing indicates that Treaty drafters designed 
monetary benefit- sharing as a disincentive to patenting,7 prioritizing continued 
unrestricted exchanges of PGRFA for research and breeding. While such 
restrictions are indeed incompatible with the open exchange systems needed for 
food security and agricultural biodiversity conservation (Louafi and Welch 
2014), this illustrates a fundamental contradiction inherent in the Treaty 
system – monetary benefit- sharing was designed as a central tool for revenue 
generation to fund the ITPGRFA goals (which include fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing); at the same time, monetary benefit- sharing is tied to 
restrictions in use, which threaten the very essence of the system and its goal of 
food security, by impoverishing its material base (Helfer 2003; Tsioumani 
2018; Frison 2018).
Three additional factors greatly impact effectiveness of the system (Frison 
2018). First, coverage of the MLS is not comprehensive (e.g. soybean, 
sugarcane, tomato and coffee are not included). Notably, some of these crops 
attracted significant research effort resulting in patented material, and their 
inclusion could result in mandatory benefit- sharing payments. Second, as noted 
above, the MLS only covers public and CGIAR (and other international) 
collections of Annex I PGRFA. This means that most material in the MLS can 
also be found elsewhere, for instance, in collections of private companies or 
non- parties to the Treaty, and can be made available without adherence to the 
benefit- sharing terms of the SMTA. Third, many parties to date failed to notify 
the Secretariat of their PGRFA included in the MLS, thus making this material 
inaccessible to users due to lack of awareness. That said, ratification by the USA 
in March 2017 is expected to close one of the major loopholes and allow for 
more comprehensive coverage, once the country’s vast crop collections are noti-
fied to be included in the MLS.
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On the user side, in practice most of the organizations that choose to take 
material from the MLS and incorporate it in new products do not restrict access 
to the improved material for further research and breeding purposes and are thus 
not obliged to share monetary benefits. Commercial users who would be more 
likely to trigger mandatory monetary benefit- sharing requirements have 
consistently chosen to access material from other sources, not the MLS (CGIAR 
Consortium 2015a).
Distribution of benefits
As noted above, distribution of monetary benefits is operated through the 
Benefit- sharing Fund via a project- based approach. According to the Treaty text 
(Art. 13(3)), benefits should flow primarily, directly and indirectly, to farmers.
Looking at the 22 projects funded under the third cycle, most of them are run 
by international and national agricultural research centres, two are run by NGOs 
and one is run by an association of indigenous organizations.8 Channelling 
benefits directly to farmers is not easy, given the limited capacities of most 
farmer communities and organizations to reach international funding through 
the complex Benefit- sharing Fund application and project execution procedures. 
While this project- based approach arguably combines elements of inter- state 
benefit- sharing regulation with implementation at the local level, its results 
illustrate the challenges that an international organization faces to reach directly 
communities on the ground, and vice versa. In addition, national partners, in 
particular agricultural research centres, are expected to serve as intermediaries 
and transmit to farmers the outcomes of the research funded, including, for 
instance, seeds of improved varieties, information and training or collaboration 
in participatory breeding programmes.
An additional challenge lies in the diversity of the ITPGRFA system users. 
The Treaty is to serve a wide set of users across the entire spectrum of 
agricultural production, with different or contradictory needs: public research 
institutes, smallholder farmers, companies big and small, in developing and 
developed countries, actors engaged in commercial or non- commercial research, 
in formal and informal seed systems. The current realities of agricultural 
research and development characterized by high market concentration as noted 
above put at risk not only farmers’ innovation on- farm but also public 
agricultural research. As a result, agricultural research centres in developing 
countries also compete for funding under the Treaty. The Treaty struggles to 
find and maintain a balance between modern scientific methods of identifying 
and developing new varieties on the basis of material in ex situ collections and 
farmers’ traditional agro- ecological approaches. It remains a matter for con-
sideration though whether the current approach serves well the objectives of 
sustainable agriculture and global food security (Swiss Government 2015; 
Frison 2018). Sélim Louafi in particular has questioned whether a competitive 
project- based approach is appropriate to meet challenges related to 
distributional equity, the public value of PGRFA and the required cooperation 
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among different states and actors to address food security concerns (Louafi 
2013). A series of measures have been taken to address some of these concerns, 
including the organization of regional workshops to build capacities to access 
funding, and the prioritization of cooperative, multi- country projects.
Negotiations for the revision of the Multilateral System
As noted above, the realization that the MLS has not been producing monetary 
benefits led to the establishment of a working group with the mandate to 
‘enhance the functioning of the MLS’, by developing measures to increase 
user- based payments and contributions to the Treaty’s Benefit- sharing Fund 
(Tsioumani 2014). However, following six years of deliberations, including an 
immense amount of work on complex legal and policy issues, time and finan-
cial resources spent on the effort and agreement reached on several important 
matters, negotiations collapsed at the Governing Body session in November 
2019, marking a missed opportunity, for the Treaty and for multilateralism in 
general (Tsioumani et al. 2019b). The section below outlines some of the high-
lights of the process.
Aseffa Seyoum and Eric Welch had suggested that a combination of upfront 
payments for access with no or low restrictions in use may be better suited to 
generate benefits, ensure continued exchanges and increase legal certainty 
(Seyoum and Welch 2013). Indeed, early in the process the Working Group 
started developing a subscription system for access to material in the MLS, to be 
included in a revised SMTA. This means that subscribed users would need to 
pay before access (Tsioumani 2015). Expanding the list of crops included in the 
MLS to add those crops that attract significant research and development efforts 
and potentially result in commercially successful varieties, such as soybean and 
tomato, was also proposed as an additional part of the solution to enhance the 
MLS and the flow of benefits.
The successful multilateral ABS system established under the WHO PIP 
Framework has also been proposed as a model with regard to attracting 
payments (Third World Network 2015), although one should take into account 
the crucial difference between the highly regulated transfers of pathogenic 
material made available under strict conditions from very specific providers, 
and the transfers of PGRFA, which can generally be made available easily 
from several providers and do not constitute a biosecurity risk. The WHO PIP 
Framework is an ABS instrument that aims to put the sharing of influenza 
viruses of human pandemic potential on a par with access to benefits such as 
vaccines. Under the PIP Framework, member states share pathogenic material 
through the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS). 
Transfers of material between GISRS collaborating institutions are conducted 
through a standard material transfer agreement which does not involve benefit- 
 sharing obligations, nor can recipients apply for IPRs over acquired material. A 
second type of standard material transfer agreement (SMTA2) regulates trans-
fers of pathogenic material to recipients outside the system, in particular the 
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private sector and research institutions. SMTA2 does not exclude IPRs, but 
involves a range of options regarding benefit- sharing activities, to be agreed 
upon on a case- by- case basis. Benefits are not shared on a bilateral basis 
between provider and recipient, but multilaterally through WHO with particular 
regard to the needs of developing countries. As the standard material transfer 
agreements are binding contracts, the agreed benefit- sharing arrangements are 
also binding upon the relevant parties. An additional innovative form of 
benefit- sharing established under the PIP Framework is the ‘partnership contri-
bution’, which consists of financial contributions from vaccine, diagnostic and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers who use GISRS, and is equivalent to 50% of its 
running costs, aiming to fund influenza pandemic preparedness and response 
(Switzer et al. 2019).
The revision of the SMTA and the expansion of the list of crops in the MLS 
were seen as a package deal during the ITPGRFA negotiations. On the one 
hand, developing countries wishing to see benefits flowing into the system 
prioritized revision of the SMTA to enable the flow of monetary benefits from 
commercial users. On the other hand, developed countries with big seed com-
panies and advanced research capacities have an interest in expanding the list of 
crops in the MLS for continued agronomical research under predictable con-
ditions. The Working Group achieved a breakthrough in June 2019 and was 
successful in forging the main parts of a compromise; it reached tentative 
agreement on amending the list of crops in the MLS to cover all PGRFA under 
the management and control of parties and in the public domain that are found in 
ex situ conditions, allowing parties the right to make reasoned declarations 
exempting a limited number of native species. At the same time the Working 
Group made significant progress in detailing the subscription system for access 
to MLS crops, while also providing for ‘single access’ to the MLS with no 
subscription as an exception. Two main issues remained outstanding: the 
payment rates for monetary benefit- sharing, and the issue of genetic sequence 
data, which refers to information generated from genetic resources (Tsioumani 
et al. 2019a).
In June, agreement seemed to be within reach for the first time on benefit- 
 sharing payment rates. Since the subscription system would be the main 
approach and single access the exception, the Working Group agreed in general 
to set a lower rate for the primary model and a much higher rate for exceptional 
single access, aiming to attract more users and hopefully more funds. Uncer-
tainty remained, however, with regard to the exact payment rate that would 
result in tangible benefits while attracting users into the system, as user- based 
income would still depend on the number of companies that would eventually 
subscribe.
At the Governing Body meeting in November 2019, however, negotiations 
collapsed amidst not only substantive disagreements but also procedural 
confusion. While disagreement remained over payment rates for benefit- sharing, 
it was the issue of benefit- sharing arising from the use of genetic sequence data 
that was identified as a deal- breaker (Tsioumani et al. 2019b).
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The issue of genetic sequence data, or digital sequence information as it is 
referred to in the CBD context, has been making waves in all ABS- related fora, 
as its use in research and development could result in bypassing both the need 
for physical access to genetic resources, and requirements for benefit- sharing, 
potentially making ABS frameworks obsolete unless specifically addressed. 
The term refers to information and knowledge extracted from biological 
material thanks to advances in bioinformatics, an interdisciplinary field of 
knowledge. Developing and using a variety of methods and software tools, 
bioinformatics lead to the ‘dematerialization’ or digitalization of genetic 
resources. This suggests that the information content of genetic material may be 
extracted, processed and exchanged in its own right, detached from the physical 
genetic resource. The availability and easy exchange of large amounts of 
genetic sequence data have the potential to facilitate research on genetic 
resources, especially for actors in developed countries who have the capacities 
to analyse and use such data. At the same time, the issue challenges traditional 
ABS frameworks, including the Treaty, by posing two main regulatory issues: 
the possibility of appropriation of genetic sequence data through IPRs, and the 
question of commercial value arising from the use of such data, and related 
benefit- sharing obligations (Tsioumani et al. 2019b). The challenge is to find a 
way to integrate genetic sequence data in the MLS to honour benefit- sharing 
obligations, while at the same time maintaining the unrestricted flow of 
information, and building capacity to use such information to serve sustainable 
development needs, particularly in developing countries. States are divided 
largely across traditional North/South lines. Developing countries wish to 
ensure that benefit- sharing obligations extend to use of genetic sequence data, 
to make sure that the Treaty’s benefit- sharing obligation is not bypassed and to 
maintain relevance of the framework in light of technological developments. 
Developed countries, on the other hand, point to legal issues and limitations 
regarding the Treaty’s scope, arguing that the Treaty was developed to regulate 
exchanges of physical genetic resources.
In November 2019, ITPGRFA negotiators missed an opportunity to enhance 
the system of the Treaty and propose international regulations on use of genetic 
sequence data in response to the specific needs of the agricultural community. 
Arguably, the failure to conclude the revision process marked a missed oppor-
tunity for multilateralism in general, at times of rising nationalism and fading 
political will to address global problems through international cooperation 
(Tsioumani 2019). Benefit- sharing from the use of genetic sequence data (or 
digital sequence information) will continue to be a central topic in ABS- related 
fora, including the negotiations for a post- 2020 global biodiversity framework 
under the auspices of the CBD, which will culminate at the 2020 UN 
Biodiversity Conference, to be held in Kunming, China.
Following failure to revise the system, exchanges of PGRFA in the MLS will 
continue on the basis of the current Treaty regime. These exchanges are 
conducted within the broader regime complex of relevance to agricultural 
research and development. As examined above, IPR instruments form a central 
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part of this regime complex. The following section will explore the current lack 
of support for benefit- sharing in IPR- related instruments, and related human 
rights, development and ethical concerns.
IPR- related instruments and benefit- sharing
Unlike environmental treaties such as the CBD and the ITPGRFA, there is no 
explicit requirement related to fair and equitable benefit- sharing in IPR instru-
ments, the argument being that IP protection benefits society as a whole by 
promoting innovation. This section will address: the role of exceptions under 
the UPOV Convention and their potential interpretation as a benefit- sharing 
mechanism; ongoing negotiations of relevance under the WTO and WIPO; and 
related human rights, development and ethical concerns. It will also explore 
challenges for national implementation in the context of conflicting international 
law obligations, illustrated by relevant examples.
Exceptions to plant breeders’ rights and benefit- sharing
As noted above, the model of PBRs under UPOV 78 permitted the use of pro-
tected varieties as the source material of further breeding (breeders’ exception) 
and the re- use of saved seeds by farmers (farmers’ privilege) (Correa 1999). 
Both are important mechanisms to protect farmers’ livelihoods, allow traditional 
seed- saving and exchange practices and, in general, guarantee the continued 
exchange of material for public research and global food security purposes 
(Tsioumani et al. 2016). These exceptions, however, were restricted in 
UPOV 91. The plant breeders’ exemption was preserved, and acts done 
‘privately and for non- commercial purposes’ or ‘for experimental purposes’ 
were also exempted (UPOV 91 Art. 15(1)). This latter exception of private acts 
could apply to subsistence farmers. However, the scope of protection was 
extended beyond the propagating material of protected varieties to include 
‘essentially derived varieties’ (Art. 14(5)). The farmers’ privilege for replanting 
was made optional, allowed at the discretion of UPOV member states ‘within 
reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of 
the breeder’ and only to ‘permit farmers to use for propagating purposes, on 
their own holdings, the product of the harvest which they have obtained by 
planting, on their own holdings, the protected variety’ (Art. 15(2)). Seed 
exchanges and informal sales, which are common practice in most developing 
countries (as explored in the second chapter) are thus not covered. This restricts 
exchanges among farmers (Helfer 2004; Chiarolla 2012) which facilitate crop 
and variety rotation (Silva Repetto and Cavalcanti 2000), to the detriment of 
both farmers’ livelihoods and farmer- based innovation.
Despite these limitations, the UPOV Council has consistently highlighted the 
importance of access to genetic resources to ensure progress in plant breeding 
and thereby to maximize the use of genetic resources for the benefit of society, 
and has expressed its concern that additional benefit- sharing measures could 
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introduce barriers to progress in breeding (UPOV 2003; Cabrera Medaglia 2010; 
Dutfield 2011). In its contribution to the CBD negotiations on access and 
benefit- sharing, UPOV considered the breeder’s exception, an ‘inherent benefit- 
 sharing principle’ (UPOV 2003). The same goes for the exception to breeders’ 
rights regarding acts done privately and for non- commercial purposes and the 
optional farmer’s privilege.
From a fairness and equity perspective, UPOV 91 aggravates the asymmetry 
in protection between modern and traditional varieties, and limits the discretion 
of member states that wish to safeguard agricultural systems that rely upon 
traditional practices and smallholder farmers. In addition, the presumption that 
technological developments benefit society at large fails to acknowledge the 
well- documented fact that technologies ‘such as high- yielding crop varieties, 
agrochemicals and mechanization have primarily benefitted the better resourced 
groups in society and transnational corporations, rather than the most vulnerable 
ones’ (IAASTD 2009: 23) and ignores the question of distributing the benefits to 
the most vulnerable groups of society, including smallholder farmers. As 
extensively highlighted in literature, the UPOV model was designed with the 
commercialized farming systems of the developed world in mind (Commission 
on Intellectual Property Rights 2002) and is not appropriate for developing 
countries wishing to maintain small- scale farming largely depending on 
informal seed systems (Oguamanam 2015). Pressure to comply with UPOV 91 
standards therefore creates a host of human rights, political and ethical issues, 
addressed further below.
Benefit- sharing in patent laws: exceptions and WTO negotiations
My examination of possible indications of benefit- sharing in the patent land-
scape is twofold. I first address any permitted exceptions to patent holders’ 
rights, along the lines of exceptions to PBRs above, and I then consider a pos-
sible amendment of the TRIPS Agreement to be in line with CBD principles, 
including fair and equitable benefit- sharing.
Exceptions to patent holders’ rights are even more limited than under 
UPOV 91. They can be introduced under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement,9 
but practice varies among WTO member states and the WTO dispute settlement 
bodies have interpreted the provision narrowly (Yamane 2011). Viola Prifti has 
recently analysed the breeder’s exception under TRIPS Article 30, noting that 
the vagueness of the provision does not allow concluding which type of research 
exception can be deemed permissible. Compliance of national patent legislation 
with Article 30 is to be decided case- by- case by a WTO panel (Prifti 2015).
Only one WTO panel has addressed the issue of interpretation of Article 30 
so far, while examining an EC–Canada case focusing on Canada’s generic 
pharmaceutical sector.10 The case involved a complaint brought by the EC 
against Canada alleging that provisions of Canadian patent law that allowed the 
stockpiling of products prior to the expiration of a patent term, and that 
authorized the use of patented inventions for the purposes of preparing and 
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pursuing regulatory submissions prior to the expiration of a patent term, 
violated TRIPS obligations. The EC claimed that the relevant provisions of 
Canada’s Patent Act allowed generic producers to obtain approval for, and 
stockpile, patented medicines contrary to TRIPS rules. Canada invoked Article 
30, asserting that it was providing limited exceptions to the rights of patent 
holders.
The Panel analysed the meaning of the three elements of Article 30: the 
meaning of limited exception, not unreasonably interfering with the normal 
exploitation of the patent, and not unreasonably prejudicing the interests of the 
patent holder, taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties. It 
determined that Canada’s stockpiling exception was not sufficiently ‘limited’ 
because it potentially allowed an unlimited quantity of products to be made 
during the patent term. It therefore did not qualify as a limited exception under 
Article 30. Canada’s regulatory review exception, which allows third parties to 
use patented inventions during the term of the patent to develop submissions for 
approval, was deemed limited because it addressed only a small part of the 
patent right, and was reasonably closely circumscribed. It was eventually found 
overall lawful also under the other two elements of Article 30 regarding 
unreasonable interference with patent exploitation and prejudice to the patent 
holder.
Prifti concludes that the Panel’s interpretative outcome is limited and does 
not help with defining a priori which type of research exception is permissible 
under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. She notes critiques that the Panel 
fails to take into account the particularities of domestic innovation systems and 
it might discourage countries from adopting flexible solutions based on their 
socio- economic needs (Prifti 2015).
The issue of the breeder’s exception to patent rights may be revisited once the 
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court11 enters into force. This Agreement, which 
is open to EU member states, makes the breeder’s exception mandatory for its 
parties. It includes a provision which limits the effects of patent rights for ‘the 
use of biological material for the purpose of breeding, or discovering and 
developing other plant varieties’ (Art. 27(c) of the Agreement on a Unified 
Patent Court).
In addition to the legal uncertainty with regard to the use of exceptions, the 
TRIPS Agreement does not require disclosure of prior informed consent of the 
country of origin and of benefit- sharing in patent applications involving use of 
PGRFA. Therefore, foreign companies may obtain private rights derived from a 
country’s genetic resources without having to adhere to the CBD principles 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002). Although it can be argued 
that such access to resources may not be legitimate, enforceability of CBD prin-
ciples is weak unless mandated and monitored by national legislation. In addition, 
the validity of the patent would be assessed on the basis of the legislation of the 
country that granted it, not the country that provided the genetic resource used.
Unless the TRIPS Agreement is amended to ensure respect for the CBD prin-
ciples, the implementation and enforceability of such principles would remain 
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elusive (Chouchena- Rojas et al. 2005). Importantly, such an amendment would 
allow access to the WTO dispute settlement system for breaches of the CBD 
requirements, as, unlike the CBD, TRIPS rules are enforced through mandatory 
adjudication and retaliatory sanctions. On the basis of the review clause 
enshrined in Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, as well as the 2001 Doha 
Declaration, which broadened the discussion to also address the relationship 
between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, several developing countries, led 
by India and Brazil, have thus called for an amendment to TRIPS by introducing 
requirements to disclose the origin of genetic material and evidence of prior 
informed consent and benefit- sharing in patent applications. The original 
proposal was supported by 110 WTO member states by 2008, when a strategic 
alliance was made with the EU and Switzerland calling for a procedural decision 
to negotiate in parallel the biodiversity amendment and geographical indications. 
No progress has been achieved since, despite efforts by developing countries to 
revive negotiations.
In the context of the WTO deliberations, Switzerland has proposed an 
amendment to the regulations of WIPO’s Patent Cooperation Treaty so that 
domestic laws may ask inventors to disclose the source of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge when they apply for patents. This proposal identifies 
WIPO as the competent forum to address disclosure of origin and evidence of 
prior informed consent and benefit- sharing in patent applications, although 
ongoing negotiations address such issues under WIPO’s Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Know-
ledge and Folklore (IGC), addressed below very briefly.
WIPO negotiations
As the impasse on these negotiations at the WTO continues, many countries 
have been calling for disclosure requirements and mechanisms, including on 
benefit- sharing, to be addressed under the IGC. Since 2000, the IGC has had a 
mandate to negotiate text- based instrument(s) for the effective protection of 
genetic resources, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions. 
Negotiations have been ongoing on a parallel basis on three instruments, one for 
each of the subject matter areas, with the text on genetic resources considered 
the most advanced. Despite numerous sessions over the last 20 years, however, 
agreement remains elusive. Some links with environmental treaties have been 
made during the negotiations though, and admittedly reaching agreement could 
change the course in the IPR realm. As an example, according to the latest draft 
on genetic resources,12 the ITPGRFA MLS could be disclosed as the source of 
PGRFA used in patent applications.13
Human rights, development and ethical concerns
Both PBRs and patents used in agricultural research and development are widely 
criticized as designed to suit the needs of developed countries, ignoring different 
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contexts in the developing world. They have been associated with reducing the 
developmental choices of developing countries, intensifying control by 
agrochemical companies, raising the cost of agricultural inputs and risking the 
food security of vulnerable groups, including smallholder farmers (Correa 1995; 
Dutfield 2000; Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002; Drahos and 
Braithwaite 2002; Drahos 1996).
Ample literature highlights that implementation of UPOV 91 and the TRIPS 
Agreement may result in contraventions to human rights (UNDP 2000; Correa 
and Yusuf 1998). The Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights of the former UN Commission on Human Rights declared that 
there are apparent conflicts between the IPR regime and international human 
rights law, in relation to the transfer of technology to developing countries, the 
consequences of plant variety rights and the patenting of genetically modified 
organisms for the enjoyment of the right to food, biopiracy and the reduction of 
communities’ control over their genetic and natural resources and cultural 
values14 (Weissbrodt and Schoff 2003).
Additionally, former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Olivier De 
Schutter criticized UPOV 91 for restricting farmers’ privilege, highlighting 
concerns arising from the strengthening of PBRs regarding the right to food. He 
further pointed to obstacles in public research caused by the intensification of 
IPRs, and to the need for a broad interpretation of the limitations that can be 
imposed to the patent rights holder (De Schutter 2009). Challenging the idea that 
IP protection benefits society as a whole, De Schutter further argued that the 
human rights framework requires investigating primarily who benefits from any 
technological advance, with the needs of the most vulnerable groups at the 
centre of attention (De Schutter 2009).
Accordingly, former UN Special Rapporteur on Cultural Rights Farida 
Shaheed also stressed tensions between IPRs and the right to benefit from 
scientific progress enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. She 
has noted that ‘the need to promote everyone’s access to science and its 
applications raises the issue of the sharing of benefits and the transfer of sci-
entific knowledge and technologies’ (Shaheed 2012: 18). Cross- referencing 
the provisions of several international instruments, including the ITPGRFA 
and other environmental agreements, she has identified, in addition to tensions 
with IPRs, an obligation for developed countries to ‘comply with their inter-
national legal obligations through … the development of international 
collaborative models of research and development for the benefit of 
developing countries and their populations’ (Shaheed 2012: 18). Developing 
countries, on the other hand, should prioritize the development and 
dissemination of simple and inexpensive technologies that can improve the 
life of marginalized populations. At the same time, states should protect indi-
viduals against any harmful effects of the misuse of scientific and technolo-
gical developments. All these recommendations are particularly relevant in 
the context of agricultural development and are useful in both elucidating the 
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right to benefit from scientific progress and contextualizing the concept of fair 
and equitable benefit- sharing.
Legal debates on social and moral concerns continue to rage in several 
jurisdictions around the globe. Gene patentability in particular remains an open 
question in IP- related bodies, legislatures and courts (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics 2002). Are DNA sequences invented or just discovered? In the USA, 
the Supreme Court held in Myriad15 that DNA segments and the information 
they encode are not patent- eligible when they have been simply isolated from 
surrounding genetic material. With Myriad, the US Supreme Court reversed 
years of prior jurisprudence and confirmed a shift in the broad scope of 
patentability of genetic sequences. In Europe, the position is different. The 
Biotechnology Directive mentioned above states that biological material that is 
isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical 
process may be the subject of an invention, even if it previously occurred in 
nature. However, as ruled by the European Court of Justice in Monsanto 
Technology v. Cefetra BV,16 in order to meet the requirements for patent 
eligibility, the ‘functionality’ of the genetic sequence must be disclosed in the 
patent application (i.e. a DNA sequence alone, without any indication of what it 
does, is not a patentable invention). Developing countries have also sought to set 
their own standards within the international legal framework. Brazil, for 
instance, excludes living beings or biological materials found in nature from 
patentability, even if isolated, and this includes the genome or germplasm of any 
living being (Correa 2014).
Challenges for national implementation
The choices that national governments need to make in this complex framework 
of contradictory rules and objectives is illustrated by the following question on 
the clash between IPRs and farmers’ rights: is a farmer allowed to save, 
exchange and re- use seed that incorporates an IPR- protected component? Can it 
be argued that in the context of the entire spectrum of their international legal 
obligations, IPR- , biodiversity- and human rights- related, national governments 
may opt for supporting farmers’ seed rights against the interests of IPR holders, 
through national legislation (Tsioumani et al. 2016)?
As explored in further detail in the second chapter, national positions vary. 
Jurisprudence in US and Canadian courts has affirmed the primacy of patent 
rights over the right of the physical owner of the seed to save and replant 
(Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser; Bowman v. Monsanto Co).17 India’s 2001 
Act on the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights, on the other hand, 
establishes rights for farmers to save, use, exchange and sell farm- saved seed, 
conferring also related rights to breeders and researchers (Farmers’ Rights 
Project 2009). A member of the WTO and the TRIPS Agreement, India con-
sidered its legislation to be in compliance with TRIPS provisions on plant 
variety protection, and applied for UPOV membership. The Act, however, was 
found not in compliance with the UPOV requirements and now, more than 
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ten years later, India’s UPOV application is still pending (Farmers’ Rights 
Project 2009; UPOV 2019).
While many developing countries, particularly in Africa, have resisted 
ratifying UPOV 91 or adopting it as the standard for their plant variety 
protection laws, as noted above, pressure continues as a result of bilateral and 
regional trade and investment agreements, and technical advice, including 
from UPOV and WIPO. The African Union’s African Model Legislation on 
the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders,18 
for instance, which attempted to strike a balance between the commercial 
interests of breeders, food security and cultural and social objectives, was 
heavily criticized by UPOV and WIPO, as inadequate protection of the 
commercial interests of breeders and a violation of the TRIPS Agreement 
(Isiko Štrba 2017).
Among an increasing amount of literature, both Susan Isiko Štrba and Chidi 
Oguamanam have offered to- the- point, policy- relevant academic analyses of 
pressure exerted to developing countries to adopt UPOV 91 or TRIPS- plus 
standards for plant variety protection. Isiko Štrba has documented the pressure 
to African countries through technical advice, including through African 
regional organizations on intellectual property (Isiko Štrba 2017). Oguamanam 
has explored Africa’s reversal of policy position on PBRs through concerted 
sites of pressure, especially free- trade and economic partnership agreements, 
resulting in policies with a narrow focus on breeders and marginal reference to 
farmers, advocating the continued relevance of the African Model Legislation, 
mentioned above (Oguamanam 2015).
Case study: benefit- sharing and patent protection – IRRI 
and the SPIKE gene
To illustrate the complexities of the relationship between patent protection and 
fair and equitable benefit- sharing – at least in its monetary dimension – I have 
explored a very specific case study: the patent applications submitted by the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) on breeding methods associated 
with a rice gene called SPIKE, isolated in an Indonesian farmers’ variety. Civil 
society brought it to the attention of the ITPGRFA Governing Body, which 
discussed it briefly without taking any specific decision. This case study serves 
to illuminate the requirements for monetary benefit- sharing under the Treaty, 
while at the same time it provides the opportunity to assess application of the 
policy of the CGIAR Consortium on IPRs, as well as discuss ethical concerns 
around gene patentability.19
The background
IRRI is a non- profit research organization that belongs to the CGIAR 
Consortium, which, as noted above, is the network at the forefront of inter-
national efforts to conserve agricultural biodiversity ex situ (in its genebanks) 
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and to support public agricultural research. On its webpage, IRRI presents itself 
as ‘the world’s premier research organization dedicated to reducing poverty and 
hunger through rice science; improving the health and welfare of rice farmers 
and consumers; and protecting the rice- growing environment for future 
generations’.
Like all CGIAR centres, IRRI is bound by two sets of rules: CGIAR’s 
internal regulations and principles, and the ITPGRFA provisions, detailed in the 
agreement signed with the Treaty’s Governing Body under ITPGRFA Article 15 
(IRRI 2006). These two sets of rules are briefly explored below.
In addition, IRRI is bound by the Consortium’s policies and guidelines on 
open access and open data and intellectual asset management. In principle, as 
stated in Article 1 of the CGIAR Principles on the Management of Intellectual 
Assets:
CGIAR regards the results of its research and development activities as 
international public goods and is committed to their widespread diffusion 
and use to achieve the maximum possible access, scale, scope of impact and 
sharing of benefits to advantage the poor, especially farmers in developing 
countries.20
CGIAR centres are therefore mandated to produce public goods of particular 
value to the developing (as well as the developed) world: conservation of 
agricultural germplasm (i.e. seeds or other propagating material), development 
of sustainable production techniques, improvement of germplasm through plant 
breeding and enhancement of research efforts in general (Halewood 2013). Yet 
the use of IP rights is not completely ruled out. The Principles also state that the 
‘CGIAR is committed to the prudent and strategic use of IP Rights’ (Article 6(4); 
emphasis added). In addition, in accordance to Article 6(4),
The Centers shall carefully consider whether to register/apply for (or allow 
third parties to register/apply for) patents and/or plant variety protection 
(‘IP Applications’) over the Centers’ respective Intellectual Assets. As a 
general principle, such IP Applications shall not be made unless they are 
necessary for the further improvement of such Intellectual Assets or to 
enhance the scale or scope of impact on target beneficiaries, in furtherance 
of the CGIAR Vision.
IP- related controversies are not unheard of in the CGIAR system. As noted in 
the section on the evolution of governance of PGRFA, IP controversies can be 
argued to be key determinants of the current legal status of the CGIAR 
collections.
Currently, the majority of the material positively identified as belonging to 
the Treaty’s MLS is hosted by the CGIAR centres. In line with their agreements 
with the Governing Body, the centres use the SMTA when distributing Annex I 
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materials, as well as materials not included in Annex I collected before the 
Treaty’s entry into force (FAO 2007).
On IP rights, the ITPGRFA states in its Article 12(3)(d) that:
Recipients shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit 
the facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, 
or their genetic parts or components, in the form received from the Multi-
lateral System.
This cryptic provision, which was notoriously difficult to negotiate (Helfer 
2003), is also reflected in Article 6(2) of the SMTA. Both these provisions, as 
well as the CGIAR principles on IP management, raise a range of questions for 
the IRRI SPIKE gene case.
What is the case about?
In 2013, IRRI and Japanese researchers identified a rice gene that, in preliminary 
testing, increased production by 13–36% in modern long- grain indica rice 
 varieties – the world’s most widely grown types of rice (Fujita et al. 2013). The 
gene, SPIKE, was isolated in an Indonesian farmers’ variety that is held in trust 
in the IRRI’s genebanks and is therefore part of the Treaty’s MLS.
The following year, IRRI and Japan’s international agricultural research 
agency (JIRCAS) filed an international patent application,21 as well as several 
national patents, on breeding methods associated with the yield- boosting rice 
gene SPIKE. The applications did not escape the attention of CGIAR 
governance bodies; IRRI is obliged to report patent and plant variety rights 
applications to the Fund Council Intellectual Property Group, which monitors 
the application of the CGIAR Principles on the Management of Intellectual 
Assets.
The response from CGIAR
The CGIAR’s internal deliberations are described in their 2015 Intellectual 
Assets (IA) report (CGIAR Consortium 2015b). According to the report, no 
other centre but IRRI filed plant variety protection rights or patent applications 
in 2015. IRRI reported filing three provisional patent applications – two in the 
USA and one in Australia – as well as a Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) filing, 
advancing to national phase filings in seven countries (Brazil, China, India, the 
Philippines, Thailand, the USA and Vietnam). All these were patent applications 
associated with the SPIKE gene.
IRRI claimed that the method in question has the potential to increase yield 
for rice varieties, but that additional research needs to be conducted in various 
genetic backgrounds and in different agro- climatic conditions. As it did not have 
the resources to perform this additional research, IRRI argued, its IP protection 
strategy aimed to provide an incentive for seed companies to enter into license 
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agreements in order to use the asset and develop new rice varieties. IRRI also 
claimed that the original material was acquired under the Treaty’s SMTA, and 
that it will manage the asset in a way that does not impair legitimate use of 
landrace material containing the trait. In other words, it will not limit any use of 
the original material containing the potentially soon- to- be- patented trait by plant 
breeders and farmers, in accordance with the terms of the SMTA under the 
ITPGRFA.
The CGIAR Consortium and the Fund Council Intellectual Property Group 
found IRRI’s justifications acceptable. Stressing that the case represents a first 
for the CGIAR framework, they specified the kind of information necessary to 
assess the acceptability of patent applications against the criteria of prudent and 
strategic IP use, including information on ownership, arrangements with third 
parties and licensing strategy. In particular, they noted that:
These national filings provided the first opportunity for the CGIAR 
Consortium and FC IP Group to assess, in the context of a specific scenario, 
the information that should reasonably be included in a Center’s 
justifications provided in support of non- preliminary patent applications, in 
countries that are of strategic interest when considering CGIAR’s target 
beneficiaries. The CGIAR Consortium and FC IP Group further clarified to 
Centers that justifications in such instances should contain clear information 
concerning ownership, arrangements with donors, co- developers or third 
parties for managing dissemination, specific details regarding the anticipated 
licensing strategy for maximizing impact, and plans for communications and 
impact evaluation.
(CGIAR Consortium 2015b: 3; emphasis added)
They further added that the centres should develop a clear communications 
strategy for any technology where reputational concerns can be reasonably 
anticipated, and conduct a critical evaluation of dissemination strategies for 
maximizing global access by farmers, as well as the manner in which patent 
protection will affect such access.
In an independent section of the IA report, the Fund Council Intellectual 
Property Group raised a number of additional concerns and recommended 
specific action. Pointing to the need to respect farmers’ seed rights, it stressed 
that:
any issued patent must not limit farmers in any way from using, saving, 
exchanging, trading, selecting and breeding with their landraces or farmer 
varieties containing the SPIKE trait.
(CGIAR Consortium 2015b: 23)
It also noted that IRRI is bound by the benefit- sharing conditions of the Treaty’s 
SMTA, and drew attention to the ‘sensitivities surrounding the patenting of 
(methods relating to) native traits’. Finally, it recommended that ‘IRRI make 
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every effort to increase the scope of impact of the technology and access by 
farmers in developing countries, and to be transparent about its IP management 
practices in this regard’ (CGIAR Consortium 2015b: 23).
At the end of the day, application in practice will depend on the IP 
management agreement signed with patent co- owner JIRCAS. The Fund 
Council Intellectual Property Group noted that the terms included in the 
agreement ‘may strengthen dissemination pathways of the technology to reach 
target beneficiaries and preserve ample latitude for IRRI to advance the CGIAR 
vision and strategy’ of providing broad access to IRRI’s resources. It thus 
requested ongoing review and monitoring of IRRI’s negotiations with JIRCAS 
to ensure that the final agreement advances the CGIAR vision. In sum, it 
strongly encouraged IRRI to:
- share its final agreement with JIRCAS with the Consortium upon execution, 
along with any future licensing agreements concerning the patented method;
- promote and track the scope of impacts from technology- and benefit- 
 sharing for the poor, especially farmers in developing countries; and
- pursue a transparent and proactive public communications strategy with 
respect to its IP management in this regard.
The response of the ITPGRFA Governing Body: spelling out  
the questions – and a roadmap to answers
Civil society, based on research by Edward Hammond (2017), brought the case 
to the attention of the ITPGRFA Governing Body. Without fully clarifying the 
facts of the case, they highlighted the ethical dimensions around the patenting of 
digital sequence information, and called for full disclosure of patent applications 
and IP policy changes by the CGIAR Consortium. Many participants, and those 
from civil society and farmer representatives in particular, argued that a patent 
application by a CGIAR centre on a trait found in a farmers’ variety was 
‘shocking’, while even government representatives agreed that ‘it does not look 
good’, pointing to reputational concerns.
The IRRI representative highlighted two points: according to the terms of the 
SMTA, the commercial exploitation of varieties comprising the protected trait 
would lead to monetary benefits accruing to the MLS; and access via the MLS 
and the provision of improved seed to farmers would not be affected.
As noted above, under the current SMTA mandatory monetary benefits flow 
into the system, and are then distributed through the Benefit- sharing Fund, only 
where the use of commercialized varieties developed on the basis of material 
from the MLS is restricted for further research and breeding. This means that 
the current system only envisages mandatory monetary benefit- sharing for 
patented varieties, as only patents restrict the use of protected material for 
further research and breeding.
From a legal point of view, therefore, the first IRRI argument on monetary 
benefit- sharing is accurate. As a first in the Treaty framework, the case provided 
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a real- life illustration of the links between monetary benefit- sharing and 
patenting, and the frictions that may arise. Of course, much depends on the 
drafting of the final IP management agreement between IRRI and the patent co- 
 owner JIRCAS, and the licensing strategy to be used. But so long as the 
licensing agreements signed between the patent holders and patent users respect 
the benefit- sharing terms of the SMTA, IRRI seems to be in compliance. The 
licensing agreements should also accommodate IRRI’s commitment to continue 
making available seed that contains the protected trait to farmers, and ensure the 
respect of CGIAR objectives on achieving maximum possible access, impact 
and sharing of benefits to advantage the poor, as well as farmers’ rights.
Another question regards transparency: while patent ownership is usually a 
matter of public record, patent licensing agreements generally are not 
(Tsioumani et al. 2016). Transparency was addressed in the IRRI case; IRRI is 
required to report on its licensing agreements to the CGIAR Fund Council 
Intellectual Property Group, as well as to the ITPGRFA Governing Body, as 
noted above.
Still, the case is illustrative of the fundamental contradiction inherent in the 
Treaty system described in detail in the relevant section above: monetary 
benefit- sharing is tied to restrictions in use associated with patenting. This 
threatens the very essence of the system and its goal of food security by 
impoverishing its material base, the MLS. At the same time, monetary benefit- 
 sharing was designed as a central tool for revenue generation, not only to serve 
the Treaty’s objective of fair and equitable benefit- sharing, but also to fund the 
overall goals of sustainable agriculture and food security.
The Governing Body did not adopt any specific decision on the IRRI patents 
case. It did note, however, that the CGIAR Principles on the Management of 
Intellectual Assets explicitly require the centres to comply with their obligations 
under the Treaty framework, and serve as a mechanism for monitoring and com-
pliance. It also invited the CGIAR system to provide annual reports on the 
implementation of the CGIAR Principles on the Management of Intellectual 
Assets related to germplasm managed by CGIAR centres within the Treaty 
framework, ‘including in cases where such germplasm, parts thereof, or 
information generated from the use of this germplasm are the subject matter of 
patent or plant variety protection applications, or are included in partnerships 
that qualify as restricted use or limited exclusivity agreements pursuant to the 
CGIAR Principles’ (Resolution 4/2017). The Governing Body thus called for 
transparency, and arguably hinted that, at least for the time being, compliance 
with the Treaty framework should be assessed by the CGIAR’s own system in 
accordance with its own principles.
The case is illustrative of a series of fundamental questions. How compat-
ible are the restrictions in use required for monetary benefit- sharing with the 
open- exchange systems necessary for food security and agricultural 
biodiversity conservation? To what degree can the sharing ethos re- introduced 
by the Treaty co- exist with the highly proprietary environment of commercial 
plant breeding usually associated with patents? In an era of unprecedented 
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patent expansion and market concentration in the agricultural sector, as well as 
increasing funding constraints for public agricultural research, what steps 
should a CGIAR centre – a centre committed to research and development as 
international public goods – take to fund its future research? Is it ethical, or 
even sustainable, for a research centre mandated to produce global public 
goods to seek to fund its research through patents? The CGIAR instruments 
call for the prudent and strategic use of IP; applications should not be made 
unless they are necessary for the further improvement of intellectual assets or 
to enhance impacts for target beneficiaries. Can the patenting of a gene found 
in a farmers’ variety be considered in principle prudent and strategic, given the 
continuing debates on gene patenting? Were these patent applications really 
necessary to attract funding for future research? That is, did IRRI exhaust all 
alternatives before resorting to this costly and time- consuming process? These 
questions remain open.
The patenting of isolated genes has been at the heart of debate since the 
Treaty negotiations. Indeed, these debates are the reason behind the cryptic 
formulation of Article 12(3)(d). As Laurence Helfer (2003: 34–35) puts it:
The critical issue for interpreting Article 12(3)(d) is just how far a seed’s 
genetic blueprint must be modified before the resulting genetic material is 
no longer ‘in the form’ received from the multilateral system. Most obser-
vers agree that a new plant variety or extracted genes as incorporated into 
such a variety would be sufficiently distinct to qualify for IPR protection. A 
more contentious question is whether merely extracting a gene from a seed 
is in itself a sufficient alteration of genetic material.
The IRRI case shows that the discussion on the patent eligibility of genetic 
sequences, and what the potential granting of such patents would mean for the 
Treaty framework, remains open. Decoupling monetary benefit- sharing from 
patenting was under discussion in the ongoing review process. It would be a step 
towards resolving the system’s contradictions and simplifying access and 
benefit- sharing altogether, but the process has failed and stopped, at least for the 
time being. Clarifying whether gene patents on material acquired from the MLS 
are allowed could also help with implementation given the ambiguities in the 
Treaty text. Deliberations on genetic sequence data or digital sequence informa-
tion also provide room for these discussions.
Postscriptum
The 2016 CGIAR Intellectual Assets Management Report provided an update 
on the IRRI case (CGIAR Consortium 2016). At the end of 2017, IRRI had 
signed an IP management agreement with JIRCAS, decided to pursue the 
SPIKE gene patent application in Japan, India, the Philippines and the USA 
only, and signed several non- exclusive R&D licensing agreements with third 
parties. The System Council Intellectual Property Group (previously the Fund 
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Council Intellectual Property Group) reached the following conclusions and 
recommendations.
The SC IP Group is pleased to confirm that the terms of IRRI’s IP 
Management Agreement with JIRCAS protect dissemination pathways of 
the technology to reach target beneficiaries and preserve ample latitude for 
IRRI to advance the CGIAR vision and strategy of providing broad access 
to IRRI’s intellectual assets. The SC IP Group regrets that IRRI, despite the 
recommendations given in the 2015 IA report, did not pursue a pro- active 
communication strategy regarding this patent given the sensitivities 
surrounding the protection of a method related to a ‘native trait.’ The SC IP 
Group continues to insist that IRRI provide more public information on how 
this patent will further the CGIAR vision, and to share with the System 
Office and SC IP Group a more detailed dissemination plan and/or global 
access strategy.
(CGIAR Consortium 2016: 15)
With no final answers on the use of the patent, the discussion outlined above 
remains valid.
Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I have tracked and analysed the emergence of the concept of fair 
and equitable benefit- sharing in the context of the evolving principles of 
governance of agricultural biodiversity. I argue that the first wave of 
privatization of genetic resources resulted in a major asymmetry between the 
stewards of these resources, namely biodiversity- rich developing countries and 
their indigenous peoples and farmer communities, and those who benefitted 
more from their use, predominantly private companies and more affluent groups 
in developed countries. Concerns regarding such unfairness were exacerbated 
by well- documented cases of biopiracy, where patents were sought or granted 
over genetic resources in the form found in nature or in farmers’ fields, without 
further improvement. In this context of enclosure to the previous systems of 
exchange, and following the failed attempt to apply the common heritage 
approach to plant genetic resources via the International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, the principle of national sover-
eignty over natural and genetic resources as reaffirmed in the CBD aimed to 
defend the rights of countries providing such resources by creating a second, 
defensive enclosure. Aiming to ensure some portion of the benefits arising from 
the use of their resources, developing countries pushed for a major shift in the 
regulation of access to such resources. Thus, the CBD, a legally binding treaty, 
recognizes that the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with 
national governments and is subject to national legislation, and includes prom-
inently among its objectives the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
from their commercial or other utilization. Benefit- sharing is thus linked to the 
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principle of national sovereignty, and appears to have a balancing function 
against the privatization of genetic resources via IPRs. Benefit- sharing can be 
further conceptualized as a development tool, to reap part of the gains of the 
biodiversity market, as well as an incentive for stewards of biodiversity, 
including biodiversity- rich developing countries, indigenous peoples and 
smallholder farmers, to reward them and enable their continued contribution to 
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, including genetic 
resources.
While adoption of the CBD was considered a major victory for the global 
South, a second wave of privatization meant that many of the gains associated 
with the CBD were at risk. Illustrating a dramatic change of the legal, political 
and economic landscape, this wave was marked by adoption of the TRIPS 
Agreement, strengthening of plant breeders’ rights, a continuous expansion of 
the patentable subject matter in view of the breakthrough of modern 
biotechnologies, high corporate concentration in the agrochemical sector and 
bilateral and multilateral pressures to developing countries to ratify IPR- related 
provisions in trade and investment treaties that often exceed the TRIPS stand-
ards. In this complex and often contradictory policy context, I explored the 
status and applications of fair and equitable benefit- sharing in environmental and 
IPR- related instruments governing agricultural research and development. While 
fair and equitable benefit- sharing is an objective of environmental treaties and 
the focus of sophisticated regulation efforts, the concept is not enshrined in the 
IPR instruments.
The ITPGRFA, negotiated in response to the CBD and developed to address 
the specificities of agricultural biodiversity, established the MLS of access and 
benefit- sharing. The MLS facilitates access to, and exchange of, a list of 
64 crops and forages considered vital for food security and agricultural 
research, listed in Annex I of the Treaty. It also institutionalizes the sharing of 
the benefits arising from the utilization of these resources, including monetary 
and non- monetary benefit- sharing. Monetary benefit- sharing refers to the return 
to the Treaty system of a portion of the gains of commercialization of products 
developed on the basis of material accessed through the MLS. Non- monetary 
benefit- sharing, according to the Treaty provisions, involves exchange of 
information, access to and transfer of technology, capacity- building, as well as 
facilitated access to Annex I resources, which is recognized as a benefit in 
itself.
The MLS operates as a virtual common pool of PGRFA held by various 
national and international institutions. It includes collections of Annex I crops 
that are under the management and control of parties to the Treaty and in the 
public domain, those held by the CGIAR centres and other institutions that have 
signed agreements with the Treaty’s Governing Body, as well as those included 
voluntarily by other holders, such as private companies or indigenous peoples 
and local communities. Exchanges take place in accordance with the terms of 
the SMTA, which is a standardized private- law contract between a provider and 
recipient (user) of material, negotiated and adopted by the Treaty’s Governing 
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Body. The SMTA provides for mandatory payments mainly when a user 
commercializes a plant product incorporating material from the MLS that is not 
available to others for further research and breeding (i.e. it is patented). The 
distribution of user- based payments accumulated through the SMTA and other 
funding such as country donations is operated through the Treaty’s Benefit- 
 sharing Fund. Under the direction of the Governing Body and through a project- 
 based approach, the Benefit- sharing Fund allocates the accumulated funds to 
particular activities designed to support farmers and breeders in adapting crops 
to changing needs and demands in the face of climate change, giving priority to 
farmers in developing countries who still conserve and manage sustainably crop 
diversity in their fields.
Two observations can be made with regard to illuminating the concept of fair 
and equitable benefit- sharing. First, a lack of conceptual clarity is observed with 
regard to terminology. Monetary benefit- sharing refers both to the accumulation 
of monetary benefits through the SMTA and to the distribution of monetary 
benefits through the Benefit- sharing Fund. Second, the line between monetary 
and non- monetary benefit- sharing is blurred, highlighting the close interlinkages 
among relevant mechanisms. Such interlinkages are both operative and 
substantive. For instance, while the funds distributed through the Benefit- sharing 
Fund are the outcome of the monetary benefit- sharing mechanism of the Treaty, 
the funded projects produce both improved genetic resources – which are to 
return to the system enriching the MLS – and non- monetary benefits, such as 
information, training or partnerships between farmers and breeders. In fact, as 
noted above, information exchange, technology transfer and capacity- building, 
namely three of the mechanisms of the Treaty for non- monetary benefit- sharing, 
are priorities for the Benefit- sharing Fund. In addition, it can be argued that non- 
 monetary benefit- sharing mechanisms serve as a precondition to monetary 
benefit- sharing. Non- monetary benefit- sharing mechanisms can be used to build 
the capacities required for facilitated access to, and use of, PGRFA, which could 
potentially result in the development of new varieties and product 
commercialization. Information exchange, technology transfer and capacity- 
 building are instrumental in addressing the unequal capacities of countries and 
communities to benefit from the ITPGRFA, and thus bridging the capacity, 
fairness and equity gap in agriculture and agrobiodiversity conservation.
A set of challenges have, however, arisen with regard to the ability of the 
MLS to generate and share monetary benefits. As a result, very limited user- 
 based payments have been realized since the Treaty’s entry into force, and the 
Benefit- sharing Fund has been operating solely on the basis of donor country 
voluntary contributions. Consequently, a working group was specifically 
mandated in 2013 to ‘enhance the functioning of the Multilateral System’. 
However, following six years of deliberations, including an immense amount of 
work on complex legal and policy issues, time and financial resources spent on 
the effort, and tentative agreement reached on several important matters, 
including expanding the list of crops in the MLS and devising a system for 
access to MLS crops mainly upon subscription, negotiations collapsed at the 
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Governing Body session in November 2019. This failure marked a missed 
opportunity for the Treaty, sustainable agriculture and multilateralism in 
general. For the time being, benefit- sharing will continue under the Treaty as 
originally established.
Despite the shortcomings, I argue that the objective of fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing introduces both legally binding obligations for the parties of 
these treaties, and a sharing ethos in international environmental law. This ethos 
may have the potential to eventually change the paradigm, affecting the 
acceptability and legitimacy of policy action beyond strict legal frameworks.
To be fair, the MLS is already a success in many ways. It has been facilit-
ating hundreds of thousands of exchanges of PGRFA every year, mainly to 
enable public agricultural research; it has further provided valuable support, par-
ticularly through non- monetary benefit- sharing to build the capacities required 
for facilitated access to, and use of, PGRFA. It is thus instrumental in building 
endogenously defined needs and capacities of countries and communities, and 
bridging the fairness and equity gap in agricultural research and development. 
These successes, however, have been overshadowed by expectations for 
monetary benefits, in the context of growing inequities due to trade and IPR- 
 related policies.
In the IPR realm, there is no explicit requirement related to fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing, the main argument being that IP protection benefits society as a 
whole by promoting innovation. The 1978 version of the UPOV Convention 
permitted the use of protected varieties as the source material of further breeding 
(breeders’ exception) and the re- use of saved seeds by farmers (farmers’ 
privilege) – two mechanisms which could be considered as expressions of 
benefit- sharing. These exceptions, however, were restricted in the 1991 version 
of UPOV. Exceptions to patent holders’ rights are usually even more limited 
than under UPOV 91.
From a fairness and equity perspective, UPOV 91 and the expansion of 
patents aggravate the asymmetry in protection between modern and traditional 
varieties, stifle public agricultural research and limit the discretion of member 
states that wish to safeguard agricultural systems that rely upon small- scale 
farming. In addition, the presumption that technological developments benefit 
society at large fails to acknowledge the well- documented fact that technologies 
promoting agricultural industrialization and intensification have primarily bene-
fitted transnational corporations and ignores the question of distributing the 
benefits to the most vulnerable groups of society, including smallholder farmers. 
Both plant breeders’ rights and patents used in agricultural research and 
development have been associated with reducing the developmental choices of 
developing countries, intensifying control by agrochemical companies, raising 
the cost of agricultural inputs, and risking the food security of vulnerable 
groups, including smallholder farmers.
Pressure to comply with UPOV 91 standards, including through free- trade 
and investment agreements, creates a host of human rights, political and ethical 
issues. These have been highlighted on numerous occasions, including by the 
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Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of the 
former UN Commission on Human Rights, and former UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Food Olivier De Schutter, who challenged the idea that IP 
protection benefits society as a whole, and argued that the human rights frame-
work requires investigating primarily who benefits from any technological 
advance, with the needs of the most vulnerable groups at the centre of attention. 
Accordingly, former UN Special Rapporteur on Cultural Rights Farida Shaheed 
also stressed tensions between IPRs and the right to benefit from scientific 
progress enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. She argued in par-
ticular that developed countries should comply with their international legal 
obligations through the development of international collaborative models of 
research and development for the benefit of developing countries and their 
populations, while developing countries should prioritize the development and 
dissemination of simple and inexpensive technologies that can improve the life 
of marginalized populations. At the same time, gene patentability remains an 
open question in several jurisdictions and positions differ around the globe.
Finally, as an illustration of the complexities of the relationship between 
patent protection and fair and equitable benefit- sharing – at least in its monetary 
dimension – I have explored a very specific case study: the patent applications 
submitted by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) on breeding 
methods associated with a rice gene called SPIKE, isolated in an Indonesian 
farmers’ variety. The case is illustrative of a series of fundamental questions. 
How compatible are the restrictions in use required for monetary benefit- 
 sharing with the open- exchange systems necessary for food security and 
agricultural biodiversity conservation? To what degree can the sharing ethos 
re- introduced by the Treaty co- exist with the highly proprietary environment of 
commercial plant breeding usually associated with patents? In an era of unpre-
cedented patent expansion and market concentration in the agricultural sector, 
as well as increasing funding constraints for public agricultural research, what 
steps should a CGIAR centre – a centre committed to research and development 
as international public goods – take to fund its future research? Is it ethical, or 
even sustainable, for a research centre mandated to produce global public goods 
to seek to fund its research through patents? These questions remain open.
Notes
 1 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (1980), ruling on the patentability of a live 
organism.
 2 Biopiracy, a term originally coined by civil society organization the ETC Group, 
refers to the appropriation of the knowledge and genetic resources of farming and 
indigenous communities by individuals or institutions that seek exclusive monopoly 
control (patents or other forms of IP) over these resources and knowledge.
 3 Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.
 4 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on 
the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, OJ L 213, (30 July 1998): 13–21.
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 5 1992 Nairobi Final Act of the Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Resolution 3.
 6 ITPGRFA Governing Body Resolution 2/2006 (2006).
 7 I am grateful to former ITPGRFA Secretary Shakeel Bhatti for drawing my attention 
to this point.
 8 The list of approved projects is available at: www.fao.org/plant- treaty/areas- of- work/
benefit- sharing- fund/projects- funded/bsf- third- cycle/en/ (last accessed 1.11.2019).
 9 TRIPS Agreement Article 30 on Exceptions to Rights Conferred reads: ‘Members 
may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, 
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploita-
tion of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties’ (emphasis 
added).
10 Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114 (17 March 2000).
11 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, OJ C 175 (20 June 2013): 1–40.
12 ‘Consolidated Document Relating to Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources’, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/40/6 (9 April 2019).
13 I am grateful to Claudio Chiarolla for drawing my attention to this point.
14 Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Resolution 
2000/7, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/7.
15 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 US 576 (2013).
16 Case C- 428/08 (2010).
17 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser (2004) 1 SCR 902, SCC 34; Bowman v. 
Monsanto Co. (2013) 133 S Ct 1761.
18 Organization of African Unity (OAU), the African Model Legislation on the 
Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the 
Regulation of Access to Biological Resources (2000).
19 The case study draws from my post on the BeneLex blog, available at: https://
benelexblog.wordpress.com/2018/05/22/irri- and- the- spike- gene/ (last accessed 10.10. 
2019). It is based on personal observations as a writer for IISD Reporting Services at 
the seventh meeting of the ITPGRFA Governing Body, interviews with participants, 
as well as additional research.
20 CGIAR Principles on the Management of Intellectual Assets of 7 March 2012, 
endorsed by the System Council on 12 July 2016 and by the System Management 
Board on 13 July 2016; available at: www.cgiar.org/wp/wp- content/uploads/2018/03/
CGIAR- IA- Principles.pdf (last accessed 8.11.2019).
21 International application no. PCT/IB2014/000607, available at: https://patentscope.
wipo.int/search/en/detail.jsf?docId=WO2014118636 (last accessed 8.11.2019).
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2  Fair and equitable benefit- 
sharing in land governance  
for sustainable agriculture
Introduction
As explored in detail in the previous chapter, the concept of fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing was born and developed in the context of international law and 
policy related to bio- based research and development. Aiming to ensure some 
portion of the benefits arising from the use of their genetic resources against the 
privatization trend promoted by the strengthening of IPRs, developing countries 
pushed for a major shift in the regulation of access to such resources. As a 
result, fair and equitable benefit- sharing became the objective of legally binding 
treaties, including the CBD and the ITPGRFA, in the latter case accompanied by 
sophisticated implementation mechanisms. Despite the questionable success of 
implementation efforts to inject fairness and equity in agricultural research and 
development, mainly due to the conflicting legal framework described above, I 
argue that the objective of fair and equitable benefit- sharing introduces both 
legally binding obligations for the parties of these treaties and a sharing ethos in 
international environmental law. This ethos may have the potential to eventually 
change the paradigm, affecting the acceptability and legitimacy of policy action 
beyond strict legal frameworks. Within this line of argumentation, in this 
chapter I explore expressions of benefit- sharing in the governance of land for 
agricultural purposes in the following contexts: farmers’ rights, and benefit- 
 sharing from public lands, including the specific case of large- scale agricultural 
investments.
Importantly, due to characteristics of the land sector explored below, the 
emergence of the concept of fair and equitable benefit- sharing cannot be clearly 
traced as part of a chronological line of evolution of policies and principles. On 
the contrary, applications of benefit- sharing are rather ad hoc. Compared to the 
field of agricultural research and development, international instruments 
specifically related to land governance are less binding, references to benefit- 
 sharing less explicit and benefit- sharing systems less developed. Examination of 
benefit- sharing is inextricably linked to redistribution efforts for land or agrarian 
reform, which have marked human history ever since Solon’s and Tiberius’ land 
reform laws in ancient Athens and Rome respectively (Adams 1995; Groppo 
2003; Binswanger- Mkhize et al. 2009). Specific contributions to the study of 
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benefit- sharing can be identified in the ITPGRFA provisions and related policies 
on farmers’ rights; soft law, including the Voluntary Guidelines on the Respons-
ible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of 
National Food Security (VGGT),1 the Voluntary Guidelines to support the 
Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of 
National Food Security (Right to Food Guidelines)2 and the recently adopted 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural 
Areas;3 and the growing body of international jurisprudence in the context of 
human rights treaties and investment agreements. These will be critically 
explored in the contexts identified above.
Academic and policy analyses of benefit- sharing from land use have largely 
focused on schemes aiming to support the effectiveness and legitimacy of pro-
grammes to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and to 
conserve, manage forests sustainably and enhance forest carbon stocks in 
developing countries (REDD+) (Pham et al. 2013; Weatherley- Singh and Gupta 
2015; Brockhaus et al. 2014; Peskett 2011; Vijge et al. 2016; Luttrell et al. 
2013; McDermott et al. 2013; Wong et al. 2019). Benefit- sharing in REDD+ 
projects rests outside the scope of this chapter. A review of this literature, 
however, helped frame and inform my exploration of benefit- sharing applica-
tions in the field of land for food and agriculture.
Differentiating land use from genetic resource use
My analysis starts from the observation that there are fundamental elements that 
differentiate the regulation of benefit- sharing from land use compared to benefit- 
 sharing from genetic resource use for research and development. These elements 
are related to the nature of the resource, the scope of the regulation and the 
determination of beneficiaries.
When it comes to the nature of the resource, land was traditionally considered 
renewable, but fixed in supply. In the context of soil and natural resource 
degradation and population growth, the land resource base is considered to be 
shrinking, and policies are required to accommodate competing uses and over-
lapping claims. Soil in particular is considered a non- renewable, finite resource, 
meaning its loss and degradation is not recoverable within a human lifespan 
(Smith et al. 2010; Fischer et al. 2011). Genetic resources, on the other hand, are 
renewable and easily multiplied. Usually a very small quantity is required for 
breeding, research and development (Guneratne 2012), and such activities can 
be conducted in parallel and indefinitely by several users. Restrictions in use of 
genetic resources stem solely from legal limitations, such as IPRs and ABS 
laws, while sustainability considerations weigh in in exceptional cases of limited 
supply of biological resources. Restrictions in land use, on the other hand, come 
from both material limitations, i.e. the limited resource base, and legal limita-
tions, such as ownership and other land- related rights.
When it comes to regulation, benefit- sharing arising from the use of genetic 
resources is primarily guided by international law and operates at the inter- state 
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level. The ABS- related treaties, including the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol, and 
the ITPGRFA, point to transactions between providers and users of genetic 
resources situated in different countries. The only intra- state benefit- sharing 
obligation, referring to an internal, state- to- community obligation, concerns the 
obligation for parties to the Nagoya Protocol to share benefits with indigenous 
peoples and local communities within their territories, who hold genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge used for research and development 
purposes (Morgera et al. 2014). This obligation builds on the CBD provision 
concerning respect for traditional knowledge and benefit- sharing from its 
utilization (CBD Art. 8(j)). In contrast, benefit- sharing from land use is prim-
arily guided by national laws and operates at the intra- state level. As explored 
below, land governance remains mostly an issue for national legislation, 
although international norms increasingly come into play with regard to human 
rights considerations, indigenous peoples’ claims and environmental concerns 
(Cotula 2017a). An exception to the intra- state nature of benefit- sharing from 
land use could be the benefit- sharing arrangements linked to transnational 
investment agreements, in case such arrangements are not mediated by the state 
receiving the investment.
Furthermore, benefit- sharing from genetic resource use emerged as a new 
concept in international biodiversity law, filling a gap and aiming to pursue 
fairness and equity considerations in bio- based research and development. 
Benefit- sharing in land governance, on the other hand, came more as an 
afterthought in an already complex field, ripe with often competing objectives, 
rights and arrangements, in which distribution has always been a central issue. 
Particular difficulties thus arise with regard to the relationship between land 
rights and benefit- sharing, the crucial questions touching upon both the resource 
itself and determination of the beneficiaries: who has control and decision- 
 making capacity over land use? Who has the power to determine the preferred 
benefits? And can this power be replaced by benefits, monetary or non- 
 monetary, as determined by outsiders, i.e. the government or an investor? Under 
which circumstances are rights holders reduced to beneficiaries under benefit- 
 sharing arrangements, and under which conditions can benefit- sharing contribute 
to justice in land governance?
Discussing beneficiaries
Determination of the beneficiaries is far more complex and context- specific 
when it comes to benefit- sharing from land use. As analysed in the first chapter, 
benefit- sharing from genetic resource use was based on the principle of national 
sovereignty over natural and genetic resources. The providers of genetic 
resources were thus deemed beneficiaries in benefit- sharing arrangements as 
owners or stewards of the resource; ownership was the criterion used to pursue 
justice in a Lockean sense of the term. As explored below, however, bene-
ficiaries of benefit- sharing from land use can be identified on the basis of 
various, often contradictory, terms. Using Amartya Sen’s famous parable of the 
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flute4 to navigate through justice principles (Sen 2009), I loosely structure bene-
ficiaries in the land sector around the criteria of ownership, merit and vulner-
ability. Ownership would come into play with regard to private individuals or 
communities, including indigenous peoples, who assert control rights over land, 
as detailed below. Merit would be used as a criterion in cases for instance of 
land concessions to smallholder farmers and agricultural producers in general, in 
the pursuit of public- interest objectives including food security, agricultural 
productivity and rural livelihoods; the criterion of vulnerability would be 
prioritized in cases of land allocation for the benefit of the rural poor or the land-
less, including women.
This is of course a highly schematic and thus problematic framework. The 
range of conceptual differentiations around the globe when it comes to land 
tenure, for instance, provides an illustration of the challenges involved in 
applying the ownership criterion. As examined below, statutory systems usually 
co- exist with customary ones, and private with state and collective property, 
while legitimate uses of the same land are often overlapping or conflicting. In 
addition, in most jurisdictions, states have powers of eminent domain; they can 
thus expropriate property even against the will of the owner under conditions, 
including payment of compensation.
The distinctive features of property in the civil- law tradition would generally 
refer to the owner’s rights to possess, use and dispose of the property in 
question. Understanding of property in common- law systems, on the other hand, 
is less unitary and would include the ‘bundle of rights’ popularized by Edella 
Schlager and Elinor Ostrom in their seminal 1992 paper in the context of 
common property regimes: the rights of access, withdrawal (of benefits), 
management, exclusion (of others) and alienation (i.e. transfer of the right) 
(Schlager and Ostrom 1992), accompanied by the expectation of legal protection 
(Cotula 2016). The lack of clarity and understanding of common property 
regimes and community customary systems of land and natural resource use 
result in lack of legal recognition, which impacts on the identification of rights 
holders as beneficiaries, and undermines the lives and livelihoods of millions, as 
explored below.
Furthermore, real- life situations are never clear and groups of beneficiaries 
are never homogeneous. Vast differences exist around the globe within each 
cate gorization, such as ‘indigenous peoples’ or ‘smallholder farmers’, depending 
on historical, socio- economic, cultural and geographical specificities, while even 
narrowly defined communities, geographically and culturally close, rarely share 
unanimously the same views regarding development choices. Policy decisions 
would further need to address cases of conflicting uses by different groups of 
beneficiaries, and overlapping claims regarding land use. In addition, challenges 
arise with regard to the identification of which individuals belong to specific 
groups of beneficiaries and which ones are excluded, and the criteria to be used 
for such identification.
Questions of terminology also remain open to debate. The use of and 
relationship between ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘rights holders’ is not clear. The term 
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‘beneficiary’ has passive connotations, and usually refers to someone who 
simply receives benefits, without contributing to their creation or accumulation. 
This fails to capture the majority of situations where benefit- sharing is sought, 
and may result in confusion. For this reason, analyses of benefit- sharing under 
REDD+ project implementation have called for a rights- based approach, which 
requires engagement with indigenous men and women as rights holders, rather 
than as project beneficiaries (Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2017).
Finally, public support to a specific group through policy decisions and 
implementation may be deterred by hostile or indifferent power structures and/or 
overarching socio- economic choices related to the preferred model of agriculture 
and development. Smallholder farmers, the focus of this chapter, would generally 
be a group satisfying most aspects of the justice- related criteria: ownership, merit 
and vulnerability. Difficulties of identification aside, smallholder farmers are 
responsible for a large amount of agricultural production in developing countries 
and local food security, have been contributing to the conservation sustainable 
use of agricultural biodiversity through their customary practices, live mostly in 
rural areas and constitute part of populations identified as extremely poor. 
Smallholder farmers face various challenges in supporting their livelihoods, 
largely stemming from the rapidly changing political, economic, social and 
environmental landscape (IFAD 2013). These challenges range from land and 
natural resource grabbing and land tenure insecurity to insecure market access 
and an inability to elicit benefits from markets due to a lack of physical access to 
urban markets because of failing infrastructure, a lack of access to information 
and financial services and an inability to cope with stringent certification, export 
and food safety standards (Lee et al. 2012; Le Courtois et al. 2011). While their 
contribution to sustainable development, food security and nutrition was particu-
larly highlighted by FAO during 2014, proclaimed as the International Year of 
Family Farming, their land rights remain vulnerable, they usually receive limited 
support from the public sector and an enabling legal and policy environment at 
the international (and domestic) level is lacking, as explored below.
But first I will start by drawing a general picture of the trends behind land 
governance, including the central role of domestic law and the emergence of 
international regulation.
Setting the scene: land for food and agriculture
Land has had a central position throughout human history as the basis for 
livelihoods and wellbeing, culture and identity, but also statehood and political 
power. It supports most productive human activities, including agriculture, 
hosts many of the world’s ecosystems and natural resources and has a political 
and cultural significance both for the nation- state and for indigenous peoples 
and local communities (FAO 2002a). Far from being symbolic, this significance 
of land has manifested itself in wars and different kinds of conflict. Depending 
on its management, land can support environmental sustainability and social 
justice, or not.
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A review of literature on land rights and policies of relevance to agriculture 
and food security (FAO 2002a; Carter 2003; Oxfam et al. 2016; Cotula 2017a) 
has resulted in a series of general observations which necessarily frame my ana-
lysis of benefit- sharing. These observations, which I briefly address below, 
include:
– chronic inequality in land distribution in many countries;
– gender as a decisive element of land poverty;
– the primacy of domestic law, the existence of vast differences around the 
world regarding land law;
– interactions between formal systems and customary arrangements; and
– the relatively recent emergence of international law, mainly related to indi-
genous peoples’ rights and human rights in general, environmental con-
siderations and market liberalization.
Land distribution, social justice and economic growth
Control of rights to land has historically been an instrument of oppression and 
colonization (Gilbert 2013). Inequitable distribution of land ownership remains 
acute in many parts of the world today. This has created several land rights 
movements around the globe, demanding land redistribution, recognition of 
customary – in cases communal – rights to land and more recently the right to 
control the type of development undertaken. Such movements indicate that the 
land issue is inextricably linked with social justice. At the same time, the 
relationship between resource distribution and economic growth has a 
permanent importance in the research agenda of economists and international 
institutions (Cipollina et al. 2018). High land concentration has been historically 
linked to economic inequality, social instability and environmental degradation, 
exacerbating the problems of landlessness, social tension and unsustainable use 
of marginal or environmentally sensitive lands (Russett 1964; FAO 2002a; 
Stiglitz 2012).
State- mandated land reform efforts to address redistribution concerns were 
undertaken in the post- war period with mixed results. Doreen Warriner (1969) 
has systematically assessed a series of such land or agrarian reforms under 
different political and socio- economic contexts. She reached the still topical 
conclusion that land reforms increase political liberty but stimulate development 
only if planned and implemented to suit local conditions rather than follow 
foreign or externally imposed solutions.
In the Cold War era, land reforms fell out of favour with donors and stopped, 
with the exception of sporadic efforts in the 1980s such as in Ethiopia and the 
Philippines, which resulted from shifts in the domestic balance of power 
between landowners and peasants (Adams 1995). Later, intensive land redis-
tribution processes took place under specific historic conditions: the 
decollectivization and redistribution of state land to private persons in Central 
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; the land reform and restitution 
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programme in post- Apartheid South Africa, to address racially skewed land 
ownership; and land reform programmes in post- conflict societies such as 
Cambodia, Burundi and Rwanda, to accommodate the return of displaced 
persons (Adams 1995; FAO 2002a). More recently, land rights reforms have 
been receiving renewed attention as instruments to redress rural poverty by 
enhancing the land access and tenure security of poor households (FAO 2002a; 
Carter 2003). These policy debates have largely reflected the World Bank’s 
focus on the assignment of legally secure, usually marketable, individual land 
rights and market- assisted land reform (World Bank 2003). At the same time, 
commercial pressure on agricultural (and other) land in many developing coun-
tries has been increasing very rapidly in recent years, especially through foreign 
direct investments – a phenomenon dubbed in critical literature as land- grabbing 
(Cipollina et al. 2018; Cotula 2015).
Gendering the land question
To quote Bina Agarwal (2003), gendering the land question remains critical, for 
policymakers and academics alike. In her seminal study on gender and land 
rights, Agarwal sees the gender gap in the ownership and control of property as 
the single most critical contributor to the gender gap in economic wellbeing, 
social status and empowerment (Agarwal 1994). Land rights are extremely 
important for rural women, because they affect both their livelihoods directly, 
and their bargaining power within the household, their community and the 
society at large (FAO 2002a), particularly since empirical research shows that 
women often hold the prime responsibility for food production (FAO 2002b). In 
addition, literature on intra- household expenditure patterns suggests strongly 
that women tend to dedicate greater proportions of their income to household 
public goods, including food, child health and education (Carter 2003). Finally, 
land rights increase women’s resilience and independence in the event or the 
death of or divorce from their spouse.
Admittedly, societal transformation when it comes to gender is an extremely 
complex issue, ranging far beyond formal and customary legal systems, to also 
encompass socio- cultural norms and family- and education- related biases. 
Cecile Jackson (2003: 477), for instance, prioritizes ethnographic research that 
focuses on social change, considers the diversity of subject positions and 
subjectivities of women in relation to land and situates gendered property rela-
tions within broader contexts related to marriage, kinship and livelihoods. While 
the transformative power of law remains a topic for intense debate, with respect 
to whether the attribution of land rights will effectively transform women’s 
position in societies or not, there is no doubt that lack of such rights constitutes 
an unparalleled institutional obstacle to women’s empowerment. In this regard, 
international bodies, for instance, under the 1979 Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the VGGT, have advocated 
for specifically addressing gender equality in land and other related legislation. 
As a result, legislative developments since the 1990s have paid greater attention 
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to the issue, by embracing the principle of non- discrimination, abrogating 
archaic customary norms disadvantaging women, promoting joint ownership of 
family land and providing for women’s representation in land management 
bodies (FAO 2002a). Obviously challenges remain in many countries around the 
world.
The central position of domestic law
The political significance of land and its links to state sovereignty have made 
land rights and administration remain subjects for domestic law. Each country’s 
land laws are unique, reflecting its political history, legal tradition and social 
experience. Some general trends can be discerned, however.
According to the FAO (2002c), land tenure rights are often classified as 
‘formal’ or ‘informal’. Formal rights are those explicitly acknowledged by the 
state, while informal are the rights lacking official recognition. Customary or 
traditional rights of indigenous peoples and local communities often fall under 
the ‘informal’ rights category, although they may be quite formal and secure 
within their own context. In addition, the distinction between formal and 
informal is becoming increasingly blurred, as many countries provide legal 
recognition and protection to customary rights as a result of constitutional 
amendments and related jurisprudence, in response to a hopefully globally 
changing paradigm. Land rights then typically include rights to use, control and 
transfer. They usually fall under more general legislation including land laws, 
land tenure agreements and planning regulations, and they are often overlapping 
or competing, creating land disputes. Another common categorization concerns 
the distinction between private, state- owned and communal land.
In addition to these categorizations, land governance in most jurisdictions 
around the globe has responded to a series of trends (FAO 2002a): increased 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights; environmental considerations; rural 
development and food security considerations; and privatization and creation of 
land markets, increasingly transnational ones. Often emerging at the inter-
national level, these trends are explored below.
The emergence of international law
Land has a particular importance for international law, as an element of 
statehood and political organization, tightly linked to sovereignty (Cotula 
2017a). Land governance, on the other hand, was not traditionally considered a 
topic for international law. International law and policy emerged relatively 
recently, following the realization that land tenure and management affect a a 
series of internationally recognized human rights and underpin all environmental 
regulation efforts. Policies to support sustainable land management were 
therefore deemed essential for a series of environmental, economic and social 
reasons. Sustainable land management leads to increased soil fertility and thus 
agronomic productivity, for food security and improved livelihoods. It enables 
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carbon capture and storage, and thus climate change mitigation, and supports 
biodiversity conservation, disaster risk management and various ecosystem 
functions such as soil maintenance. Land is also inextricably linked with rural 
livelihoods and the survival and identity of indigenous peoples.
Agenda 21, the non- binding action plan adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit, 
recognized the need for integrated planning and management of land resources, 
stating that it should be a decision- making process that ‘facilitates the allocation 
of land to the uses that provide the greatest sustainable benefits’.5 Efforts by 
multilateral environmental agreements, however, remain slim to date. It was in 
the context of the 2008 global food crisis (Headay and Fan 2010) and the 
emerging web of transnational investments in agricultural land (Cotula 2015) 
that land governance became an issue of common concern, of particular import-
ance for food security and human development. Arable lands are becoming 
increasingly valuable, due to population growth and environmental change, 
attracting the interest of investors and raising a host of associated issues with 
regard to local livelihoods. As Gilbert (2013) argues, large- scale transnational 
agricultural investments (dubbed as land grabs), alongside the acquisition of 
lands for biofuels in the context of climate change- related measures, have been 
creating a pattern of land use for economic gain to the detriment of local 
livelihoods. This section will provide a glimpse of international efforts of relev-
ance to land governance under human rights instruments, environmental treaties, 
and non- binding governance frameworks related to rural development, in 
the context of the increasing relevance of international investment law, which 
comes into play in the case of large- scale agricultural investments affecting 
control over land and natural resources.
While it is widely recognized that land rights are linked to the realization of 
several recognized human rights, such as the right to property and to food, and 
the rights of indigenous peoples, existing treaties do not recognize a human right 
to land as such (Gilbert 2013; Cotula 2017a). However, a growing acknowledge-
ment of the linkages between land claims and international human rights law has 
emerged in the context of jurisprudence of international and regional human 
rights courts, as well as in the work of UN Special Rapporteurs. These linkages 
are particularly prominent in the context of indigenous peoples’ rights, and the 
rights of peasants, briefly addressed below, in turn.
Land and indigenous peoples
The land tenure situation of indigenous peoples is closely related to the history 
of colonial and nation- state policies towards them, resulting in dispos session, 
displacement, marginalization and assimilation (Colchester 2001). Discri-
minatory land policies started shifting slowly at the end of the twentieth century 
towards multicultural approaches and recognition of customary rights. Despite 
the huge diversity that characterizes them, indigenous peoples around the world 
have stressed the special connection between land and territory, traditional 
livelihoods, cultural identity and self- determination. These linkages are 
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increasingly recognized at the international level. For the time being, this recog-
nition is reflected less in lawmaking and more in the expanding interpretation of 
existing international law.
Albeit of limited state membership, the 1989 Convention no. 169 of the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries requires states to recognize the rights of indigenous 
peoples over the lands they traditionally occupy and their natural resources, and 
to respect the special importance of lands or territories for cultures and spiritual 
values (Arts 13–16). The UN Human Rights Committee has interpreted the cul-
tural rights protected under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) as extending to the protection of a particular way of 
life associated with the use of land resources, including traditional activities as 
fishing and hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law 
(UN Human Rights Committee 1994). Regional human rights bodies and courts 
have also elaborated on the relationship between land, livelihoods and culture. 
Jérémie Gilbert in particular argues that regional human rights bodies acknowledge 
indigenous land rights as part of a larger bundle of rights including property 
rights, cultural rights and social rights (Gilbert 2013). The Inter- American Court 
of Human Rights has developed extensive jurisprudence linking indigenous 
peoples’ land rights to cultural rights, the right to property, the right to life and 
the right to health (Anaya 2005; Cotula 2017a). In the 2001 Awas Tingni case,6 
for instance, the Inter- American Court recognized indigenous peoples’ collective 
rights to land and resources on the basis of the right to property, protected under 
Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights,7 noting that the 
human right to property embraces the communal property regimes as defined by 
indigenous peoples’ own customs and traditions (Anaya 2005). The case 
concerned a logging concession of 62,000 hectares of tropical forest in com-
munal lands to be commercially developed by a company. African case law is 
more limited but growing, featuring the protection of collective land rights under 
the rights to property, culture and access to natural resources, according to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.8 In the 2010 Endorois case,9 the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights found that eviction of 
the Endorois community from their ancestral lands by Lake Bogoria for the 
purposes of creating a game reserve disrupted their pastoral way of life and 
caused damage to their livelihoods, culture and religious practices. It therefore 
violated several of their rights, including their right to property, culture, religion, 
free disposition of natural resources, and development.
The gradual policy shift towards recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights 
has arguably culminated to the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),10 which recognizes indigenous peoples’ land 
rights (Art. 26), including their distinctive spiritual relationship with their lands 
(Art. 25), the right to their conservation and protection (Art. 29) and their right 
to determine development priorities (Art. 32). While UNDRIP is formally a 
soft- law instrument, it can be argued that it reflects current understandings of 
international law regarding indigenous peoples’ rights and integrates a high 
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degree of political consensus. In addition, it produces indirect legal effects by 
providing a reference point for regional and national courts (Cotula 2017a).
The contribution of indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge when it comes 
to land management is also recognized in environmental treaties. The UN 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)11 focuses on sustainable land 
management as the main strategy to combat desertification and land degradation 
and mitigate the effects of drought with a view to contributing to sustainable 
development in affected areas (Tsioumani 2017). The UNCCD strongly 
promotes a people- centred and participatory approach to sustainable land 
management (Stringer et al. 2007), in synergy with the food security, climate 
change and biodiversity agendas. It recognizes the value of local and traditional 
knowledge with regard to natural resource management, and promotes exchange 
of such knowledge and integration in research and development processes, with 
appropriate return of the benefits derived from it to the local populations 
concerned, on an equitable basis and on mutually agreed terms (UNCCD Arts 
16–17). In addition, the Regional Implementation Annex for Africa requires 
African Parties to sustain and strengthen reforms currently in progress towards 
greater decentralization and resource tenure (Art. 4(2)(b)). Lorenzo Cotula 
(2017) highlights this as a rare example of policymaking under environmental 
treaties dealing explicitly with land tenure. He notes that the rationale is that 
more secure tenure rights are more likely to create incentives for landholders to 
use land sustainably, drawing attention, however, to empirical evidence 
highlighting that customary tenure systems can often provide greater security 
than national legislation. The UNCCD focus on land tenure is expected to be 
expanded; at the latest meeting of the Conference of the Parties in 2019, parties 
decided to include land tenure as a thematic issue, and encouraged recognition 
of legitimate tenure rights, including customary rights, in a way that is consistent 
with national legal frameworks, and following the VGGT.12
Along similar lines, the CBD has acknowledged the linkages between land 
tenure security and the status of traditional knowledge, identifying land tenure 
security as an indicator for achieving the Aichi Target on respecting traditional 
knowledge and integrating it in CBD implementation by 2020.13 Traditional 
knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities of relevance to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity is a cross- cutting issue 
area under the Convention. Such traditional knowledge is not static but evolves 
over time, incorporating elements of experimentation and integrating new ideas. 
A necessary precondition for this evolution is the interaction with the natural 
resource itself, in this case the land and the environment. Strengthening tenure 
security therefore through access and land rights in line with customary practices 
is considered vital, both for traditional knowledge preservation and sustainable 
land management (Tsioumani 2017). In addition, a series of decisions on impact 
assessment have been adopted in the CBD context. In particular the Akwé: Kon 
voluntary guidelines for the conduct of cultural, environmental and social impact 
assessments14 are of direct relevance to national- level decisions on land use, 
including in the context of large- scale agricultural investments.
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Both the UNCCD and the CBD create legal obligations for states. 
Implementation, however, is not supported by an international enforcement 
mechanism. In addition, challenges related to compliance persist mainly due to 
limitations in administrative, technical and financial capacities of national 
governments, and lack of integration of sustainable land management and 
biodiversity issues respectively into national development planning (Morgera 
et al. 2012; Ambalam 2014). However, implementation of environmental stand-
ards can be supported by unexpected means, including, increasingly, the human 
rights machinery (Morgera 2019). A notable example includes the Saramaka 
case,15 involving state concessions in the Saramaka territory. In the interpretation 
of its decision,16 the Inter- American Court of Human Rights referred to the Akwé: 
Kon guidelines as ‘one of the most comprehensive and used standards’ for impact 
assessments in the context of indigenous and tribal peoples.17 Impact assessments 
would come into play in the case of investment agreements on natural resource 
use, as addressed below, as well as with regard to implementation of conservation 
measures, such as establishment of protected areas, which have historically 
resulted in injustices and impoverishment, partly by ignoring local uses of land 
and resources (Stevens 1997; Brockington 2004; Robinson et al. 2018).
Land and smallholder farmers
Choices regarding development models, traditionally made by a centralized 
decision- making authority, affect populations beyond indigenous peoples, who 
are generally self- identified as such, with a distinct sense of identity and strong 
links to territories. Investment agreements usually have impacts on communities 
living in geographic proximity of the project. Choices regarding models of 
agricultural development, on the other hand, impact on all the rural populations, 
including more specific sets of groups generally characterized as vulnerable, 
such as smallholders, family farmers and peasants, but also the rural poor and 
the landless.
The legal framework concerning indigenous peoples’ rights is broadly related 
to their right of self- determination, recognized following a history of coloniza-
tion and conquest. The rights of local communities and of smallholders, on the 
other hand, have emerged more recently in international law, and are related to 
participatory rights, as well as to livelihoods, food security and rural 
development considerations. They have emerged in human rights case law, as 
well as in the VGGT and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants.
The first global instrument addressing land tenure in detail, the non- binding 
VGGT establish a legal framework calling for recognizing and respecting 
legitimate tenure rights, including customary rights. Seeking to improve 
governance of tenure ‘for the benefit of all, with an emphasis on vulnerable 
and marginalized people’ (Art. 1(1)), the Guidelines recognize the centrality of 
secure tenure rights and equitable access to land, fisheries and forests for 
development, and acknowledge that inadequate and insecure tenure rights 
increase vulnerability, hunger and poverty, and can lead to conflict and 
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environmental degradation. Notwithstanding their non- binding nature, the legal 
significance of the Guidelines stems from the fact that they have been adopted 
following a very inclusive multi- stakeholder process of intergovernmental 
negotiations and they enjoy high- level political legitimacy, expressed, among 
others, in the 2012 Outcome Document of the Rio+20 Conference (‘The Future 
We Want’) and the G20 Leaders Declaration of June 2012. The VGGT are thus 
well- positioned to influence national- law developments (Tsioumani 2017). 
Cotula (2017b) further points out that, in addition to reflecting existing inter-
national law on human rights and related jurisprudence, the use in the VGGT of 
extra- legal concepts, such as ‘governance’ and ‘tenure’, could arguably facil-
itate the adaptation of VGGT guidance into different legal contexts. As an 
illustration, Scotland’s Land Reform Act 2016 refers to the VGGT as an inter-
national instrument that the Scottish government must take into consideration 
when developing guidance about engaging communities in decisions relating to 
land (Cotula 2017b).
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants, adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in December 2018, also has a very broad scope. It aims to protect the 
rights of all rural populations including peasants, agricultural and rural workers 
and indigenous peoples, and address the challenges they face. It recognizes the 
contribution of peasants to sustainable development, food security and 
biodiversity conservation as the basis of food and agricultural production, as 
well as their special relation with the land, water and nature. It specifically 
recognizes peasants’ right to land and water, and the need to recognize their cul-
tural identity and traditional knowledge. The Declaration, alongside the VGGT 
and the ITPGRFA, explicitly recognizes landscapes as the physical space that 
supports farmers’ livelihoods and their continued contribution to food security 
and the conservation and sustainable use of agricultural biodiversity. In this 
context, the linkages between rights to land and natural resources and farmers’ 
rights will be explored below, as part of the analysis of expressions of fair and 
equitable benefit- sharing.
Land and international investment law
While land and natural resources are obviously covered by the principle of 
national sovereignty, an ever- increasing network of multilateral and bilateral 
investment treaties aim at protecting foreign investment established mainly in 
developing countries, and may come into play in the case of large- scale 
agricultural investments. Lack of transparency makes it difficult to know 
which land deals exactly are covered by investment treaties; however, after a 
study of available data, Lorenzo Cotula and Thierry Berger have concluded 
that 64% of land deals were protected by at least one investment treaty (Cotula 
and Berger 2015). At the same time, Cotula (2016) draws attention to the 
‘highly dynamic process’ of development of international investment law, 
characterized by multiple bilateral treaty negotiations and an increasing arbitral 
jurisprudence.
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International investment law sets substantive and procedural standards for the 
protection of investment against regulatory action of the host state. With regard 
to land governance, it may come to the fore both with regard to the allocation of 
property, thus the conditions under which investors acquire land and resource 
rights, and its protection (Cotula 2016). No investment arbitration tribunal has 
directly addressed large- scale land acquisitions to date, although the possibility 
cannot be ruled out. With an ever- expanding field of application, over the years 
investors have challenged public measures to claim protection for their assets in 
areas ranging from landownership to shareholdings, with monetary compensation 
being the most common remedy for breaches of investment treaties.
While according to the mainstream economic paradigm foreign investment 
can contribute to economic growth and development, the conditions required for 
the host country to benefit from such investment, and the extent to which inter-
national investment agreements enable such conditions, are still open to debate 
(Tauli- Corpuz 2016). Three legal considerations are of particular relevance: the 
lack of references to human rights obligations in investment agreements; the fear 
of dispute settlement arbitration, which may restrict the host state’s regulatory 
activity for the public interest; and the lack of public participation in drafting, 
particularly with regard to the groups that are affected the most, as is the case of 
indigenous peoples and rural communities in land deals. It is remarkable that 
investment arbitration tribunals routinely dismiss human rights considerations as 
falling outside the scope of their mandate (Tauli- Corpuz 2016).
In addition, according to Cotula (2016), the application of two legal con-
cepts may be of particular risk to local land rights: the growing use of ‘pre- 
 establishment’ obligations in investment treaties and the concept of legitimate 
expectations in arbitral jurisprudence. Pre- establishment national treatment 
clauses could require states to remove clauses that differentiate between 
foreign investors and their own nationals when it comes to land acquisition 
rights. While several investment treaties exclude land tenure from the applica-
tion of pre- establishment rules, others do not (Cotula 2016). The concept of 
legitimate expectations, on the other hand, has been developed in arbitral juris-
prudence as an implementation element of the treaty standard of fair and equit-
able treatment, and has been applied to challenge a wide range of public measures, 
including sanctions of contractual breaches, environmental regulations or tax 
legislation (Cotula 2016; Bernasconi- Osterwalder et al. 2012).
In theory, both international investment and international human rights law 
should govern the decisions and practices of the host state with regard to the 
rights and obligations of investors, the perceived benefits for the host state and 
the impact of the investment on the rights of affected local communities, such 
as indigenous peoples and rural populations. The expanding sphere of applica-
tion of international investment law, in combination with its enforcement 
potential and the asymmetry in capacities and power of the parties involved, has 
resulted in protection of the international capital, often to the detriment of 
national development priorities in developing countries, restricting states’ 
ability to regulate for the public interest. As detailed below, lack of recognition 
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of customary tenure systems and rights may enable arbitrary expropriations to 
make land available for investment, increasing the risk of dispossession for vul-
nerable rural populations. Imbalances in the law raise questions about whose 
rights are being prioritized and why.
The troubled relationship between investment and human rights has attracted 
the attention of human rights bodies, including the Sub- Commission on the Pro-
motion and Protection of Human Rights. The High Commissioner for Human 
Rights issued a report, including areas for consideration on the need to balance 
competing objectives related to seeking higher investment levels while pursuing 
national development objectives (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2003). Among them, states should consider: including the promotion and 
protection of human rights among the objectives of investment agreements; 
ensuring their right and duty to regulate; promoting investors’ obligations, 
alongside their rights; and promoting international cooperation as part of 
investment liberalization, including with regarding to funding commitments for 
international development.
While such recommendations require a total rethinking of international 
investment treaties, implementation also requires social transformations. 
Victoria Tauli- Corpuz, UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, has highlighted the ‘implementation gap’ resulting from the power 
imbalance between political elites and vulnerable populations, even in countries 
where human rights standards have been incorporated into national law, 
explaining that ‘deep- rooted structural discrimination and vested interests can 
render ineffective the legal protections’ (Tauli- Corpuz 2016: 6). That said, many 
of the challenges associated with the implementation of international investment 
agreements have been raised in the context of intergovernmental deliberations 
on a treaty on business and human rights, briefly addressed below.
The emergence of benefit- sharing in land governance
As noted above, emergence of the concept of fair and equitable benefit- sharing in 
land governance cannot be clearly traced as part of an evolutionary line. Refer-
ences to benefit- sharing seem to be more ad hoc, although still linked to notions 
of justice and solidarity to the vulnerable. Its legal bearing is not consistent. In 
the context of the instruments and jurisprudence presented in the previous 
section, benefit- sharing is sometimes framed as a right, other times as a policy 
objective, and yet other times as a safeguard. The relation of benefit- sharing with 
tenure rights is also not clear. The section below presents some illustrations.
Following the detailed exploration of benefit- sharing in agricultural research 
and development in the first chapter, it comes as no surprise that the strongest 
references to benefit- sharing as a right are linked to the utilization of traditional 
and local knowledge for research and/or development purposes. The clearest 
illustration in this regard is the conceptualization of benefit- sharing under 
farmers’ rights in the ITPGRFA context, which will be examined in detail in the 
following section.
66  Benefit-sharing in land governance
Environmental treaties and the VGGT see benefit- sharing from natural 
resource use, including land use, as a policy objective to be implemented at the 
intra- state level, so within a national territory. They seek to create a framework 
involving the enabling conditions and decision- making capacity for both the 
identification and realization of benefits at the local level, and the sharing of 
such benefits. Such a framework would thus entail both procedural and 
substantive elements. The identification and sharing of benefits, in such cases, 
would usually also involve assessment of the risk and burdens, and potential 
conflicts regarding resource use. Actors involved would include the state or 
central government, one or more communities in the broad sense outlined above, 
and a company or investor, if applicable. A legal relationship (regulatory or 
contractual) would thus need to be established among the state and a com-
munity. Unlike genetic resource utilization, however, specific guidance is 
lacking, and only dispersed elements can be found in the adopted decisions. 
Well- established legal tools, such as environmental impact assessments, can be 
used for such purposes.
Environmental treaties: CBD and UNCCD
The CBD, in which fair and equitable benefit- sharing features prominently 
among its three objectives, calls on parties to encourage the equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising from the utilization of traditional knowledge of indigenous 
and local communities as part of measures to support biodiversity conservation 
in situ (Art. 8(j)). This provision has been used as a cross- cutting theme 
throughout the development of intergovernmental guidance for CBD 
implementation (Morgera and Tsioumani 2010), also in relation to land tenure 
security, as noted above. The ecosystem approach (COP Decisions V/6 and 
VII/11), a CBD- endorsed strategy for the integrated management of land, water 
and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equit-
able way, also offers useful elements for implementation of benefit- sharing in 
natural resource use (Morgera 2017; De Lucia 2019). The decisions on the eco-
system approach point to benefit- sharing as a reward for the integration of 
traditional knowledge in planning and management, and for ecosystem 
stewardship of indigenous peoples and local communities, and as an element of 
good governance. For instance, Principle 1 of the ecosystem approach (COP 
Decision VII/11) notes that indigenous peoples and other local communities 
living on the land are important stakeholders and their rights and interests should 
be recognized, while ecosystems should be managed for their intrinsic values 
and for the tangible or intangible benefits for humans, in a fair and equitable 
way. With regard to ecosystem management in an economic context (Principle 4), 
which is relevant for agricultural or other land uses, it is noted that, where those 
who control land uses do not receive benefits from maintaining natural eco-
systems and processes, they are likely to initiate unsustainable land- use 
practices, from which they will benefit directly in the short term, while equitable 
sharing of the benefits of conservation can counter such challenges. Finally, as 
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part of good governance, it is noted that accountability for making decisions 
needs to be placed at the appropriate level, including the central and local 
governments and community organizations. Strategic land- use planning and 
management decisions, for example, may be taken by the central government, 
operational decisions may be taken by the local government, whereas decisions 
associated with benefit- sharing may be taken by a community organization.
While the ecosystem approach’s frame of action for decentralized decision- 
 making is certainly intuitive, its implementation is not without challenges 
(Grindle 2007) and it does not rule out local opposition to a decision taken by 
the central government in the name of public interest, particularly if significant 
risks and costs are expected to impact the local level. This is often the case when 
it comes to large- scale agricultural investments, addressed below. In addition, a 
crucial question concerning implementation of benefit- sharing from natural 
resource use, including land, is its relationship with actual access to the 
resource. As noted above, replacing land- related rights with a share of benefits, 
which empirical research has shown tend to be monetary, fails to consider the 
broader benefits that people get from natural resources and at the end reproduces 
injustices, also by imposing dominant ideological, economic and development 
models (Martin et al. 2014; Dahlberg et al. 2010).
Other examples from the CBD context document the emergence of benefit- 
 sharing in land governance as an extension of biodiversity governance, with a 
focus on its enabling conditions. The programme of work on dry and sub- humid 
lands (COP Decision V/23) calls for promoting responsible resource 
management at the appropriate level through an enabling policy environment. 
Such a policy environment can be achieved, according to the decision, through 
strengthening local institutional structures for resource management, supporting 
indigenous and local techniques of resource use that enable biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable use and creating or strengthening appropriate 
institutions for land tenure and conflict resolution. Maintaining the socio- cultural 
diversity of indigenous and local communities is further endorsed as a goal for 
the programme of work (COP Decision VIII/2).
The above- mentioned Akwé: Kon guidelines aim to support the incorporation 
of cultural, environmental and social considerations related to indigenous 
peoples and local communities into new or existing impact assessment proced-
ures, indicating that traditional legal tools such as impact assessments can be 
used to build the enabling conditions and allow for meaningful identification and 
sharing of benefits arising from an investment or development. Impact 
assessments can thus be used to identify and weight the expected cultural, social 
and environmental costs and impacts of proposed developments, as well as 
opportunities and potential benefits for the communities (Morgera and 
Tsioumani 2010). The guidelines specifically call for assessing the impacts of 
proposed developments on traditional systems of land tenure and other uses of 
natural resources, noting that developments that involve changes to traditional 
practices for food production, or the introduction of commercial cultivation and 
harvesting of a particular wild species, may lead to pressures to restructure 
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traditional land tenure systems or expropriate land, as well as pressures on 
biodiversity (para. 47). The guidelines thus frame changes to traditional land 
tenure systems as potentially negative impacts that need to be assessed prior to a 
proposed development, with the argument that such changes can have far- 
 reaching ramifications, while the assessment should take into account the 
community’s value systems. In addition, the baseline studies to determine the 
scope of impact assessments should address, among other areas, traditional 
systems of production and asset distribution, including ownership, land tenure 
arrangements and rights related to natural resources (para. 44). Interestingly, 
such rights and customary arrangements are framed as benefits. This shows that, 
in the context of land governance, the benefits are largely linked to decision- 
 making capacity, i.e. who has the authority to make decision and thus maintains 
control over the actual resource, the land. This matter of control is also reflected 
in another provision, stating that indigenous and local communities should be 
involved in the financial auditing processes of the proposed developments, to 
ensure that the resources invested are used effectively (para. 46).
The guidelines provide examples of potential economic benefits, such as job 
creation within safe and hazard- free working environments, viable revenue from 
the levying of appropriate fees, access to markets and diversification of income 
opportunities. They clearly link such expected economic benefits with potential 
negative impacts, such as crime and sexually transmitted diseases (para. 40), 
implying directly that benefit- sharing requires first an assessment of costs and 
benefits. In a rare reference to intra- community benefit- sharing, they note that 
the impact assessment process should take into consideration the possible effects 
of a proposed development on the community by ensuring that particular indi-
viduals or groups are not unjustly advantaged or disadvantaged (para. 51).
Τhe UNCCD also features several provisions on benefit- sharing from the use 
of local and traditional knowledge related to natural resource management in 
drylands (UNCCD Secretariat 2005). Recognizing the value of local and 
traditional knowledge for sustainable land management, it promotes its 
exchange, with appropriate return of the benefits derived from it to the local 
populations concerned, on an equitable basis and on mutually agreed terms 
(Art. 16). It further calls for its integration and validation in research and 
development processes, again ensuring that its owners will directly benefit from 
any commercial utilization or technological development derived from it 
(Art. 17) and it specifically acknowledges traditional knowledge with regard to 
technology transfer (Art. 18).
The UNCCD Strategic Plan and Framework 2008–201818 seemed to imply a 
form of benefit- sharing, linking livelihoods with benefits derived from income 
generated from sustainable land management. Under Strategic Objective 1, ‘To 
improve the living conditions of affected populations’, people living in areas 
affected by desertification/land degradation and drought were to have an 
improved and more diversified livelihood base and to benefit from income gener-
ated from sustainable land management (Expected Impact 1.1). This linkage, 
however, was not retained in the new UNCCD Strategic Framework 2018–2030.19 
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In the new framework, sustainable land management is linked to the generation of 
global environmental benefits related to biodiversity and climate (Strategic 
Objective 4), while improving the living conditions of populations affected by 
desertification, land degradation and drought is a separate objective (Strategic 
Objective 2).
Adopted 20 years later, in 2012, as the first comprehensive international 
instrument on land governance, the VGGT offer useful elements for the 
conceptualization and application of the concept of benefit- sharing in land use 
for food security and rural livelihoods purposes, with regard to distribution of 
benefits from state- owned land, including in the case of large- scale agricultural 
investments. Lack of clarity persists, however, on the relationship between 
benefit- sharing and tenure rights. These elements are explored in detail below 
as specific regulatory applications of benefit- sharing in land use, alongside 
farmers’ rights.
Status and applications of fair and equitable benefit- 
 sharing in land governance
Farmers’ rights
The concept of farmers’ rights, enshrined in the ITPGRFA and also discussed in 
international human rights processes, including the recently adopted UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Peasants, has a central role in the exploration and 
assessment of benefit- sharing in agriculture. This section will discuss the origin 
and rationale of farmers’ rights, with a focus on farmers’ right to benefit- sharing, 
its legal basis, implementation challenges and linkages with land rights, in an 
effort to construct a broad interpretation. A case study examines access to 
markets for smallholder farmers, a topic illustrating the interlinkages among 
benefit- sharing and its supporting elements and enabling conditions, including 
land rights, and highlights the need for a comprehensive analysis of complex 
governance frameworks.
Origin and rationale
The emergence of the legal concept of farmers’ rights is a result of equity- , 
justice- and conservation- related considerations. Farming communities around 
the world have been developing crop varieties for centuries. Until recently, 
agricultural innovation was farmer- led, and depended upon farmers’ seed 
exchange and crop management systems aiming to ensure both the conservation 
and development of agricultural biodiversity, and the sustainability and 
adaptability of production. Mainly as a subsistence strategy, farmers around the 
world have maintained a high genetic diversity of plants and animals, as well as 
different location- specific bodies of traditional knowledge and farming 
practices. Agricultural biodiversity is thus the outcome of interactions among 
the genetic resource (the seed), the environment (the surrounding ecosystem and 
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natural resources) and farmers’ management systems, practices and knowledge 
(Tsioumani et al. 2016).
Traditional crop varieties, serving as reservoirs of agricultural biodiversity, 
provide a much required safety valve in the face of threats such as pests, 
diseases and environmental stresses. With the primary emphasis being not on 
high yields and productivity, but on resilience and risk- adverse qualities in the 
face of harsh, variable and unpredictable conditions, they provide the raw 
material for modern scientific varieties, forming the basis of scientific plant 
breeding. As a result, they form the basis of local and global food security.
An increasing body of literature has been linking the loss of agricultural 
biodiversity to incidents of collapse of local agricultural production, food insec-
urity, social vulnerability and loss of livelihoods and cultural diversity (Thrupp 
2000; Fraser 2003; Jacques and Racine Jacques 2012). Historical and current 
examples show that crop genetic uniformity, combined with specific socio- 
 economic conditions of either localized or global nature, ‘invites disaster’ (FAO 
1993: 8). The Irish Potato Famine is one such example of dramatic proportions. 
Between 1845 and 1850, a potato blight triggered a famine that killed or 
displaced 25% of the Irish population, while at the same time food exports from 
Ireland increased (Kinealy 1997). A watershed in Irish history, the Great Famine 
still illustrates how agricultural management based on crop uniformity made the 
potato crop vulnerable to a pest outbreak, while a series of cultural, social and 
economic forces made the country’s peasant population completely dependent 
on the potato (Fraser 2003). More recently, in the 1970s, genetic uniformity left 
the US maize crop vulnerable to a blight that reduced yields by 50% and 
destroyed almost US$1 billion- worth of maize. At the same time, the grassy- 
 stunt virus devastated rice fields from India to Indonesia, endangering the 
world’s most important food crop. After a four- year screening of over 17,000 
cultivated and wild rice samples, a gene providing disease resistance was found 
in a single wild rice population in Uttar Pradesh, India, enabling the 
development of the hybrids currently grown in Asia and confirming the value of 
wild crop relatives as source material of modern varieties (FAO 1993).
Uniform production is vulnerable not only to pests but also to market shocks. 
Fifty years after the Great Famine, the Greek raisin crisis, stemming from the 
collapse of raisin export markets, resulted in the loss of livelihoods for thou-
sands of farmers and major riots, eventually driving the country’s first migration 
wave of 1890–1910 (Aroni- Tsichli 2000). On the other hand, agricultural 
biodiversity and crop diversification is linked to not only environmental, but also 
socio- economic resilience (Elfstrand et al. 2011). Research by Bioversity Inter-
national (2018), for instance, shows that planting different varieties of the same 
crop greatly reduces pest and disease damage, while forgotten and neglected 
varieties are increasingly being used to improve dietary diversity, health and 
nutrition as well as enhance livelihoods and food security through marketing of 
specialized products.
The value of agricultural biodiversity, however, resulting from the contributions 
of farming communities worldwide, is not adequately reflected in mainstream 
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agricultural production. The modernization of agriculture and the green revolu-
tion dramatically increased world food production through scientific and techno-
logical advances, including modern plant breeding. The professiona lization of 
breeding and the emergence of the commercial seed sector, however, promoted 
the uniformization of crop varieties, which resulted in the marginali zation of 
customary farmer practices and varieties, and the erosion of agricultural 
biodiversity. The promotion of IPRs over crop varieties, examined in the first 
chapter, alongside insecure land tenure, and seed marketing and food safety 
regulations, explored below, have further marginalized, or in cases criminalized, 
customary farmer practices and informal seed systems.
The availability of high- quality seeds of different crops and varieties to suit 
farmers’ needs is necessary to ensure sustainability of production and farmers’ 
livelihoods. Smallholders in particular are involved in different seed systems in 
order to obtain or produce seed to fulfil their needs. According to the FAO 
(2018), these systems can be divided into two interlinked types: formal and 
informal or local ones.
Formal seed systems are similar throughout the world. They are clearly 
constructed and regulated systems involving a chain of activities, usually 
starting with plant breeding and selection, resulting in different types of vari-
eties, including hybrids, and leading to variety certification and marketing. Their 
aim is to produce seed of optimal physical, physiological and sanitary quality, 
and to maintain the identity and purity of the variety. Seed marketing and 
distribution usually takes place through official outlets, although seed may also 
be distributed by research institutes. A central premise of the formal system is 
the clear distinction between ‘seed’ and ‘grain’ (Sperling et al. 2014).
Informal or local seed systems, on the other hand, tend to be locally organized 
and include most of the other ways in which farmers produce, access and 
exchange seed: from their own harvest, or from friends, family and local markets. 
In contrast to formal systems, varieties may be heterogeneous and the seed of 
variable quality and purity (Almekinders et al. 1994). There is not necessarily a 
distinction between ‘seed’ and ‘grain’, and seed selection and multiplication are 
usually integrated in the production process. Seed- related activities do not follow 
quality standards and regulations but are guided by local knowledge and social 
norms (McGuire 2008).
Extensive literature shows that informal seed systems are the most important 
source of food crop seeds for smallholders in developing countries, and that they 
should be supported as complementary to the formal one through an integrated 
approach in breeding, and seed production and distribution (Almekinders et al. 
1994; Sperling et al. 2014). The importance of informal seed systems for 
farmers’ livelihoods has been well documented around the world, including 
across Africa (McGuire and Sperling 2016), the Andes (Thiele 1999), Brazil 
(Santilli 2013) and Central America (Almekinders et al. 1994). This literature 
shows the role of informal seed systems in building ecological and socio- 
 economic resilience, promoting biodiversity conservation, supporting com-
munity cohesion and even sustaining peace in countries in fragile situations and 
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those affected by conflict (FAO 2018). Nevertheless, the current regulatory 
framework, fit for the formal seed sector, fails the informal seed systems by 
paying little attention to their special requirements and dynamic character. This 
regulatory framework includes not only the usually cited IPR framework, but 
also crop variety control systems, and seed certification and quality control 
regulations (Louwaars 2007), which limit in particular smallholders’ access to 
seed markets, as explored below.
The concept of farmers’ rights emerged partly as a response to this hostile 
regulatory framework. It was a reaction to the asymmetry between farmers as 
donors of germplasm in the form of traditional seeds and the producers of 
commercial varieties that ultimately rely on such germplasm. While commercial 
varieties were protected and generated returns on the basis of plant breeders’ 
rights and other IPRs, there was no system of compensation, reward or incentive 
for the providers of the traditional germplasm. At the same time, farmers’ rights 
were meant to ensure that the restrictions in use associated with IPRs would not 
adversely affect farmers’ practices. That means that farmers should not only be 
allowed to continue, but also encouraged and supported in their contribution to 
the conservation and development of agricultural biodiversity and food security 
globally. Farmers’ rights are therefore seen not only as a means towards equity 
but also as a crucial tool for conservation (Correa 2000).
Legal basis
Farmers’ rights were first introduced into the International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources as an Agreed Interpretation of the Undertaking, adopted by 
FAO Resolution 4/89. In this Resolution, participating states recognized the 
‘enormous contribution that farmers of all regions have made to the conservation 
and development of plant genetic resources, which constitute the basis of plant 
production throughout the world, and which form the basis for the concept of 
Farmers’ Rights’. In addition, Resolution 5/89 on farmers’ rights introduced the 
element of benefit- sharing, acknowledging that ‘farmers, especially those in 
developing countries, should benefit fully from the improved and increased use 
of the natural resources they have preserved’. Farmers’ rights were recognized in 
the latter Resolution as arising from the past, present and future contributions of 
farmers in conserving, improving and making available plant genetic resources, 
particularly in the centres of origin/diversity. These rights were vested in the 
international community, as trustee for present and future generations of farmers, 
for the purpose of ensuring full benefits to farmers, and supporting the continu-
ation of their contributions (Tsioumani 2014; Andersen 2005).
The issue of farmers’ rights was debated intensely during the ITPGRFA nego-
tiations and was eventually left to the responsibility of national governments. The 
Treaty acknowledges farmers’ ‘enormous contribution’ to the conservation and 
development of plant genetic resources (Art. 9(1)) and obliges governments to 
assume responsibility for upholding them; it stops short, however, of actually 
defining farmers’ rights. Rather, it sets out measures a party should take to 
Benefit-sharing in land governance  73
protect and promote them, including: the protection of traditional knowledge; the 
right to equitably participate in sharing benefits arising from the utilization of 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; and the right to participate in 
decision- making at the national level on related matters (Art. 9(2)).
Interestingly enough, the Treaty reaches no final conclusion with regard to 
farmers’ seed- related rights and their link to IPRs. Instead, it states that ‘nothing 
in this Article shall be interpreted to limit any rights that farmers have to save, 
use, exchange and sell farm- saved seed/propagating material, subject to national 
law and as appropriate’ (Art. 9(3)). It does not, therefore, limit the customary 
rights of farmers to reuse, exchange or sell farm- saved seeds. Nor does it 
safeguard these rights by establishing an international legal basis for their 
protection. To add to the confusion, the ITPGRFA preamble states that:
the rights recognized in this Treaty to save, use, exchange and sell farm- 
 saved seed and other propagating material, and to participate in decision- 
 making regarding, and in the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising from, the use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, are 
fundamental to the realization of farmers’ rights, as well as the promotion of 
farmers’ rights at national and international levels.
Although the preamble uses a positive formulation to refer to seed rights, a 
contextual interpretation would suggest that it refers to seed rights as and if 
protected at the national level. It is therefore difficult to argue that the 
ITPGRFA creates an international legal basis for implementation of farmers’ 
seed- related rights in view of the shrinking exemptions to plant breeders’ rights 
and patents examined in the first chapter. The Treaty provisions can, however, 
be used to justify national policies providing the necessary space for informal 
seed systems and for farm- saved seed exchanges as a means of supporting 
smallholders’ livelihoods.
Additional arguments can be found in the 2010 Nagoya Protocol on ABS, 
adopted under the CBD, which sets out an obligation on parties not to restrict 
the customary use and exchange of genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge within and among indigenous peoples and local communities 
(Nagoya Protocol Art. 12(4)). This provision envisages that states should avoid 
placing restrictions on traditional use and exchanges within communities, par-
ticularly as long as such traditional use and exchange contribute to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits. The rationale is the recognition that, due to the inseparable 
nature of genetic resources and traditional knowledge for indigenous peoples 
and local communities, recognized in the Protocol’s preamble, traditional use 
and exchanges of genetic resources are essential for the preservation and con-
tinued evolution of traditional knowledge, and for the preservation of 
communities’ cultural identities. The provision thus represents an elaboration of 
the more general obligation under the CBD to ‘protect and encourage customary 
use of biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural practices that 
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are compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements’ (CBD 
Art. 10(c)); Glowka and Normand 2013). With a scope broader than PGRFA, it 
can be used to reinforce seed rights at the national level.
An international legal basis for the protection of seed- related farmers’ rights 
may be emerging as a result of developments in the human rights realm (Berger 
and Tsioumani 2019). In his 2009 report to the UN General Assembly, Olivier 
De Schutter, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food at the time, highlighted 
the interaction between farmers’ rights, farmers’ seed systems and the human 
right to food, pointing out that a human rights framework may assist states in 
addressing challenges related to agrobiodiversity conservation and the needs of 
smallholder farmers in the context of industrialized agriculture (De Schutter 
2009). The right to adequate food has been affirmed in several international 
instruments, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (ICESCR), which imposes on states three levels of obligations: 
respecting existing access to adequate food; protecting the right to food; and 
fulfilling the right to food (De Schutter 2009). The introduction of legislative or 
other measures creating obstacles to the reliance of farmers on informal seed 
systems, or the failure to regulate the activities of IPR holders, could deprive 
farmers from a means to achieve their livelihoods and could therefore violate 
these obligations. In addition, states should be proactive and take measures to 
‘improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by 
making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating know-
ledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian 
systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and 
utilization of natural resources’ (Art. 11(2)(a)).
When it comes to the need for states to take a proactive approach to 
implementation, the normative content of the right to food has also been 
clarified in the 2004 Right to Food Guidelines, which call on states to promote 
agricultural research and development, ‘in particular to promote basic food 
production with its positive effects on basic incomes and its benefits to small 
and women farmers, as well as poor consumers’ (Guideline 8.4). It should be 
noted that the Right to Food Guidelines were the first international instrument to 
articulate explicitly the relationship between the right to food, land tenure and 
agricultural biodiversity including plant genetic resources.20 In particular, states 
should take measures to promote and protect land tenure security, especially 
with respect to women, and poor and disadvantaged segments of society, and 
consider establishing legal and policy mechanisms that advance land reform to 
enhance access to land for the poor and women, and promote land conservation 
and sustainable use (Guidelines 8.1 and 8.10). In addition, states should consider 
policies to prevent the erosion and ensure the conservation and sustainable use 
of genetic resources for food and agriculture, including through traditional 
knowledge protection, benefit- sharing and participation of farmers and local and 
indigenous communities in national decision- making on relevant matters 
(Guideline 8.12). Therefore, access to land and natural resources, to outcomes of 
agricultural research and development and to agricultural biodiversity including 
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plant genetic resources for food and agriculture are considered in the Guidelines 
as means towards the realization of the right to food. The Guidelines further 
recognize protection of traditional knowledge, benefit- sharing and participation 
in decision- making processes as means for the conservation and sustainable use 
of agricultural biodiversity, although they do not refer to them as farmers’ rights. 
Unfortunately, they offer no further guidance on the relationship between the 
right to food, land tenure and agricultural biodiversity including plant genetic 
resources, a relationship which remains little understood in international 
policymaking and understudied in academic scholarship. Continuing debates on 
the implementation of farmers’ rights under the ITPGRFA, as well as the 
recently adopted UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants, can provide oppor-
tunities for better understanding.
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants constitutes a valuable addition 
to the international legal basis of farmers’ rights, providing useful elements for 
their conceptualization and implementation. It clearly states that peasants and 
other people working in rural areas have the right to seeds, including the right to 
save, use, exchange and sell their farm- saved seed or propagating material, and 
the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their own seeds and traditional 
knowledge (Art. 19(1)(d) and 19(2)). These rights are accompanied by a range 
of obligations for states, including taking measures to respect, protect and fulfil 
the right to seeds, recognizing peasants’ rights to rely on their own seeds and to 
decide on the crops they wish to grow, and supporting peasant seed systems 
(Art. 19(3), 19(5) and 19(6)). At the same time, other obligations for states 
address the relationship between agricultural research and development, seed 
policies and IPRs and peasants’ needs and livelihoods. States must thus ensure 
the availability of sufficient and affordable quality seeds (Art. 19(4)), take meas-
ures to ensure that agricultural research and development integrates peasants’ 
needs and invest in research that responds to their needs (Art. 19(7)) and ensure 
that seed policies, plant variety protection and other intellectual property laws, 
certification schemes and seed marketing laws respect and take into account 
peasants’ rights, needs and realities (Art. 19(8)).
Development of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants has been 
informed by the work of UN Special Rapporteurs, including former Rapporteur 
on the Right to Food Olivier De Schutter, who has elaborated on rights related to 
access to seeds, benefit- sharing, as well as the distribution of benefits of scient-
ific progress in the agricultural context. Olivier De Schutter has noted that 
states’ obligation to fulfil the right to food implies strengthening access to and 
utilization of resources and means to ensure people’s livelihoods, including food 
security, and improving food production methods by making full use of 
technical and scientific knowledge, in accordance with the provisions of the 
ICESCR and the Right to Food Guidelines (ICESCR Arts 11(2)(a) and 15(1)(b) 
and Guideline 8.4). These obligations apply both to the regulation of the 
commercial seed system and to the preservation and enhancement of informal 
ones. He has further noted that human rights obligations imply that the 
commercial seed system needs to be regulated in order to ensure that farmers 
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have access to inputs, including non- open- access seeds ‘on reasonable con-
ditions’, and that innovations leading to improved varieties and resources benefit 
all farmers, including the most vulnerable and marginalized ones. It follows, at 
the same time, that states should ensure that informal, non- commercial seed 
systems can be developed and protected from interference and pressures 
imposed by the commercial seed sector (De Schutter 2009).
These considerations, along with the elements provided for in the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Peasants, can provide useful guidance with regard 
to the implementation of farmers’ rights as set out in the ITPGRFA. Such ele-
ments relate both to seed rights as explored above, and to rights to land and 
natural resource use, association, education and training, and development, 
addressed below. These elements may also be used to illuminate the right to 
benefit- sharing as provided for in ITPGRFA Article 9 on farmers’ rights.
Conceptualization
When it comes to national- level implementation of farmers’ right to benefit- 
 sharing, the Treaty provision on farmers’ rights does not provide any specific 
guidance. A more systematic examination of relevant ITPGRFA provisions is 
necessary in this regard, with a view to determining which of the possible 
types of benefit- sharing are relevant, including facilitated access to plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture, the exchange of information, access 
to and transfer of technology, capacity- building and the sharing of monetary 
and other benefits arising from commercialization (ITPGRFA Art. 13).
As detailed in the first chapter, benefit- sharing within the ITPGRFA frame-
work is multilateral (supported by a multilateral fund), rather than bilateral 
(based on bilateral, contractual arrangements between providers of genetic 
resources and commercial users). In the same vein, farmers’ rights are collective 
rights. Identifying specific individual farmers that develop varieties later utilized 
in commercial breeding would be virtually impossible in view of the continuous 
experimentation and exchanges among farmers and farmer communities. Thus, 
monetary and non- monetary benefits stemming from the Treaty’s Multilateral 
System are to be shared with farmers, particularly in developing countries, 
through the projects funded by the ITPGRFA Benefit- sharing Fund.
I understand this multilateral approach to benefit- sharing as aiming both to 
reward and to enable farmers’ contribution to the conservation and sustainable 
use of agricultural biodiversity and thus to sustainable agriculture and global 
food security, as global public goods. As part of farmers’ rights, benefit- sharing 
appears to operate in two arguably distinct but interlinked forms. The first is 
the sharing of the benefits arising from the past and present contribution of 
farmers to the utilization of genetic resources for research and development 
purposes, and the possible commercialization of the resulting varieties or 
products. In this form of benefit- sharing, farmers are the beneficiaries, entitled 
to part of the monetary and non- monetary benefits arising from such research 
and development efforts. The second form relates to the benefits arising from 
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the contributions of smallholder farmers, indigenous peoples and local com-
munities as users and stewards of agricultural biodiversity on- farm. These 
benefits flow to humanity at large as global public goods, and may be con-
sidered as part of a set of rights, which would enable farmers’ continued contri-
bution to the stewardship of the resources in the future (Tsioumani 2014). 
Through this twin ‘reward and enable’ approach, benefit- sharing is linked to 
farmers’ and peasants’ rights in their broad sense.
This approach resonates with the findings of the first phase of the Farmers’ 
Rights Project, a ten- year project carried out by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute. In 
these findings, Regine Andersen distinguishes two approaches to the under-
standing of farmers’ rights: the ownership approach and the stewardship 
approach. The ownership approach refers to the right of farmers to be rewarded 
for genetic material obtained from their fields, which is used in commercial 
varieties and/or protected with IPRs, while the stewardship approach refers to 
the rights that farmers must be granted and the legal space created to enable 
them to continue as stewards of agricultural biodiversity (Andersen 2006). She 
notes that respondents to the project’s questionnaire indicated preference for the 
stewardship approach, adding that the ownership approach could lead to a 
‘tragedy of the anticommons’ – a term coined by Michael Heller to describe a 
situation where numerous rights holders of a single resource prevent others 
from using it, eventually obstructing socially desirable outcomes (Heller 1998). 
Mirroring Garrett Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, where a resource is 
prematurely exhausted because no one has the right to exclude (Hardin 1968), 
the tragedy of the anticommons refers to a situation where too many parties 
hold a right to exclude with respect to a particular property or resource, 
meaning that several permissions must be obtained for use, due to overlapping 
ownership claims. The term has been used since to describe the failure to 
innovate due to competing patent claims (Heller and Eisenberg 1998).
Andersen further highlights the limited demand for farmers’ varieties among 
commercial breeders, which would mean that few farmers would benefit, and 
difficulties to identify exactly which farmer should be rewarded because of 
farmers’ sharing practices. These remarks indicate that the ownership approach 
envisages a bilateral model of benefit- sharing, rather than the multilateral model 
favoured by the ITPGRFA as better reflecting the specificities of the agricultural 
sector. As examined below, however, domestic implementing measures take 
various approaches and clear understanding seems to be lacking.
A multilateral approach to benefit- sharing in combination with the ‘reward 
and enable’ approach proposed above suggests that farmers should not only be 
rewarded in monetary terms for their contribution, but should also be supported 
to continue their practices, which contribute to the conservation of genetic 
diversity. Such an interpretation of farmers’ rights, including the right to benefit- 
 sharing, would be in line with the Treaty provisions on conservation, explora-
tion, collection, characterization, evaluation and documentation of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture (ITPGRFA Art. 5), which requires parties to 
promote or support farmers’ and local communities’ efforts to manage and 
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conserve on- farm their plant genetic resources for food and agriculture 
(Argumedo et al. 2011). This provision should be read together with Article 6 
on sustainable use, which calls for the development of legal and policy meas-
ures, including on promoting the expanded use of local and locally adapted 
crops, supporting the wider use of a diversity of varieties and species in on- farm 
management and reviewing regulations on variety release and seed distribution. 
Farmers’ rights are therefore among the preconditions for the achievement of the 
Treaty’s objectives concerning the conservation and sustainable use of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture, for sustainable agriculture and food 
security (ITPGRFA Art. 1). Additional guidance with regard to their 
implementation at the national and local levels would therefore support 
implementation of the Treaty’s objectives. Expert groups on farmers’ rights, and 
PGRFA conservation and sustainable use, recently established under the 
auspices of the Treaty, will be contributing to this direction.
In line with the above, secure land tenure is a necessary precondition for con-
tinuation of farmers’ contribution and a core enabling condition for the 
implementation of farmers’ rights. Land, along with other natural resources such 
as water, constitutes the necessary resource base for farmers’ livelihoods and 
their continued contribution to agrobiodiversity conservation. As explored above, 
access to seeds, including traditional varieties and commercial seeds at reason-
able prices, is another enabling condition. In addition, implementation of benefit- 
 sharing as an element of farmers’ rights may also include supporting measures, 
such as legal recognition of customary agricultural practices, assistance in the 
organization of community- based structures such as cooperatives and local seed 
banks, training and collaboration activities between farmers and scientists or 
professional breeders and access to markets, as examined below.
Implementation challenges
When it comes to farmers’ rights implementation, or lack thereof, two (very 
generalized) tendencies can be identified in the literature: a ‘celebratory’ one, 
highlighting success stories and best practices, thus pointing to positive 
examples of implementation of farmers’ rights and implicitly highlighting the 
available legal space and the potential for mutual supportiveness between 
environment- and trade- related legal instruments, and a ‘denunciatory’ one, 
highlighting cases of violation of farmers’ rights and implicitly or explicitly 
calling for more radical socio- economic change. These two tendencies are 
exemplified by the research outputs produced by the Farmers’ Rights Project, on 
the one hand (Andersen and Winge 2013), and GRAIN, a non- profit organization 
focusing on smallholder farmers and social movements on the other (GRAIN 
2019a, 2019b).
Both academic and grey literature have focused more on seed rights than 
other elements, including benefit- sharing, protection of traditional knowledge 
and participation in decision- making processes, or the enabling conditions and 
supporting measures identified above. The focus on seed rights can be attributed 
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both to the role of seed for peasant autonomy and farmers’ livelihoods, and to 
the symbolic character the seed has acquired in broader agrarian struggles for 
social justice. At the same time, the seeds and varieties developed by farmers are 
based on their traditional knowledge and may reflect the status of enabling con-
ditions, including access to land, so vibrant farmer seed systems can be con-
sidered an indicator of traditional knowledge protection and of undisturbed 
access to supporting mechanisms identified above.
In the first chapter, I touched upon the varying legal patterns with regard to 
the implementation (or not) of seed rights in the context of IPR- related and 
human rights obligations, noting they range from the judicial declaration of the 
primacy of patent rights over the right of the physical owner of the seed to save 
and replant in North America (Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser; Bowman v. 
Monsanto Co.)21 to India’s legislation establishing rights for farmers to save, 
use, exchange and sell farm- saved seed (Ragavan and O’ Shields 2007; Winge 
et al. 2013; Peschard 2014). Comparative legal analyses of implementation are 
rare. This could be attributed to the highly technical nature of the implementing 
legislation and the interlinkages among issue areas including agriculture, trade 
and environment. Karine Peschard (2017) is an exception; building on 
Andersen’s conceptualization of farmers’ rights’ implementation in the context 
of an ownership or a stewardship approach (addressed above), and on the basis 
of a literature review and interviews, she examines the legal framework and 
practical implementation of farmers’ rights in India and Brazil, two megadiverse 
countries with a high percentage of smallholder farmers. She concludes that 
India promotes an ownership approach to farmers’ rights, having established a 
comprehensive piece of legislation on farmers’ and plant breeders’ rights (2001 
Act on Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights), which protects the 
rights of farmers to save, use, exchange and sell farm- saved seed within a 
conventional IPR framework. She shows that, despite the progressive intentions 
and extensive rights granted, including the ‘remarkable achievement’ related to 
the unambiguous recognition of the right to ‘save, use, sow, re- sow, exchange, 
share or sell seeds, including from protected varieties, as well as harvested 
materials’, a decade of implementation had no significant impact on farmers’ 
rights or agricultural biodiversity conservation on the ground. She highlights in 
particular challenges arising from the right for farmers to register their varieties 
in the same way as breeders. This results in an uneven playing field, in which 
farmers’ varieties enter a system developed to meet the different needs and cri-
teria of the commercial seed sector, ultimately contradicting the objective of 
biodiversity conservation. Brazil, on the other hand, she argues, leans towards a 
stewardship approach, although farmers’ rights are addressed more as 
exceptions to plant breeders’ rights. Similarly, according to the Brazilian Seed 
Act, farmer varieties are exempted from registration with the national registry, 
while their inclusion in public programmes of seed distribution and exchange is 
ensured. This was in line with the strategies of Brazilian farmers’ organizations 
and activists, who opposed the introduction of property rights on farmer vari-
eties or the creation of centralized registries for such varieties.
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It should be made clear that seed production and commercialization in all 
countries with formal seed systems around the globe are generally regulated by 
two separate sets of regulations, operating in parallel: the IPR system, and seed 
and variety certification and marketing regulations. There are regional and 
national variations. In North America, for instance, state involvement in seed 
markets is minimal; certification is voluntary and variety release is the respons-
ibility of the seed company (Louwaars 2007). At the same time, companies’ 
control of the market via IPRs, in particular patents, is strong, as addressed in 
the previous chapter, and patents are enforced through contracts and the judicial 
system. In Europe, on the other hand, seed certification and variety registration 
in official catalogues are part of the mandatory authorization process for entry in 
the seed market. The objective is to control varietal identity and purity, and seed 
health, so as to make only quality seed of varieties of proven value available to 
farmers (Louwaars 2007). At the same time, though, this has an impact on 
informal seed systems, and thus agrobiodiversity conservation and farmers’ 
rights, by marginalizing farmers’ varieties and hampering access to seed 
markets. Some countries have attempted to remedy this by establishing deroga-
tions for farmers’ seeds and varieties, as in the case of Brazil, addressed above. 
In the EU, rules on ‘conservation varieties’ set different requirements for the 
recognition and inclusion of such varieties in national catalogues. Although they 
were specifically designed to soften the seed regulations that hindered the 
conservation and sustainable use of crop genetic diversity, they were criticized 
for remaining too restrictive (Andersen 2013).
In fact, the EU regulations make an interesting case study of the interlinkages 
between conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources, benefit- 
 sharing and access to seed markets. EU Directive 2008/62 on conservation vari-
eties22 provides that such varieties may be approved for cultivation and 
marketing even when they do not meet the general requirements for recognition 
of varieties and sale of seeds and propagating material set in the relevant general 
directives.23 The Directive sets different guidelines for seed production and 
marketing, and for the recognition and inclusion in national catalogues, for vari-
eties which are naturally adapted to local and regional conditions and are 
threatened by genetic erosion, and are of interest for the conservation of plant 
genetic resources. So the scope of the Directive is quite narrow already, as 
conservation varieties need to be threatened by genetic erosion, in addition to 
being of interest for conservation and be adapted to local conditions (which 
could potentially apply to all farmers’ varieties). Considering these terms apply 
and the variety in question is submitted for approval by the national authority, 
some exceptions to the general seed and variety- related requirements apply: 
while conservation varieties must meet the normal requirements of distinctness, 
uniformity and stability for approval, and must conform to the usual certification 
requirements, application of the uniformity requirement and of the requirement 
for minimum varietal purity may be more flexible. At the same time, however, 
there are several restrictions. The seed of conservation varieties may be 
produced only in their region of origin, and the varieties can only be cultivated 
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and marketed there; the quantity of seed marketed should not exceed 0.5% of the 
seed of the same species cultivated in the country in one growing season or 
alternatively a quantity necessary to sow 100 hectares, while for certain species 
stricter provisions apply; seeds of conservation varieties may be marketed only 
by authorized seed shops in their region of origin. This list of requirements has 
justifiably given rise to criticism and doubts as to whether the Directive serves 
its objective of conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources; 
farmers need to go through a highly complicated approval process and, even if 
their seed is approved, they are still prohibited from selling it unless through an 
authorized seed shop in the region of origin.
Directive 2009/145 on vegetable landraces24 aims to facilitate the sale of seed 
with no intrinsic value to commercial producers, but which have been developed 
for growing under particular conditions. In addition to the general aim of 
protecting plant genetic resources, the particular interest of preserving these 
varieties, as stated in the Directive, lies in their ability to grow in particular cli-
matic, soil or agronomical conditions. It addresses conservation varieties of 
vegetables according to the same definitions and criteria of Directive 2008/62 
with regard to registration, marketing and certification requirements, although 
seed quantity restrictions are calculated differently, as well as vegetable varieties 
with no intrinsic value for commercial crop production, also known as ‘amateur’ 
varieties. The requirements for the amateur varieties are less restrictive than 
those established for conservation varieties; there are no geographic restrictions 
for their marketing related to their region of origin, and no need to showcase risk 
of genetic erosion. At the same time, though, amateur varieties’ seeds can be 
sold in small packages only, so they are destined for gardeners rather than 
professional farmers (Andersen 2013; Spataro and Negri 2013).
In the EU setting, the interlinkages and trade- offs between conservation and 
sustainable use of agricultural biodiversity and farmers’ rights, on the one hand, 
and agricultural productivity and marketing requirements, on the other, are 
partly illustrated by the Kokopelli case and related judgment of the European 
Court of Justice.25 The facts of the case, set in 2005, are as following: Kokopelli 
is a non- profit association which sells seed of traditional vegetable and flower 
varieties, without following the general registration and marketing requirements 
of the Directive on vegetable seeds. It is to be noted that the Directive on veget-
able landraces did not exist at the time. Graines Baumaux, a seed trader, 
identified 461 varieties offered for sale by Kokopelli which did not follow the 
marketing requirements. Baumaux thus commenced proceedings on grounds of 
unfair competition, claiming damages of €50,000 and seeking the removal of all 
advertising for those varieties. At first instance, the court at Nancy, France, 
found that Kokopelli and Baumaux were competitors, as they were both 
operating in the sector of traditional or ‘old’ or ‘collectors’’ seed, they were 
marketing 233 identical or similar varieties and they were supplying the same 
customers, amateur gardeners. It therefore considered that Kokopelli was 
engaging in acts of unfair competition by offering for sale vegetable seed which 
was neither in the French catalogue nor in the common catalogue of varieties of 
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vegetable species. It thus awarded Baumaux damages of €10,000 and dismissed 
the remainder of the action. The court of appeal made a preliminary reference to 
the European Court of Justice asking whether a series of seed- related directives, 
including Council Directive 2002/55 on the marketing of vegetable seed and 
Commission Directive 2009/145 on vegetable landraces, are valid in the light of 
fundamental EU rights and principles, namely, the freedom to pursue an eco-
nomic activity, proportionality, equal treatment or non- discrimination and the 
free movement of goods and also in the light of the commitments arising from 
the ITPGRFA, particularly insofar as they impose restrictions on the production 
and marketing of traditional seed and plants.
Needless to say the judicial procedures attracted a significant degree of atten-
tion from EU institutions, NGOs and farmer organizations and the seed industry 
(Bocci 2014). Advocate General Juliane Kokott delivered an opinion in favour of 
Kokopelli. While she noted that the ITPGRFA provisions cannot be used to 
challenge the validity of EU legislation on seed marketing, as they are not 
unconditional and sufficiently precise, she did conclude that the prohibition 
against the sale of seed of varieties that are not demonstrably distinct, stable and 
sufficiently uniform and, where appropriate, of satisfactory value for cultivation 
and use, established in the Directive on marketing of vegetable seed, is invalid, as 
it breaches the principle of proportionality, the free movement of goods, as well 
as the principle of equal treatment and the freedom to conduct a business under 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Particularly regarding the principle 
of proportionality, she stated that even following the adoption of the Directive on 
vegetable landraces which established derogations, the disadvantages for 
biodiversity remain disproportionate, while disadvantages for economic operators 
and consumers who wish to access traditional varieties are ‘manifestly 
disproportionate’ to the objectives of the prohibition, including productivity and 
the protection of farmers.
The Court, however, did not follow the Advocate General’s opinion. It found 
that an acceptance regime based on the requirement that the seed of vegetable 
varieties is distinct, stable and uniform serves the objectives of increased 
agricultural productivity and establishment of the internal seed market, while the 
derogating acceptance regime for landraces guarantees the conservation of plant 
genetic resources. It further noted that a regime requiring prior acceptance, 
including the prohibition of sale of unapproved seed, is appropriate in light of the 
objectives pursued, and a less restrictive measure, such as labelling, would not 
be as effective since it would allow the sale of seed that is ‘potentially harmful or 
not conducive to optimum agricultural production’. Therefore, the Court 
concluded, the EU legislature did not breach the principle of proportionality (or 
any of the other general principles the Advocate General invoked).
While a detailed analysis of EU law and this particular judgment falls outside 
the scope of this endeavour, a series of observations can be made to link this 
particular case to the issue areas addressed and my overall narrative. First, 
Kokopelli was convicted of unfair competition, not of its involvement in 
informal seed systems altogether (Bocci 2014). The specific issue at stake was 
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the fact that Kokopelli marketed traditional seeds without following the legal 
requirements. While sale is certainly linked to the viability of informal seed 
systems, particularly given the trend of reducing public funding for agricultural 
research, the two do not necessarily coincide. Second, the EU legislation seems 
to consider European farmers as consumers of seed, potentially in need of 
protection in a traditionally fraudulent market managing a fragile product. While 
this may certainly be true for at least a proportion of farmers, it fails to provide 
for those farmers who continue to conserve and develop crop genetic resources 
on- farm. This failure to provide for on- farm, user- based innovation gives 
implicit prominence to ex situ conservation of plant genetic resources. As 
pointed out by Guy Kastler and Anne- Charlotte Moÿ (2013), to allow on- farm 
management of crop genetic resources for conservation purposes, ‘the EU 
should shelve its directives for conservation varieties and … allow for more 
flexible variety lists. It should accommodate local varieties that are characterized 
by being populations and therefore are less stable and less uniform’. The refer-
ence to the criteria of stability and uniformity leads to the third observation. As 
highlighted by Riccardo Bocci (2014), the EU legislation, and the Court in its 
argumentation, ‘seems to make objectionable claims about what agricultural 
progress is and what the strategies to increase productivity are’. By linking 
productivity solely to stability and uniformity, they ignore the value of diversity 
as key to the sustainability of such productivity, particularly in the face of 
climate change. In this context, non- uniform varieties with the potential to adapt 
to different environmental, agronomical and socio- economic contexts are 
needed, also with the objective of productivity in mind.
With regard to these challenges, and with the informal seed sector still 
thriving in France (Rezvani 2020), the recent French biodiversity and agriculture 
and food laws26 put forward a series of possible solutions attempting to balance 
objectives and priorities. The new biodiversity legislation would allow the 
transfer of seeds in the public domain, including farmers’ traditional varieties, 
from non- profit associations to non- commercial users free of charge, with no 
requirement for inclusion in the national catalogue of varieties (Art. 11). The 
agriculture and food law would further allow the sale of such seeds (Art. 78). 
While strictly delineated, this solution would create an opening for the continued 
exchange of traditional seeds in the current context of industrialized and 
standardized agricultural production, and was hailed as a victory by relevant 
associations. To their dismay, however, application of both provisions was halted 
by the French Constitutional Council, which annulled them as unconstitutional 
due to procedural shortcomings (Réseau Semences Paysannes 2018).27 Denmark, 
on the other hand, has successfully legislated to allow the exchange and sale of 
‘non- commercial’ seeds between family farmers and organizations, through an 
interpretation of ‘marketing’ under the EU directives. By arguing that the EU 
directives apply only to the marketing of seeds intended for commercial 
production, practices of exchange and sale of farmers’ seeds not intended for 
commercial production were interpreted as not subject to the directives’ 
requirements and limitations (Seed Freedom 2016).28
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Still, while literature has focused more on the obstacles posed by IPRs, rather 
than by seed certification and marketing regulations affecting farmers’ access to 
seed markets (addressed below), as understanding of these linkages is growing, 
this has started to change. After examining more than 40 domestic seed laws, 
Niels Louwaars (2007) has aptly explained that variety and seed regulatory and 
control frameworks in most countries are suited to the formal seed sector, but 
fail to pay attention to farmers’ seed systems that are built on different principles 
and mechanisms and therefore have special requirements. He notes that variety 
control systems tend to limit the number of varieties available on the market and 
are not suited to identifying varieties appropriate for smallholders in 
ecologically diverse conditions, while seed certification and quality control 
regulations tend to restrict and consider illegal farmers’ seed production and 
exchange systems. He therefore calls for explicit limitations in seed laws to 
allow for the development of diversified seed systems and for emphasis on 
supporting the production and use of good- quality seed in both the formal and 
farmers’ seed systems rather than on policing the formal seed system (Louwaars 
2007). Christine Frison (2018) has further addressed the matter, highlighting the 
need for political will to soften the seed certification and registration regulations 
and allow the flexibility suited to farmer varieties.
Domestic measures on benefit- sharing are difficult to conceptualize and 
identify. They may be considered to relate to projects funded under the Treaty’s 
Benefit- sharing Fund (ITPGRFA Secretariat 2017) or other international or 
domestic programmes (Andersen and Winge 2013), and they may range from 
monetary support through domestic funds to enabling measures and supporting 
structures. This lack of clarity is reflected in the (limited) literature and points 
to the value of the work undertaken by Louisa Parks (2019) as part of the 
BeneLex project and the need for ongoing research on domestic and local 
understandings of benefit- sharing.
Among the examples identified in the literature, Peschard draws attention to 
the provisions on benefit- sharing in India’s Act, which state that farmers who 
are engaged in the conservation of genetic resources and their improvement 
through selection are entitled to receive benefits through the National Gene 
Fund. Upon registering varieties, private and public breeders must declare if they 
have used genetic resources maintained by indigenous or farmers’ communities. 
Indigenous and farmers’ communities may also file claims to the National Gene 
Fund when they believe that genetic resources from their communities have 
been used without their authorization. However, she notes that the registration of 
farmers’ varieties has not resulted in any instance of benefit- sharing yet, as no 
company has disclosed the use of a registered farmers’ variety in the 
development of a commercial cultivar (Peschard 2017).
The ITPGRFA Secretariat, in its educational module on farmers’ rights 
(2017), takes a broader approach to benefit- sharing, with a focus to projects 
funded under the Treaty’s Benefit- sharing Fund and non- monetary benefit- 
 sharing. Among other examples, it mentions the biocultural protocol for access 
and benefit- sharing developed by the communities managing the Potato Park 
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in Peru (explored in further detail in the fourth chapter), knowledge and tech-
nology dissemination by the Agronomic Research Center of the University of 
Costa Rica regarding potato varieties, including wild relatives, and establishment 
of participatory plant breeding programmes in India and Jordan that develop locally 
adapted varieties of wheat, barley, rice and maize while enhancing 
biodiversity use. The module further includes examples provided by the 
Farmers’ Rights Project (Andersen and Winge 2013), including stories on the 
Seeds of Survival project in Mali, which works to combine scientific with 
traditional knowledge regarding the improvement of local crops, aiming to 
promote long- term food security for marginal farming communities, com-
munity seed fairs in Zimbabwe, which offer a venue for local farmers to 
display the crops they grow and interact with farmers and other stakeholders, 
and a project on the revitalization of cultivation of indigenous vegetable vari-
eties promoted by the Hiroshima Prefecture in Japan and the Agricultural 
Gene Bank. The Farmers’ Rights Project further showcases examples 
including participatory barley breeding in Syria, which combines farmers’ 
knowledge with the knowledge of professional breeders, and benefit- sharing 
arising from a farmers’ organization in a cooperative in Nepal, to improve the 
generation of benefits from production and better marketing. These case 
studies indicate that implementation of benefit- sharing as part of farmers’ 
rights at the domestic and local level is inextricably linked to the remaining 
elements of farmers’ rights, including supporting measures and enabling con-
ditions, and far broader than monetary benefit- sharing, which is the main focus 
of international negotiations on benefit- sharing. This is also one of the 
conclusions of the BeneLex research on local- level expressions of benefit- 
 sharing that Louisa Parks (2019) explored, taking a broad, rights- based 
approach.
Parks (2019) analysed a series of original, local case studies, regarding 
traditional goat pastoralists on the isle of Ikaria, Greece, with questions related 
to access to land and access to markets (also addressed below), traditional 
health practitioners in Bushbuckridge, South Africa, with the discussion 
focusing on access to medicinal plants in a conservation context, Khwe resi-
dents of Bwabwata National Park, Namibia, with questions linked to wildlife 
management, residents around the Olaroz and Salinas Grandes salt flats, 
Argentina, concerning themes linked to lithium mining, and the Kelabit com-
munity of Bario, Malaysia, with questions arising on farmers’ rice varieties 
and contract farming. Two of these case studies, the Greek and the Malaysian 
ones, are of particular relevance for this analysis, as directly related to agri-
culture and food production. Parks exactly highlights that the involved com-
munities more often raised concerns linked to the conditions that need to be in 
place for discussions on benefit- sharing to begin and for the actual benefits to 
have a chance of being fair and equitable, with recognition being identified as 
a central theme, along with community organization, support from non- state 
actors, and procedural guarantees, in the context of complex governance 
structures.
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Linking farmers’ rights to land rights: constructing farmers’  
rights broadly
Human rights considerations further support a broad interpretation of farmers’ 
rights to include enabling and supporting measures as noted above, and could be 
used as guidance for domestic implementation efforts. The UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Peasants in particular puts forward a holistic approach 
encompassing human rights protected in other instruments and new standards 
for individual and collective rights (Claeys and Edelman 2019). The Declaration 
recognizes in its preamble the special relationship and interaction between 
peasants and the land, water and nature to which they are attached and on which 
they depend for their livelihood, as well as peasants’ past, present and future 
contributions to development, and biodiversity conservation and improvement, 
as the basis of food and agricultural production and global food security, which 
are fundamental to attaining the internationally agreed goals, including the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development. Although its recent adoption does not 
allow for assessment of its potential to influence domestic implementation or 
human rights jurisprudence, its value lies in two main features: its compre-
hensive, substantive approach regarding the rights of rural populations, linking 
their vulnerabilities, their special relationship to land, water, seeds and natural 
resources, and their contribution to global food security, through rights already 
protected in international law and new ones; and the bottom- up process of its 
development and negotiation. These two features will be addressed below, with 
a focus on the provisions that illuminate potential implementation avenues for 
farmers’ rights and their linkages to land and resource rights.
The Declaration includes provisions on ‘traditional’ civil and political rights, 
such as the right to life and the right of expression, often accompanied by more 
radically oriented elaborations. It also includes provisions on the so- called 
second- generation, socio- economic rights – such as the rights to work, freedom 
of association, education and training, and social insurance – and third- 
 generation, solidarity collective rights – such as the right to development and 
the right to the environment (Macklem 2015). Importantly, it includes a series 
of provisions elaborating on the right to land and to the sustainable use of 
natural resources.
A provision on the right to food (Art. 15), for instance, is accompanied by the 
right of peasants and other people working in rural areas to determine their own 
food and agriculture systems, which is recognized by many states as the right to 
food sovereignty (Art. 15(4)). ‘Food sovereignty’, a term coined by global 
peasant movement La Via Campesina at the World Food Summit in 1996, goes 
beyond food security, and refers to ‘the right of peoples to healthy and culturally 
appropriate food produced through sustainable methods and their right to define 
their own food and agriculture systems’.29 La Via Campesina, which was 
instrumental in the development of the Declaration as addressed below, sees 
food sovereignty as a ‘process of building social movements and empowering 
peoples to organize their societies in ways that transcend the neoliberal vision of 
Benefit-sharing in land governance  87
a world of commodities, markets and selfish economic actors’ (European 
Coordination Via Campesina 2018).
A provision on the right to an adequate standard of living (Art. 16) further 
refers to the right of facilitated access to the means of production, including 
production tools and technical assistance, the right to engage freely in traditional 
ways of farming, fishing, livestock rearing and forestry and the right to develop 
community- based commercialization systems. As analysed above, a far- fetching 
provision details seed rights (Art. 19), while the provision on the right to health 
includes the right to use traditional medicines (Art. 23).
Other provisions are more radically oriented towards equitable resource use, 
such as: the right of equal access, use and management of land and natural 
resources, and equal or priority treatment in land and agrarian reform schemes 
(Art. 4(2)(h)); the right of access to and sustainable use of natural resources, and 
of participation in their management (Art. 5); and the right to water, for personal 
and domestic use, but also for livelihoods- related activities (Art. 21(1) and (2)). 
These are accompanied by environmental rights and relevant state obligations, 
such as: the right to the conservation and protection of the environment and the 
productive capacity of lands and resources (Art. 18); state obligations to ensure 
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, protect relevant traditional 
knowledge and agro- ecological systems and prevent risks arising from living 
modified organisms (Art. 20); and state obligations to ensure access to water, 
including in customary and community- based water management systems, and 
protect water- related ecosystems (Art. 21(3) and (4)).
Other provisions develop interesting interlinkages, promoting ideas 
hardly explored in international law before. For instance, states facing high 
levels of rural poverty and in the absence of employment opportunities in 
other sectors shall take measures to promote sustainable food systems that 
are sufficiently labour- intensive to contribute to the creation of decent 
employment (Art. 13(4)).
Some of the provisions are particularly relevant as going beyond traditional 
approaches to create the enabling conditions for the enjoyment of all rights. 
These include participatory rights, such as: the right to participation in the 
preparation and implementation of development planning (Art. 4(2)(a)) and of 
policies and projects that may affect their lives, land and livelihoods (Art. 10); 
the right to organize associations and cooperatives (Art. 4(2)(e) and Art. 9); the 
right to information to promote empowerment (Art. 11); the right of access to 
justice and of legal assistance (Art. 12); and the right to education and training, 
including a state obligation to encourage equitable and participatory farmer– 
scientist partnerships (Art. 25).
The Declaration includes a provision on guidance for its implementation by 
UN agencies and other intergovernmental organizations (Art. 27), which is of 
particular importance given the increasing role of such organizations in the 
design and implementation of development- and climate- related projects which 
could affect the livelihoods of rural populations. A final clause, partly inspired 
by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, seeks to address the 
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concept of limits to rights and the relationship, including potential conflicts, 
between rights and other policies. It states that any limitations to the exercise of 
rights provided for in the Declaration shall be non- discriminatory and necessary 
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and for meeting the just and most compelling requirements 
of a democratic society (Art. 28).
Importantly, the Declaration asserts the right to land, individually and/or 
collectively (Art. 17), including the right to have access to, sustainably use and 
manage land and the water bodies, coastal seas, fisheries, pastures and forests, in 
addition to the right to housing (Art. 24). States are required to provide legal 
recognition for land tenure rights, including customary rights not currently pro-
tected by law, and recognize the existence of different models and systems 
(Art. 17(3)). In addition, states should consider carrying out agrarian reforms to 
facilitate broad and equitable access to land and other natural resources neces-
sary to ensure that rural populations enjoy adequate living conditions, and to 
limit excessive concentration and control of land, taking into account its social 
function (Art. 17(6)). According to my knowledge, this is the first reference to 
the social function of land in an international instrument since the Declaration 
on Social Progress and Development of the UN General Assembly30 adopted in 
1969 (times of profound social change) and thus represents an important 
novelty, particularly since social notions of property have been constantly 
challenged by free- trade agreements and commodification of land in a neoliberal 
context.
Thomas Ankersen and Thomas Ruppert (2006) offer an extensive review of 
the social function doctrine as a legal basis for land reform. Enshrined in 
several constitutions around the world, mainly in Latin America, or at a 
minimum incorporated into agrarian reform legislation and general property 
law, the social function doctrine suggests a greater role for the state in land 
policy for equity and social change than the traditional role of arbitration and 
regulation of private property relations. In this context, state protection of 
private property remains justified as far as property provides a ‘social function’. 
Landowners are thus under the obligation to ensure that their property use 
serves a social function, or risk expropriation. Throughout the twentieth 
century, the social function doctrine has provided the legal basis for rural 
development and land restructuring policies for agrarian reform. Definition of 
this social function as ‘productive use’, however, served as a perverse incentive 
for massive deforestation in Latin America; landowners sought to clear and 
fence their land to demonstrate possession and ownership, before seeking title, 
further aggravating land concentration, and resulting in conflicts with 
‘unproductive’ occupants such as indigenous peoples. The concept of social 
function was then gradually redefined, on the basis of environmental and 
human rights considerations, to accommodate other public interests such as the 
ecological function of property. As a result, possession and productive use of 
the land in many countries now includes land conservation, in addition to 
cultivation. Ankersen and Ruppert further highlight the example of Brazil, 
Benefit-sharing in land governance  89
where the concept of social function has been broadened to include the ‘socio- 
 environmental’ function of land. This means that landowners should not only 
respect ecological functions but also promote respect for rural workers. In addi-
tion, the social function doctrine has been applied in an urban context in Brazil, 
suggesting that vacant buildings may be subject to expropriation for not 
fulfilling their social function.
Fundamental in private as well as public law in many countries, and with 
significant analytical potential with respect to the role of land in different soci-
eties and in the context of different philosophies, the social function doctrine 
has received little attention in international and comparative law scholarship. 
This reference in the Declaration could, however, incentivize further academic 
research, as well as use in international legal instruments and jurisprudence. 
While its application and underlying philosophy has the potential to contribute 
to equity and justice, it would still depend on who decides and for the benefit of 
whom, with issues related to the scale of actions and power of actors involved 
gaining importance.
When it comes to the process of development of the Declaration, Priscilla 
Claeys and Marc Edelman (2019: 1) characterize it as ‘a new kind of people’s 
diplomacy and an innovative, bottom- up process of building alliances, lobbying, 
and authoring international law’. In their study, based on their own involvement 
in the negotiations, interviews and insights shared by key actors, and a literature 
review, they argue that development of the Declaration represents ‘a rare case of 
direct involvement of social movements in international law- making’. La Via 
Campesina had a leading role in the negotiations, from alliance- building and 
advocacy, to the sharing of information and analysis. Although some may find 
their account over- enthusiastic, it is undeniable that agrarian movements played 
a unique role in the negotiations, from the first call by La Via Campesina in 2001 
for recognition of peasants’ rights in debates on the right to development in the 
UN Human Rights Commission, to its adoption by the UN General Assembly on 
17 December 2018. Indeed, as Claeys and Edelman put it (2019: 29), the 
adoption of the Declaration was a ‘huge success’, providing ‘a glimpse of hope 
that multilateralism can be centred on human rights, anti- colonialism, justice and 
solidarity … even in times of rising authoritarianism’.
Time will show whether the Declaration’s emancipatory potential will become 
‘international common sense’ (Edelman 2014) and be translated into pro- poor 
policy change on the ground, at times of multiple assaults on peasant livelihoods 
resulting from land- grabbing, industrialization of agriculture, trade liberalization, 
speculation in food commodities, dismantling of public support, discrimination 
and criminalization of activists. Despite its non- binding legal nature, the 
Declaration can inspire political mobilizations for democratic control over land; 
it can legitimize and provide political leverage to previously marginalized groups 
for legal change at the domestic level; it may influence power structures and 
relationships, in order to provide authority and legal guarantees in favour of 
people whose vulnerability results in making their rights insecure; it may also 
inform land restitution processes in cases of historic patterns of enclosure and 
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dispossession (Franco et al. 2015). This can be particularly important not only 
with regard to implementation of farmers’ rights, but also in the context of the 
global land rush, further addressed below.
Indeed, according to Noha Shawki (2014), claims by La Via Campesina 
eventually enshrined in the Declaration have resonated with international prior-
ities, especially after the 2007–2008 global food crisis. At the same time 
however, she argues, peasant rights enjoy limited acceptance as norms by states, 
and domestic implementation is far from certain, particularly since they seek to 
expand internationally recognized human rights in ways that some states do not 
accept. In addition, besides such challenges, related to the current neoliberal 
paradigm, domestic implementation will have to address legal issues regarding 
transcribing the peasant identity in law, and defining adequately the rights 
holders while addressing the risk of excluding others.
The case study below attempts to exemplify the interlinkages among benefit- 
 sharing and other elements of farmers’ rights, including supporting elements and 
enabling conditions, and highlight the need for a comprehensive analysis of 
complex governance frameworks.31
Case study: benefit- sharing and access to markets for  
smallholder farmers
Several policy fora have repeatedly identified the need for access to markets as an 
essential avenue towards improved livelihoods and development outcomes for 
smallholder farmers. At the same time, fora engaging in biodiversity conservation 
and sustainable use have linked access to markets to the concept of fair and equit-
able benefit- sharing. Despite the opportunities for cross- fertilization, there seems 
to be a disconnect between these two areas, however, and dialogue has been 
limited. In the analysis below, I showcase policy opportunities for promoting 
access to markets as an avenue for benefit- sharing, in order to enable farmers’ 
continued contribution to agrobiodiversity conservation and sustainable agri-
culture, and achieve improved rural development outcomes. After recapping the 
discussion on access to markets in relation to farmers’ rights under the ITPGRFA, 
and introducing the matter in relation to conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity under the CBD, I focus on the work of the UN Committee on World 
Food Security (CFS) as the forum offering the most possibilities to successfully 
address the interlinkages among all these agriculture- , environment- and 
development- related issues.
Smallholders are engaged in a variety of markets, both of agricultural 
produce and seeds, but informal local markets are easier for them to access. Few 
among them have access to more formal value chains or international markets. 
As noted already, they face various challenges in securing market access and 
eliciting benefits from markets due to a broad range of reasons, including lack of 
infrastructure, information and credit, and an inability to comply with marketing 
standards. Access to seed markets in particular is affected by IPRs and seed 
certification and marketing regulations, as detailed above.
Benefit-sharing in land governance  91
Research undertaken by the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security 
and Nutrition (HLPE), which was established to provide the CFS with scientific 
and knowledge- based advice to underpin policy formulation, has suggested that 
strengthening smallholders’ links to markets increases agricultural production, 
contributes to poverty reduction and improves food security and nutrition both 
for smallholders themselves and for urban and rural populations as a whole 
(HLPE 2013). Given radical changes in agri- food systems and technologies in 
the last two decades in the shape of extreme market concentration, it is neces-
sary to examine not only how best to stimulate these linkages, but also to 
identify which markets are best to engage with, and under what conditions 
engagement is most likely to be beneficial and sustainable for smallholders 
(Wiggins et al. 2010). Furthermore, within an enabling institutional environ-
ment including secure access to markets, smallholders can contribute to the 
conservation and sustainable use of agricultural biodiversity and other natural 
resources while preserving traditional farming knowledge and techniques. In 
addition, in many countries smallholder agriculture functions as an important 
social safety net, both by providing potentially resilient food production in times 
of crisis and by being at the heart of social networks and solidarity systems. 
Overall, research demonstrates that smallholder farming can be an economic-
ally, socially and environmentally effective way of organizing agricultural 
production (HLPE 2013).
At the international level, access to markets is largely defined by inter-
national trade law, shaped by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the 
notoriously complex WTO negotiations, which tend to favour the interests of 
developed countries and large- scale agricultural producers against those of 
developing countries and smallholders (Rosset 2000). Still, bodies dealing with 
biodiversity, agriculture, food security and human rights have been striving to 
make an impact. The importance of well- functioning and regulated markets for 
the progressive realization of the right to food was acknowledged in the Right to 
Food Guidelines explored above, along with the realization that markets ‘do not 
automatically result in everybody achieving a sufficient income’ and cannot 
protect the environment and public goods (Guideline 4). The CFS has conducted 
policy work at the interface between smallholders, markets, and global and local 
food security. Discussions on farmers’ rights under the ITPGRFA, as detailed 
above, touch upon access to markets in relation to the protection of agricultural 
traditional knowledge, benefit- sharing and seed rights, while under the CBD 
access to markets is mainly considered as an incentive measure to be used for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing.
As analysed above, access to markets is not listed in the ITPGRFA as a tool 
for promoting farmers’ rights. It can be considered, however, an enabling con-
dition for their realization and the achievement of the Treaty’s objectives on 
conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA, and fair and equitable benefit- 
 sharing. Obstacles are related both to IPRs and to marketing and certification 
requirements.
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When it comes to the CBD framework, a number of instruments make refer-
ence to access to markets, generally as an incentive measure to ensure the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising from its use and management. The importance of 
economically and socially sound incentive measures for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity is explicitly acknowledged by the Convention 
(Art. 11). The Addis Ababa principles and guidelines for the sustainable use of 
biodiversity state that costs related to the management and conservation of 
biodiversity should be internalized within the area of management and reflected 
in the distribution of benefits from use. Economic incentives for managers who 
have internalized environmental costs include, among others, certification to 
access new markets (Practical Principle 13). On the contrary, the list of 
monetary and non- monetary benefits annexed to the Nagoya Protocol on Access 
and Benefit- Sharing includes no reference to access to markets. A reference to 
‘contribution to local economies’ is included instead.
The 2000 CBD programme of work on incentive measures could serve as 
guidance on market- related topics. Unfortunately, intergovernmental 
deliberations on the item have been highly controversial, mainly due to linkages 
with trade liberalization and WTO negotiations on agricultural subsidies. As part 
of its review in 2008, the CBD Conference of the Parties established cooperation 
with the Biotrade Initiative of the UN Conference on Trade and Development to 
continue its work on trade promotion for biodiversity- based products produced 
in accordance with the three CBD objectives. Cooperation would address, 
among other measures, enhancing market access and promoting enabling 
environments (Decision IX/6, para. 13). Access to markets is also mentioned 
with regard to the impact assessment of proposed developments affecting natural 
resources. The Akwé: Kon guidelines on impact assessments, introduced above, 
specifically state that proposed developments should ensure that tangible bene-
fits accrue to the communities involved, such as access to markets and the 
diversification of income opportunities (paras 40 and 46).
It is under the CFS that the most comprehensive work has taken place, 
including on obstacles, enabling conditions and policy recommendations to 
enhance access to markets for smallholders. The HLPE has observed a number 
of constraints to investing in smallholder agriculture, which include 
unfavourable market conditions and a lack of access to appropriate markets. It 
has noted that governance of agriculture and rural development needs to be 
designed so as to support the multifunctional roles of smallholder farming in 
development. Underscoring the importance of access to land and natural 
resources and public goods, it recommended that governments should 
prioritize linking smallholder farmers to all types of markets as well as 
promoting schemes that rely on smallholders for the procurement of food for 
school and institutional feeding programmes. It further drew attention to 
market failures and price volatility as major disincentives for smallholder 
investment and to the need for government intervention through regulatory 
instruments (HLPE 2013).
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Responding to these findings, the CFS Plenary adopted a set of policy recom-
mendations on investing in smallholder agriculture for food security and nutri-
tion,32 calling for particular attention to be paid to enabling smallholder farmers’ 
access to productive assets and local, national and regional markets. Means 
proposed to enable access to markets for smallholders, while acknowledging 
the importance of non- monetary exchanges of products and services, included the 
development of distribution and marketing systems and mechanisms that are 
remunerative for smallholders and rural economies, the potential for smallholders 
to supply school and institutional feeding programmes and the promotion of 
cooperatives. The need to improve public policy instruments and institutions was 
also acknowledged, in relation, for instance, to contract farming and public–
private partnerships. Public support is considered necessary for mitigating 
excessive price volatility, enabling smallholders to participate in the value chains 
of their choice, increasing their negotiating capacity and ensuring legal and fair 
business practices.
Building on these recommendations as well as the HLPE report, a High- 
 Level Forum on Connecting Smallholders to Markets convened in 2015. The 
Forum discussed good practices and lessons learned that illustrate the potential 
for smallholders to benefit from access to all forms of markets, including 
localized and informal markets, commercialized value chains and cross- border 
trade. A background report informing the discussions acknowledged the need 
for further work to ‘unpack the complex relationship between smallholders, 
markets, and food security’ but identified a number of findings on the basis of 
case studies (CFS 2016). Organizing in farmers’ organizations or cooperatives 
was identified as essential to secure market access and compete with multi-
national firms, as well as to influence policy developments. Public policies 
favouring local sourcing for school meals have, for instance, proved highly 
beneficial for smallholders in many countries, including Ecuador, Brazil and 
India, and have improved food security and nutrition outcomes. Use of geo-
graphical indications, an intellectual property protection tool, has allowed 
producers to continue local production in traditional ways while receiving higher 
prices for their produce. Several challenges remain, however, including: a lack 
of data on informal markets and thus a lack of understanding of how best to 
support smallholder participation; building the capacities of smallholders to 
organize themselves and negotiate the terms of their contractual relationships; 
and developing a country- owned vision for agriculture at the national level 
addressing land governance, access to information and participatory research 
(CFS 2016).
Work continued, and the 2016 CFS Plenary endorsed a set of policy recom-
mendations on connecting smallholders to markets.33 The recommendations 
range from addressing practical challenges, such as improving processing and 
storage facilities and smallholder- targeted infrastructure including irrigation 
systems and roads, to more general policy considerations touching on different 
areas of international law and policy, such as trade, innovation, environment, 
development and human rights. They call for acknowledgment of the key role 
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smallholders play in the sustainable use and management of natural resources, 
the promotion of products with specific quality characteristics which increase 
income while preserving traditional practices and knowledge and agricultural 
biodiversity and the strengthening of smallholders’ access to and control over 
productive assets and resources. They also recommend promoting South–South, 
North–South and triangular cooperation to improve smallholders’ productivity 
and capacity to engage in all markets, and promoting food safety control 
systems that are appropriate for different scales, contexts and modes of 
production. Others refer to enabling conditions to reach markets, including 
access to market and price information, inclusive financial systems and 
enhancing smallholders’ collective organization levels to increase their 
bargaining power. Institutional procurement programmes for public institutions, 
food assistance and school meals, where smallholders are linked to structured 
demand for food and agricultural products and where consumers can access 
smallholder- produced food, are mentioned as a specific tool for linking 
smallholders to markets. In this regard, Brazil’s school feeding programme is 
often used to illustrate the potential of institutional procurement to serve 
development- related goals; the programme, which requires that 30% of school 
meal ingredients be sourced from local family farms, has helped reduce child 
hunger and malnutrition, but has also supported local agriculture and the 
country’s smallholders, while promoting rural development and changing 
children’s attitudes towards food (Sidaner et al. 2013).
The brief analysis above indicates that there are linkages among the concepts 
of access to markets and fair and equitable benefit- sharing, which, however, are 
not clear. Further systematization and conceptual clarification is needed to 
unpack them. Under the CBD, access to markets is considered an incentive 
measure for conservation, sustainable use and benefit- sharing, but also as a 
potential benefit to be taken into account in impact assessments for proposed 
developments. For the realization of farmers’ rights under the ITPGRFA, access 
to markets can be seen as an enabling condition for the protection of traditional 
knowledge and benefit- sharing, allowing farmers to continue contributing to the 
conservation of agricultural biodiversity and food security.
Against this background, the CFS has provided a relatively comprehensive 
framework for action, its mandate encompassing a wide range of issues related 
to food security and nutrition. While the concept of fair and equitable benefit- 
 sharing is not explicitly used, this work does illuminate potential policy tools 
and approaches, which could ensure that smallholders can access markets and 
benefit from them. It thus assists in operationalizing the benefit- sharing concept 
by shedding light on enabling conditions for fairness, equity, justice and redis-
tribution, such as control over productive assets and resources, scientific 
cooperation, access to information and collective organization. The CFS is also 
well positioned, on the basis of both its mandate and policy outcomes, as well as 
its multi-stakeholder structure, to link to the High- Level Political Forum in order 
to provide input to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), in particular SDG 2 on ending hunger, achieving food security and 
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improved nutrition and promoting sustainable agriculture. Under SDG 2, access 
to markets is listed as a means for doubling agricultural productivity and the 
incomes of small- scale food producers by 2030, while fair and equitable benefit- 
 sharing is mentioned in relation to the maintenance of the genetic diversity of 
seeds. Ongoing policy developments and related academic research may assist 
in further unpacking the relationship between the two, including in particular 
promoting models of agricultural development which consider genetic diversity 
to be a prerequisite of sustainable productivity, rather than an obstacle.
Benefit- sharing from public lands
Farmers’ rights provide a preferential field for the study of benefit- sharing, as 
they are situated at the interface between the regulation of agricultural research 
and development in the form of user- based innovation, and land and human 
rights. Moving away from the law and policy of research and development and 
into land use and governance, references to benefit- sharing are scarce and less 
developed. Examination of benefit- sharing is thus inextricably linked to redis-
tribution efforts for land or agrarian reform; the benefit to be shared is often the 
land itself or the right to use it. In addition, benefit- sharing considerations have 
been forwarded in the case of large- scale agricultural investments, although, as 
noted above, questions remain regarding the relationship between benefit- 
 sharing and land- use rights, particularly customary ones. That is, in many cases 
doubtful benefit- sharing arrangements seem to replace legitimate land- use 
rights, with detrimental effects for livelihoods and social cohesion.
Public land governance: categorizations and challenges arising  
from customary rights
While circumstances, terminology and categorizations differ greatly around the 
globe, in many countries public land refers to state- owned land either allocated 
for public use (such as roads and sea shores) or managed and transferred as a 
private asset (such as agricultural land). The degree and legal forms of state 
ownership or control of land vary depending on each country’s socio- economic 
and legal system. The role of the state, however, remains crucial for land 
governance in several legal systems, as it is usually the central government that 
has the legal authority to allocate land (Cotula 2016). This is particularly 
important in the case of large- scale agricultural investments, explored below.
Public land is usually accompanied by systems of concessions or use rights, 
which regulate the way the state makes land, including agricultural land, avail-
able for use by individuals (Chouquer 2011; FAO 2015). Such systems may use 
various legal tools, depending on the legal tradition of each country, including, 
for instance, land concessions or lease agreements. Where state ownership of the 
land is not contested, such legal tools can be used to promote equitable use of 
land for food security and rural livelihoods objectives and can thus be con-
sidered mechanisms for benefit- sharing. As an illustration, the Greek legislation 
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provides for granting use rights to public land to municipalities for the creation 
of vegetable food gardens, free of charge, and to individual farmers, farmer 
cooperatives and the unemployed for food production, for a low price.34
The same legal tools, however, can be used to deprive smallholders from 
their land- use rights, particularly in cases where land is used privately or 
collectively by individuals or communities, in accordance with customary tenure 
systems and on the basis of customary rights. In most countries, private property 
can be expropriated only if required for a public purpose and as long as its value 
is compensated. But in many countries, land tenure systems combine written 
laws and contracts alongside a range of customary rights and practices. This 
combination results in difficulties, because of the plurality of legal systems, 
rules and authorities with competence over land allocation and use. Customary 
rights may result being insecure, and land used by individuals or communities in 
accordance with customary tenure systems may at the end be considered public, 
because of lack of registration, legal recognition and formal title (HLPE 2011). 
Unless customary rights are recognized, land tenure insecurity may result in 
eviction, displacement or loss of livelihoods (Wily 2012).
Collective rights are particularly vulnerable, not only due to lack of recognition 
but also due to lack of understanding. This is still the case not only in developing 
but also in developed countries, as illustrated by the Ikarian case study below. In 
their extensive exploration of property rights regimes in the context of natural 
resource use, Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess (2008) have addressed the 
confusion characterizing the debate in the legal and economic scholarship 
regarding the relative advantages of private and common property for the 
efficiency, equity and sustainability of natural resource use. Focusing on common 
terminological and conceptual problems, they define common property regimes in 
differentiation from open- access systems; whereas in open- access systems no one 
has the legal right to exclude anyone from using a resource, in common property 
regimes the members of a clearly demarcated group have a legal right to exclude 
non- members from using a resource. A second terminological problem concerns 
the automatic but wrong association between common property regimes and 
common- pool resources, when in reality common pool resources may be governed 
by any type of property regime (Ostrom and Hess 2008). In addition, community 
customary systems take various forms, often combining common property with 
highly differentiated customary tenure systems (Knight 2010; Guadagni 2002).
As Katie Sandwell and colleagues argue in their critical analysis of existing 
and evolving human rights frameworks in the rural context, human rights lan-
guage and institutions, rooted in Western legal traditions, tend to prioritize indi-
vidual and property rights over collective and use rights based on customary 
systems. In their words, such interpretations ‘have been deployed in ways that 
do real violence to traditional customary systems and other existing social struc-
tures, clearing the path for neoliberal development and leaving communities less 
able to defend themselves against elite interests’ (Sandwell et al. 2019: 9). 
Customary tenure arrangements were considered confusing and insecure, and 
many governments sought to replace them by formal and transferable titles, 
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following the advice of international aid organizations, in order to attract foreign 
investment in the name of economic development.
Different types of land registration and titling programmes have been put 
into practice in many countries, with various priorities and aims, including to 
facilitate the creation of land markets, improve legal certainty in the face of 
developments, and promote investments in rural areas (HLPE 2011). The 
questions of preventing conflicts over land use and securing the customary 
rights of land users were integrated in several national agendas more recently 
(Merlet 2007; HLPE 2011) and have gradually attracted the attention of inter-
national organizations and scholars, particularly in the context of the latest wave 
of land- grabbing for international investment in farmland. Many governments 
have reviewed their land laws and policies, including constitutional 
amendments to ensure property rights for women, revised systems of land 
tenure administration, land right registration programmes and, in cases, greater 
recognition of customary rights and local land authorities (HLPE 2011).
The results of such efforts have been mixed, depending on the procedures, 
costs and accessibility of the process, as well as the vulnerabilities of land 
users. According to the literature and empirical case studies reviewed by the 
CFS High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition, long and 
costly processes risk excluding many users and giving rise to fraudulent claims, 
while lighter processes of registering family and/or collective rights through 
mapping and issue of certificates, even at the village level, may be more bene-
ficial for the rural poor. At the same time, however, concerns have been 
reported that formal titles can accelerate landlessness, since poor farmers may 
be forced to sell their land to local elites or transfer it to investors after a bad 
harvest, for instance, leading to land concentration. Formal titles also tend to 
simplify the multiple claims and rights over land use, to the disadvantage of the 
often secondary rights of women or herders (HLPE 2011). Registration does 
not equal empowerment of local populations. Still, some sort of registration of 
customary rights helps to provide tenure security to rural people, and enables 
them to negotiate with either the government or a company in case of a 
proposed investment.
Securing the tenure rights of farmers who do not own the land but depend on 
it for their livelihoods, including, for instance, tenants and sharecroppers, is 
another complex issue, which affects millions of people around the globe. Legis-
lative and policy interventions depend upon legal traditions, while their success 
is also dependent upon the collective power of farmer organizations (Merlet 
2007). In France, for instance, as Michel Merlet (2007) notes, the system affords 
considerable tenure security to tenant farmers and sharecroppers through 
guaranteed lasting land access for the farmer through written contracts, 
government- controlled land rent, specific procedures for dispute settlement and 
policy control to avoid land concentration.
This brief introduction to the range of individual or collective, formal or 
customary, often overlapping rights that come into play with regard to land 
management serves to illuminate the complexities and challenges regarding the 
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use of public land, in the context of overarching policy objectives such as 
development, food security and environmental sustainability. The particularities 
of rural communities in comparison to urban populations, as aptly identified by 
Katie Sandwell and colleagues, further complicate the picture: despite their vast 
differences, rural communities are generally more dependent on land- based 
resources for their livelihoods, often have a cultural relationship with land and 
social relationships built around it and generally have more limited access to 
state services and judicial infrastructure (Sandwell et al. 2019).
Large- scale agricultural investments
Due to the particular characteristics of rural communities, large- scale invest-
ments in farmland are considered among the main factors threatening rural 
livelihoods, radically transforming not only customary tenure systems but also 
formally recognized ones. Large- scale land investments by both national and 
international corporations are one of the key trends that emerged out of the 2008 
global food crisis (Cotula et al. 2009; Scoones et al. 2018). After losing 
confidence in global markets as a stable and reliable source of food for their 
national food security, some major food- importing countries have shown a 
growing interest in the acquisition or long- term lease of large portions of arable 
land in other countries, mostly in the developing world (De Schutter 2010, 
2011). In addition, large- scale land investments have been linked to increased 
land speculation, as land becomes a reliable investment, and to the production or 
construction of commodities in the name of sustainability, such as biofuels and 
carbon credits (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010; Sandwell et al. 2019). In 
an overview of the policy and market forces that enabled agri- food companies 
to seek more direct control of agricultural production, Lorenzo Cotula 
(2016: 181–182) further mentions that ‘increasingly stringent quality, safety, 
and traceability requirements in global supply chains have created incentives for 
companies directly to control farming activities, or to source supplies from few 
large producers’, as well as the adoption of favourable policies aiming to 
promote such investments in many countries.
While this intensification of global capital is certainly not unique to rural 
areas, its impact can arguably be harder due to the dependence of rural 
populations on natural resources, escalating what David Harvey had already 
described as ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2003; Sandwell et al. 
2019). The land rush is not a new phenomenon. Exploring the historical context 
of the most recent global wave of the land rush, Liz Wily sees it as yet another 
‘seismic shift in who owns and controls land, resources and production’, which 
has historically followed economic crises and shifts in political power (Wily 
2012). Wily draws a narrative of dispossession and defiance of customary, 
mainly collective, tenure systems, starting from feudal law enclosing the use of 
common land in Europe, to colonial laws awarding land ownership at the 
expense of local populations around the world, particularly in Africa, leading to 
the latest global land rush. According to Cotula, this latest wave of land 
Benefit-sharing in land governance  99
acquisitions has reshaped ‘relations among sovereign states, and between states, 
citizens, and businesses’ in legal terms, but has also resulted in ‘significant 
contestation at local, national, and international levels, with local- to- global 
alliances of affected people, social movements, and NGOs opposing the deals or 
seeking inclusion under better terms’ (Cotula 2016: 181, 185).
Figures concerning the recent wave of large- scale land acquisitions are uncer-
tain, mainly due to the pace and transnational character of developments, lack of 
transparency and contract disclosure and the low level of implementation. Evid-
ence shows an increased number of land contracts for agribusiness investments 
from 2005 to 2011, with the trend subsiding later on (Cotula 2016; Deininger 
et al. 2011). With regard to hectares in question, Lorenzo Cotula (2016) cites 
Land Matrix, a widely used database, to state that the latest figures are smaller 
than earlier estimates; he notes that cross- checked deals went down from 70 
million hectares worldwide in 2011 to 43 million hectares in 2016. Still, he high-
lights the limitations of a quantitative analysis; contracts may concern very large 
areas, placing disproportionate pressure on land and local land claims, or they 
are often concentrated in specific regions, while figures fail to provide insights 
on the implications of each specific contract in its national and local context.
Parties to each contract and the legal form of transaction vary, depending on 
the national legal context. Land deals usually involve long- term concessions or 
leases, rather than purchases. The government of the host country is often 
directly involved in cases where land is owned or controlled by the state, 
although the involvement of local authorities varies depending on the national 
legal system, and customary chiefs or private individuals have also led land 
deals (Cotula 2016).
FAO has identified three key legal interventions for equitable and sustainable 
agricultural investments that can contribute to food security and rural livelihoods: 
securing the land rights of indigenous peoples and local communities; ensuring 
enforceable and meaningful benefits both for the country providing land as a 
whole, and the local community in particular; and guaranteeing the meaningful 
participation of local communities in the decisions and projects affecting them 
(FAO 2011).
Two issues are of particular relevance for the study and conceptualization of 
fair and equitable benefit- sharing in the case of large- scale agricultural 
investments: the potential mismatch between macro- level benefits at the 
government level and negative impacts on local- level livelihoods, resulting in 
unfair distribution of risks and benefits; and procedural shortcomings in the 
design and implementation of such agreements, due to a series of structural con-
siderations related to national frameworks characterized by poor governance. 
These are explored below, in turn.
While foreign investment may contribute to economic growth and 
development if carefully designed, this contribution is generally measured at 
the national government level, translated, for instance, into GDP growth and 
improved government revenues. Expected local- level benefits usually include 
employment opportunities and infrastructure development, though, as Cotula 
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and colleagues conclude in a 2009 study of specific land deals, ‘these commit-
ments tend to lack teeth’ (Cotula et al. 2009: 7) due to legal challenges, 
including poor contract design and lack of enforcement of investor obligations, 
procedural shortcomings and power asymmetries, including imposition by – 
sometimes corrupted – elites at the national and local levels (Knight 2010). As 
a result, rural populations may suffer the impacts of an agreement by losing 
access to their source of livelihoods, without enjoying any of the benefits. 
Importantly, lack of legal recognition may result in the ‘invisibility’ of 
customary tenure systems and disregard for local land- use rights in view of land 
deals, ending in well- documented dispossession and enforced relocation 
(Cotula et al. 2009).
Procedural shortcomings further contribute to the marginalization of local 
voices. Many countries do not have laws and policies in place to ensure the 
participation of local communities in land- related decision- making. Lack of 
consultation thus leads to top- down and poorly informed decision- making 
regarding identification of benefits, unfair distribution of costs and benefits and 
contestation of the investment on the ground. This involves risks for investor 
companies too, as unpopular land allocations can result in grassroots action, 
causing delays, higher costs or even termination of contracts (Cotula 2016). 
Even when local participation is required by law, the actual processes for com-
munity consultation are often unsatisfactory, due to failure to include all 
legitimate rights holders and lack of transparency in contract negotiations. Fur-
thermore, involvement of local authorities does not always ensure fair participa-
tion. Often, local and customary authorities reinterpret customary land 
management rules and, in the context of weakened accountability mechanisms, 
make land available to developers for personal gain and to the detriment of 
weaker community members (Knight 2010).
In this context, benefit- sharing considerations can come into play as follows: 
as opportunities for meaningful participation and recognition of legitimate right 
holders in the decision- making process; in terms of safeguards for local land 
rights against arbitrary or unfair interference, to be included in the cost- benefit 
assessment process; and finally in the form of contractual arrangements for 
revenue- sharing and non- monetary benefits such as infrastructure development. 
Benefit- sharing thus relates to both its enabling conditions related to participa-
tion in the decision- making process, and the substantive outcomes. The concept 
needs to be understood and constructed broadly.
Reality on the ground, however, shows the limitations of the concept of 
benefit- sharing, even in the case of application of a broad construction as above. 
Even in the case of legitimate agreements, that is, agreements which have 
respected the national laws in question and are in accordance with international 
human rights standards, the question of who retains the decision- making 
authority remains. Such authority would generally rest with the central 
government, and is usually accompanied by a broad definition of public purpose 
requirements, which allows for expropriation against the will of land owners, let 
alone users, while compensation requirements are often inadequate and not 
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accompanied by alternative livelihood opportunities. Imposition of a decision in 
the context of diverging views with regard to livelihood choices and aspirations 
and the preferred development model may result in grassroots contestation of 
the project, and further socio- economic and cultural marginalization of rural 
populations. While this is especially true for projects bearing particular burden 
for the environment and human health, such as extractive industries, imposition 
of the mainstream model of agricultural development which promotes large- 
 scale mechanized farming to the detriment of small- scale farmers may also have 
the same results. Such principled concerns regarding the impact of large- scale 
agricultural investments have not escaped the attention of critical literature. 
Opposing the argument that the challenges associated with large- scale 
agricultural investments may be fixed with regulatory solutions based on good 
governance, Olivier De Schutter, for instance, argues that they promote a type of 
farming which prioritizes export crops, increases vulnerability to price shocks, 
and accelerates development of land markets, with potentially devastating 
effects on local livelihoods (De Schutter 2011).
An emerging legal basis for fair and equitable benefit- sharing  
from public lands
Limitations acknowledged, the application of benefit- sharing considerations may 
be used to promote fair and equitable use of public lands as follows: through 
systems of concessions for the use of uncontested public land for food security 
and rural livelihoods objectives; and through procedural and substantive 
safeguards against arbitrary or unfair interference with local land rights, including 
in the case of large- scale agricultural investments. This conceptualization is sup-
ported by elements enshrined in the VGGT and other soft- law instruments, and 
illustrated by human rights jurisprudence, as explored below.
As a comprehensive instrument providing international guidance on land 
governance, the VGGT provide valuable insights regarding linking benefit- 
 sharing from land use with food security objectives, land rights and human rights 
in general. They establish general principles of responsible tenure governance, 
and provide specific guidance on legal recognition and allocation of tenure rights 
and duties, land restitution, redistributive reforms, administration of tenure and 
agricultural investments, among other issues.
A number of provisions address tenure allocation and governance, including 
the equitable distribution of benefits from state- owned land and the 
establishment of transparent, participatory and accessible mechanisms for the 
allocation of tenure rights, linking thus benefit- sharing with broader social, eco-
nomic and environmental objectives (Art. 8). They seek to improve governance 
of tenure ‘for the benefit of all, with an emphasis on vulnerable and 
marginalized people’ (Art. 1(1)), linking therefore land tenure governance with 
poverty alleviation and giving general priority to the vulnerable among possible 
beneficiaries. As such, they become a tool not only for livelihoods but also for 
legal empowerment; the UN Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 
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has also highlighted the importance of secure land rights and equitable access to 
land for legal empowerment, noting they would improve livelihood security and 
contribute to sustainable poverty reduction and climate- resilient development 
(UN Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 2008; UN Secretary- 
 General 2009).
The VGGT establish clearly (albeit broadly worded) a policy objective related 
to benefit- sharing from public lands, calling on states to ‘strive to develop pol-
icies that promote equitable distribution of benefits from State- owned land, 
fisheries and forests’ (Art. 8(6)). This is supported by a series of substantive and 
procedural guarantees, including: recognition and respect of all legitimate tenure 
right holders and their rights (Arts 3(1)(1) and 5(3)); recognition of commons- 
 related, collective land- use systems (Art. 8(3)); consistency with broader social, 
economic and environmental objectives, and due consideration of local com-
munities that have traditionally used the land in the reallocation of tenure rights 
(Art. 8(7)); ensuring that allocation of tenure rights does not threaten the 
livelihoods of people by depriving them of their legitimate access to resources 
(Art. 8(7)); and development and implementation of participatory processes of 
tenure governance (Art. 4(10)).
Specifically for indigenous peoples and communities that ‘exercise self- 
 governance’, the VGGT reflect the increased degree of protection that indi-
genous peoples have acquired in accordance with international human rights 
law. States should recognize their legitimate tenure rights to the ancestral lands 
on which they live (Art. 9(5)), ensure their full and effective participation in 
the development of tenure- related laws and policies (Art. 9(7)), including 
climate- related programmes (Art. 23(3)), and hold good- faith consultation 
before any project or measure affecting their resources, in order to obtain their 
free, prior and informed consent (Art. 9(9)).
As noted above, redistributive land or agrarian reforms can be considered a 
tool for benefit- sharing, aiming to share not only the benefits arising from the 
resource but also the resource itself. Land reforms have historically been used as 
a policy tool for social justice and rural livelihoods by promoting equitable 
access to land – although critical literature notes they often result in 
controversial changes serving the interests of national and local elites (Rosset 
et al. 2006; Scoones et al. 2018). The importance of such reforms, however, for 
the future of developing countries and social and economic justice, illustrated by 
struggles by peasants and indigenous peoples around the world for their right to 
land, has regained the attention of policy and academic circles in the recent 
decades. This is reflected in the provisions of the VGGT, explored below, as 
well as of the UN Peasants Declaration. The UN Peasants Declaration does not 
go into detail regarding process and safeguards. As noted above, however, it 
does highlight the objectives of agrarian reforms regarding facilitating broad and 
equitable access to land and other natural resources, and limiting excessive 
concentration and control of land, taking into account its social function, and 
prioritizes landless peasants, young people, small- scale fishers and other rural 
workers among potential beneficiaries (Art. 17(6)).
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The VGGT provisions address the objectives, rationale, tools, process, bene-
ficiaries of redistributive reforms, as well as related safeguards (Art. 15). In 
recognition of the importance of such reforms for the broader national socio- 
 economic context, they call on states to ‘seek to develop national consensus on 
proposed [tenure] reforms’ (Art. 5(9)). Accordingly, the aim of ‘broad and equit-
able access to land and inclusive rural development’ can be facilitated by a series 
of tools, including the allocation of public land, voluntary and market- based 
mechanisms and the expropriation of private land for a public purpose 
(Art. 15(1)). Such reforms may be undertaken for social, economic and environ-
mental reasons, and where a high degree of ownership concentration is combined 
with significant rural poverty (Art. 15(4)). They should be implemented through 
policies and laws with clearly defined objectives, exemptions and beneficiaries, 
developed through participatory processes and, if appropriate, following 
assessments on the potential positive and negative impacts on tenure rights, food 
security, livelihoods and the environment (Art. 15(5–7)). Beneficiaries may 
include families including those seeking home gardens, women, informal 
settlement residents, pastoralists, historically disadvantaged groups, marginalized 
groups, youth, indigenous peoples, gatherers and small- scale food producers 
(Art. 15(5)). In addition to access to land, beneficiaries should be provided with 
support services including technical assistance and access to credit and to 
markets (Art. 15(8)).
Implementation of this international guidance may require significantly 
developing or reforming domestic law. An open legal question, for instance, 
concerns the definition of ‘legitimate’ customary rights requiring protection under 
the VGGT; such rights may be socially recognized at the local level, but may lack 
legal recognition at the national level (Cotula 2016). In addition, implementation 
requires political choices. As Peter Rosset and his colleagues at the Land 
Research Action Network note (2006), the resurrection of land redistribution 
efforts in the 1990s is the outcome of two contending forces: the World Bank and 
rural social movements, including their association La Via Campesina. While the 
World Bank proposes market- based mechanisms for land distribution, meaning 
essentially privatization, rural social movements identify use of such mechanisms 
in the neoliberal context as part of the problem. Noting that market- based 
mechanisms legitimize chronic injustices and economic inequalities resulting in 
further land concentration, social movements call for an alternative development 
paradigm based on food sovereignty and fair and equitable access to land and 
natural resources. Among these contrasting forces, the FAO has been a central 
actor in implementation initiatives, often in partnership with others including the 
World Bank and civil society and social movements, and national governments. 
The FAO has also been active in the development of publications compiling and 
assessing experiences of national land reform initiatives, including the FAO Land 
Tenure Journal (Hall et al. 2016). For national governments the challenge 
remains to plan and implement fair and equitable land reforms to suit the par-
ticular local context, rather than follow ready- made, externally imposed solutions, 
the same conclusion that Doreen Warriner reached back in 1969.
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Accordingly, application of benefit- sharing from public lands as a policy 
objective varies around the globe. Academic and grey literature addresses 
various case studies, particularly in the context of implementation of the VGGT, 
offering a multidisciplinary rather than strictly legal analysis. Synthesizing many 
of the FAO publications as well as academic literature, Ruth Hall and colleagues 
illustrate how different actor groups have promoted and used the VGGT, the 
strategies pursued and partnerships established. Sierra Leone is identified as a 
largely successful case of tenure governance reform, facilitated through a 
trilateral G7 Land Partnership between the government, Germany and the FAO, 
which resulted in a national agreement on the priority areas for reform towards 
compliance with the VGGT, strong communication between key ministries in 
the country and improved relationships between the government and civil 
society (Hall et al. 2016).
In Latin America, the VGGT have found a receptive context, due to the 
region’s history, constitutional traditions and the case law of the Inter- American 
Commission on Human Rights (Hall et al. 2016). In Brazil, a country with one 
of the highest levels of inequality of land distribution in the world, the VGGT 
held a central position in the country’s narrative on family farming and agrarian 
reform, focusing on linking social and environmental development and a 
territorial approach based on autonomous development and the rights of indi-
genous peoples (Hall et al. 2016). Pursuant to its constitution, programmes have 
been developed to facilitate access to land for the landless through expropriation 
and redistribution of unproductive lands, settlement on public lands and tenure 
reforms. As land concentration continues unabated, policy developments are 
also shaped by the struggles of the Brazilian Landless Rural Workers’ 
Movement (MST), one of the most active social movements in the region, 
known for its massive land occupations. The MST has launched the Popular 
Agrarian Reform, a new model of agrarian reform which links land distribution 
demands with governance based on food sovereignty and agro- ecology 
(Azevedo 2016). The country’s land governance assessment by the World Bank 
(2014) acknowledged this influence and associated it with strengths of the land 
governance system related to increased guarantees of property rights, including 
of vulnerable groups, transparency in the allocation of public land and public 
accessibility of recorded land information. It is noted in particular that transfers 
of public land took place to land reform settlements and then to the landless, 
while social movements are directly involved in the granting of rural 
concessions and in urban land regularization.
As noted below, EU policy on land focuses on development cooperation with 
third countries rather than land governance challenges within the member states. 
However, land ownership concentration accelerates in Europe, reinforced by 
market dynamics and institutional rules, including the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) (Gallico and Groppo 2016). This effect has been documented, 
despite the CAP’s objectives related to ensuring the sustainable management of 
natural resources and achieving a balanced territorial development of rural eco-
nomies and communities, to accompany the mainstream objective of agricultural 
Benefit-sharing in land governance  105
competitiveness. In addition, concerns related to land- grabbing have been raised, 
particularly in Eastern Europe. According to the European Economic and Social 
Committee, agricultural land ownership is increasingly becoming concentrated 
and controlled by foreign capital, particularly in Romania, Hungary and 
Bulgaria, with detrimental effects for family farming, rural life and the environ-
ment due to the promotion of monocultures (European Economic and Social 
Committee 2015). The Committee concludes with calls for aid measures to 
make small- scale farming more sustainable and resilient, and for national policy 
measures implementing the VGGT.
Academic literature documenting and analysing country efforts to implement 
the VGGT provisions on benefit- sharing from public lands is limited. Leonardo 
Gallico and Paolo Groppo (2016) offer a rare glimpse into the specific experi-
ence of Italy, in particular Lazio Region and Rome Municipality; more than 
25% of the region’s agricultural land is owned by public institutions, with half 
of it being managed by local authorities and organizations as a commons. 
Aiming to enhance access to public land for young farmers, fostering new 
employment and economic opportunities and protecting the quality of the land, 
the region’s Agency for Agricultural Development and Innovation issued a call 
for proposals for public land allocation. The call was the first such initiative 
since the national Land Agrarian Reform in the 1950s. As far as informal rights 
are concerned, Gallico and Groppo mention the case of the ‘Agricoltura Nuova’ 
cooperative farm, which occupied municipal land in 1977 and has been paying 
compensation fees to the Municipality of Rome since 1995. The farm has been 
benefiting from public funding despite lack of formal tenure recognition.
When it comes to procedural and substantive safeguards against arbitrary or 
unfair interference with local land rights, the VGGT provide guidance both on the 
protection of legitimate tenure rights, and on mechanisms for transparency, parti-
cipation and accountability in decision- making regarding land allocation. Respect 
for legitimate tenure rights is considered a general principle of responsible tenure 
governance under the VGGT (Art. 3A) and is reflected in several provisions, 
including on safeguards (Art. 7), ownership and control of public lands (Art. 8), 
indigenous peoples and other communities with customary tenure systems 
(Art. 9), investments (Art. 12), restitution (Art. 14) and expropriation (Art. 16).
Particularly when it comes to investments, the VGGT require responsible 
investments to safeguard against dispossession of legitimate tenure right holders 
and environmental damage (Art. 12(4)), and provide safeguards to protect 
legitimate tenure rights, human rights, livelihoods, food security and the environ-
ment from risks that could arise from large- scale transactions in tenure rights 
(Art. 12(6)). Such safeguards, according to the VGGT, could include ceilings on 
permissible land transactions, promotion of production and investment models 
that do not result in the large- scale transfer of tenure rights to investors and 
partnerships with local tenure right holders. States should also consider 
conducting prior independent assessments on the potential positive and negative 
impacts of investments based on large- scale transactions of tenure rights, 
ensuring systematic and impartial identification of tenure rights (Art. 12(10)). 
106  Benefit-sharing in land governance
Finally, states should ensure the protection of legitimate tenure rights when 
investing abroad (Art. 12(15)).
Additional substantive safeguards concern cases of expropriation. Expropri-
ation should take place upon prompt and just compensation, and only if required 
for a public purpose, the concept of which should be clearly defined by law to 
allow for judicial review (Art. 16(1)). In general, state measures taken for public 
purposes should be determined by law, solely for the purpose of promoting 
general welfare, including environmental protection, and be consistent with 
human rights obligations (Art. 4(3)).
Procedural safeguards related to participation, transparency and accountability, 
along with equity and justice, are addressed in the VGGT as essential principles 
of implementation (Art. 3B) and integrated in several provisions. Recognition and 
allocation of tenure rights should follow a participatory consultation process, 
including indigenous peoples and other communities with customary tenure 
systems, smallholders and anyone else who could be affected (Art. 7(3)). 
Consistency with the principles of participation and consultation is also required 
when it comes to the development of policies covering the use and control of 
public lands (Art. 8(6)), any project or measure affecting resources held by indi-
genous peoples (Art. 9(9)), the development of rules on allowable transactions in 
tenure rights and the definition of large- scale transactions (Art. 12(5)), the 
conduct of investment assessments (Art. 12(10)), the development of laws and 
policies on redistributive reforms (Art. 15(6)), the planning and process for 
expropriation (Art. 16(2)) and the negotiation and implementation of mitigation 
and adaptation programmes (Art. 23(3)). Increasing transparency is required by 
several provisions, including as a means to prevent corruption (Arts 10(5) and 
15(9)). Provisions on dispute resolution detail rules for access to justice, to 
increase accountability (Art. 21).
Among other soft- law instruments of relevance, the Principles on Responsible 
Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (RAI), endorsed by the CFS in 
2014, focus on forms of investment and their impacts in broader terms than the 
VGGT. National- level implementation of the RAI Principles, however, is quite 
limited, partly because some stakeholders consider them as favouring the 
interests of the powerful rather than the vulnerable (Hall et al. 2016). Margherita 
Brunori (2015) has assessed the relevance of the RAI Principles for the study of 
benefit- sharing, concluding that they fail to mirror higher international standards. 
Instead, they seem to imply that investments generate benefits which will eventu-
ally be shared; the first paragraph highlights the role of responsible investment in 
agriculture and food systems for food security and nutrition, sustainable 
livelihoods, eradicating poverty and increasing economic growth, and therefore 
achieving sustainable development, among other objectives. A similarly vague 
reference concerns a requirement that contracts balance the interests of 
contracting parties and be based on their mutual benefit (para. 59). Interestingly, 
the only specific reference to benefit- sharing (leaving aside a reference to 
benefit- sharing from the use of genetic resources in accordance with inter-
national treaties) concerns the role of investments in fostering gender equality 
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and women’s empowerment (Principle 3) and therefore has an intra- community 
dimension; responsible investment should enhance women’s participation in 
partnerships, decision- making, leadership and the equitable sharing of benefits. 
Accordingly, ‘all stakeholders have a role in promoting gender equality and the 
economic empowerment of women to support their access to productive 
resources and to the benefits from agricultural investments’ (para. 60). A series 
of other provisions refer to mechanisms, or enabling conditions, for benefit- 
 sharing: access to innovation and new technologies, for the empowerment of 
youth (Principle 4); promotion of the application and use of locally adapted and 
innovative technologies, including for smallholders (Principle 7); and impact 
assessments, to respect human rights and promote accountability (Principle 10). 
In general, however, they are worded in a broad, non- specific manner and seem 
oriented to the promotion of trade and investment rather than human rights and 
the protection of the vulnerable; their usefulness therefore for the 
conceptualization and operationalization of benefit- sharing is limited.
I should also mention the ongoing negotiations to develop a treaty on 
business and human rights, initiated in July 2015 in an intergovernmental 
Working Group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
with respect to human rights, under the auspices of the UN Human Rights 
Council. These negotiations were partly the result of the largely perceived as 
failed UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, endorsed by the 
Human Rights Council in 2011,35 a set of guidelines for states and companies 
aiming to prevent, address and remedy human rights abuses committed in 
business operations. The revised draft released in July 201936 includes reference 
to measures to prevent human rights violations, integrating due diligence 
requirements and conducting human rights and environmental impact 
assessments and meaningful consultations with potentially impacted groups, but 
no mention of benefit- sharing or other redistribution- related terminology. A 
general preambular reference acknowledges instead that all business enterprises 
have the capacity to foster the achievement of sustainable development through 
increased productivity, inclusive economic growth and job creation.
When it comes to Europe, the 2004 EU Land Policy Guidelines,37 intended 
mainly for EU donors when supporting interventions in rural land policy and 
governance in developing countries, address many important areas of land 
governance, including land rights, redistributive reforms and linkages with other 
policy areas such as poverty reduction and the environment. Importantly, they 
recognize that access to land and natural resources is linked to the realization of 
many human rights. While these guidelines have received little attention, many 
of their elements regarding responsible land governance and secure access to 
land have been integrated in the 2017 New European Consensus on 
Development,38 which provides the framework for development cooperation in 
light of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.
As noted above, the linkages among land tenure rights and several 
internationally recognized human rights have been acknowledged in the case law 
of regional human rights courts (Morgera 2019). The 2007 Saramaka decision of 
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the Inter- American Court of Human Rights mentioned above is particularly rel-
evant, as it involved a logging and mining concession by the government of 
Suriname on territory held by the Saramaka people, without their full and 
effective consultation. On the basis of international human rights law, the Court 
concluded that the Saramaka people, a tribal community of descendants of self- 
 liberated African slaves, have a right to use the natural resources of their tradi-
tionally owned territory which are necessary for their survival. Linking the 
community’s land rights to violation of the right to property under the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the Court declared that Suriname may grant 
concessions for the exploration of natural resources in their territory only when 
such concessions do not result in restrictions of the rights of the Saramaka people 
that would deny their physical and cultural survival. In particular, it should 
respect three safeguards: effective participation, and free, prior and informed 
consent with regard to investment projects with major impacts; sharing of the 
benefits derived from development plans; and prior and independent environ-
mental and social impact assessment (Orellana 2008). Addressing jointly the 
safeguards of effective participation and benefit- sharing, the Court stressed that 
they ‘are consistent with the observations of the Human Rights Committee, the 
text of several international instruments, and the practice in several States Parties 
to the Convention’ (para. 130). As the reference to ‘several international instru-
ments’ actually quotes provisions supporting the right to participation only, 
including of the ILO Convention no. 169 and the General Comment no. 23 of the 
UN Human Rights Committee (fn. 128), it can be argued that the Court considers 
the two tightly linked; participation is a key requirement for benefit- sharing, and 
identification and sharing of appropriate benefits could flow from effective parti-
cipation processes. Similarly, when the Court addresses the safeguard of benefit- 
 sharing separately, it links it to the (narrower) right to compensation for loss of 
property under the American Convention on Human Rights (Art. 21(2)), noting 
the provision ‘extends not only to the total deprivation of property title by way of 
expropriation by the State … but also to the deprivation of the regular use and 
enjoyment of such property’ (para. 138). It thus translates the right to just 
compensation into a right of the Saramaka people to reasonably share in the 
benefits made as a result of a restriction of their right to use and enjoy their 
traditional lands and natural resources. The Court finds support for this 
interpretation in provisions of the ILO Convention no. 169, a report of the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination39 and the reports of the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples. The limited, at the 
time, international legal basis supporting the safeguard on benefit- sharing from 
the use of land and natural resources underlines further the importance of the rel-
evant provisions of the VGGT and the UN Peasants Declaration.
As an outcome of its argumentation, the Court ordered the government of 
Suriname, among other measures, to: delimit, demarcate and grant collective 
title over the territory of the members of the Saramaka people in accordance 
with their customary laws; grant the community with legal recognition of 
collective juridical capacity as a way to ensure the exercise of their right to 
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communal property and collective access to justice; review relevant domestic 
and adopt necessary new legislation; and allocate the compensation amount set 
in a community development fund.
The Saramaka judgment has been part of a consistent line of jurisprudence 
under the Inter- American Court of Human Rights, and has inspired similarly or 
even more progressive developments under the African framework on human 
rights and global human rights processes (Morgera 2019). It is a landmark 
judgment for a series of reasons. It expands the international protection usually 
afforded to indigenous peoples to other communities, not identified as indi-
genous but maintaining an identity, socio- economic organization and livelihoods 
deeply associated with land and natural resources. It further identifies clearly the 
three interlinked safeguards for developments decided upon by the state on lands 
occupied by such communities, placing limits upon state powers and additional 
considerations for the identification of acceptable public purposes. It also 
acknowledges the need for legal arrangements to recognize communal property 
and communal management of natural resources. Finally, it has initiated a 
process of cross- fertilization between standards adopted under international 
human rights and environmental processes, with its reference to the CBD Akwé: 
Kon Guidelines on impact assessments, as noted above.
More than a decade later, however, compliance with the judgment remains 
problematic. This has been documented in three subsequent orders of the Court 
monitoring compliance with the judgment, issued in 2011, 2013 and 2018. In 
fact, while the state has established the community development fund in question 
and has paid in full the monetary damages in accordance with the judgment, it 
has failed to adopt a legislative framework providing for impact assessments of 
concessions, ensuring fair and equitable benefit- sharing and recognizing the 
community’s effective participation in decision- making regarding concessions in 
their territory. Instead, the government continues to grant concessions in the 
Saramaka territory without their involvement (Rombouts et al. 2016; Koorndijk 
2019). In addition, according to the 2018 order of the Court,40 the state has not 
yet provided adequate delimitation, demarcation and collective titling, nor has it 
provided the community with juridical personality. According to Koorndijk 
(2019), this is in line with findings in the literature that suggest that orders for 
monetary compensation have relatively high compliance rates, while states tend 
to avoid non- pecuniary reparations, due to structural considerations such as 
prevailing economic interests and marginalization of rights holders.
Documenting the state of compliance with human rights jurisprudence has 
been the focus of efforts by NGOs and social movements, such as the Inter-
national Network for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR- Net) and 
Cultural Survival, but has received little attention by international law scholars, 
possibly due to specialization- , discipline- and language- related barriers. Bas 
Rombouts and colleagues (2016) and Jeanice Koorndijk (2019) are among the 
exceptions. The limited literature illustrates the need to bridge the gap in legal 
commentary and provide a comprehensive picture of the socio- legal framework 
and its implementation on the ground, from the international to the national and 
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the local level, creating partnerships with different disciplines. As explored also 
in the context of research and development above, this is particularly true for the 
concept of benefit- sharing, implementation of which is highly dependent on a 
combination of legal frameworks at different levels and of different areas of law, 
including private law when it comes to contractual obligations, as well as power 
asymmetries.
Case study: land use and benefit- sharing on the isle of  
Ikaria, Greece
The case of the isle of Ikaria, Greece, involving pastoralism in the context of 
competing land uses and a multi- level governance framework, was one of the 
BeneLex local- level case studies, explored in detail by Louisa Parks (2019). As 
noted above, the case illustrates the interlinkages between benefit- sharing and 
access to land, access to markets and local livelihoods.41
Ikaria is a Greek island in the northeast Aegean Sea. Administratively, it 
belongs to the Periphery of North Aegean, the seat of which lies on the island of 
Lesvos. Ikaria is divided into three municipalities, the centres of which are 
located in the south, north and central- west parts of the island, respectively. As 
forested mountain Atheras crosses the entire length of the island, the road 
network and thus connectivity between villages has remained poor until now.
Ikaria maintains a relatively traditional economy combining agriculture and 
pastoralism with tourism activities, as well as a culture of self- organization and 
strong community ties, expressed through a communist political tradition 
and periodic community celebrations called paniyiries (Bareli 2018; Parks 2019; 
Bareli et al. 2020). Vineyards and a semi- wild goat population had been 
supporting this economy for centuries, and wine and goat meat have had a 
central role not only in food and nutrition but also in the island’s unique culture 
and celebrations. Land- use management has historically been collective, organ-
ized around a complex customary system for the management of private, com-
munal and village/municipal lands and the co- existence of crop cultivation and 
pastoralism. This system was built around: the common pasturelands of Atheras 
mountain, to which the inhabitants of neighbouring villages had a right of 
access; a network of fences collectively maintained by the villagers, which kept 
goats away from cultivated land; the periodically allowed use of private land as 
a common pastureland resulting in rotation in land use and thus ecological bene-
fits; and the periodic movement of flocks from higher pasturelands in the 
summer to lower grazing land in the winter. Pastoralists were valuable members 
of this traditional society. On top of providing an important source of food and 
being at the centre of the island’s culture, they were also respected for their 
knowledge of the land, the forest and the water sources.
The Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire and a series of sub-
sequent laws regarding land ownership and administrative restructuring in the 
country resulted in abandonment of these customary rules. Following independ-
ence, the Greek state claimed ownership of most of the island’s communal land, 
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questioning the Ottoman titles held collectively by the villages. The legal status 
of communal land in Ikaria is still pending to date. Until final resolution, 
according to Greek legislation, ownership of this land rests with the state, but 
the villages retain tenure rights. The situation regarding land ownership and 
tenure rights has been further complicated by the fact that, following a series of 
administrative reforms, villages have seized to exist as administrative units and 
local administration has been centralized around municipalities. In addition, a 
2015 law provided that the competence for the management of all grazing land 
would pass from the local to the regional administration, following the country’s 
division into 13 administrative Peripheries. For Ikaria, this meant that decisions 
concerning the island’s pastures would be made at the Periphery of North 
Aegean, based on the island of Lesvos (Bareli et al. 2020). This increases legal 
uncertainty regarding local tenure rights, and the Municipality of Ikaria is 
promoting an amendment to the national forest law for official recognition of 
such rights. For the time being, however, legal uncertainty and over- grazing as 
described below have resulted in pastoralists losing access to this land for 
grazing.
Within a context of a rising market economy and an increased tourism 
income, abandonment of customary land- use rules and the loss of legitimate 
access to pasturelands, an increase in the number of goats on the island resulted 
in over- grazing and environmental degradation, leading also to social conflict 
and marginalization of pastoralists. The increase of the goat population was due 
to the absence of natural predators on the island but also to policy- related factors. 
In the 1990s, direct payments under the CAP subsidized the number of animals, 
which led many Ikarian residents, in addition to farmers and pastoralists, to 
acquire animals. Following subsequent reforms of the CAP towards decoupling 
and cross- compliance, which changed the basis for payments and linked them to 
animal welfare and environmental considerations, non- professionals simply let 
the animals loose, which resulted in further environmental degradation. Com-
pliance with specific requirements was generally lacking also on the part of 
professional farmers and pastoralists, due to pastoral traditions and 
circumstances on the island (for instance, the absence of barns), but also due to 
lack of information, irregularities in payments and lack of any self- organization 
on the part of pastoralists, whose association has been inactive for years. 
Combined with social conflict, this increased disempowerment and exclusion of 
pastoralists, particularly in the context of stricter application of CAP 
requirements following Greece’s sovereign debt crisis. Cross- compliance was 
enforced through electronic data processing of all beneficiaries and animal 
tagging, the cost of which, however, was often prohibitive for small- scale 
producers. At the time of the last project visit to Ikaria in 2017, local employees 
of the Ministry of Agriculture remained pessimistic about bringing pastoralists 
into line with complex cross- compliance rules in time for them to maintain their 
subsidies.
In addition, implementation of EU regulations on food safety and animal 
welfare resulted in obstacles to slaughtering goats and thus reducing their 
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number. EU regulations on the slaughter of animals require killing in slaughter-
houses that comply with stringent food safety, environmental and animal 
welfare rules.41 Only then does the meat get the stamp needed to be sold in the 
market. With no slaughterhouse on the island, pastoralists had two solutions: 
either transporting the animals to the nearest slaughterhouse (in Athens), which 
due to rules for the safe transport of animals42 implies prohibitive costs for 
small- scale producers, or taking advantage of legal derogations that allowed 
traditional slaughter methods43 when meat would be sold at the paniyiries of 
Ikaria. While the second solution was largely used, meat consumption at local 
paniyiries was not enough to curb the goat population, despite the increase of 
such festivities during summer, leaving pastoralists at a dead end.
The Ikarian case study is illustrative of the immense variety and complexity 
of land- use systems, and the diversity of factors that can influence them. It 
also shows the strong interlinkages between land- use rights and social conflict, 
the role of enabling conditions, including access to information and participa-
tion in decision- making, as well as smallholders’ organization through associ-
ations or cooperatives, and the challenges for smallholders associated with 
access to markets in complex regulatory frameworks such as the EU. It further 
draws light on a series of questions regarding law development and 
implementation in such complex regulatory systems, and unintended con-
sequences regarding livelihoods, social cohesion and environmental sustain-
ability (Bareli et al. 2020); it also highlights the need for addressing the 
tensions associated with market and the local nature of agriculture, including 
its social and cultural aspects, and for developing specific policies to support 
smallholders, potentially balancing issues of scale, geography and livelihoods 
against stringent standards.44
Concluding remarks
In the preceding analysis, I mapped and assessed the emergence and applications 
of the concept of fair and equitable benefit- sharing in land governance, with a 
particular focus on farmers’ rights and on the governance of public lands, 
including the case of large- scale agricultural investments. In contrast to the area 
of agricultural research and development, in which I traced the emergence and 
application of benefit- sharing as part of a clear evolutionary line reflected in 
legally binding treaties and linked to specific policy objectives and 
implementation mechanisms, references to benefit- sharing in the area of land 
governance are less developed, while the legal framing varies; while still linked 
to notions of justice and solidarity to the vulnerable, benefit- sharing is 
sometimes framed as a right, at other times as a policy objective and at yet other 
times as a safeguard, and its international legal basis is usually to be found in 
non- binding instruments.
There are fundamental elements that differentiate the regulation of benefit- 
 sharing from land use compared to benefit- sharing from genetic resource use for 
research and development. These elements relate to the nature of the resource, 
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the scope of the regulation and the determination of beneficiaries. When it 
comes to the nature of the resource, land is fixed in supply, and policies are 
required to accommodate competing uses and overlapping claims. Restrictions 
in land use come from both material and legal limitations. Genetic resources, on 
the other hand, are renewable and easily multiplied, while restrictions in their 
use stem solely from legal limitations, such as IPRs and ABS laws. Furthermore, 
unlike benefit- sharing in research and development, which is an international 
law concept, land governance is still mostly a matter for domestic law. Inter-
national law emerged relatively recently, mainly with regard to indigenous 
peoples’ rights and human rights in general, environmental considerations and 
transnational investment. It was in the context of the 2008 global food crisis and 
the growing trend of large- scale agricultural investments that land governance 
became an issue of common concern, of particular importance for food security 
and human development. Finally, determination of the beneficiaries is far more 
complex and context- specific when it comes to benefit- sharing from land use. In 
particular, difficulties arise with regard to the relationship between different 
types of land rights and benefit- sharing. A crucial question concerning 
implementation of benefit- sharing from land use is its relationship with actual 
access to the resource; the benefit to be shared is often the land itself or the right 
to use it.
Examination of benefit- sharing is thus inextricably linked to redistribution 
efforts for land or agrarian reform in view of chronic inequality in land 
distribution in many countries, complex interactions between formal tenure 
systems and customary arrangements around the globe and the fundamental 
question of who has decision- making authority, and thus control over land 
allocation and use. Control of rights to land has historically been an instrument 
of oppression and colonization, giving birth to social movements demanding 
land redistribution as a means towards social justice, and the right to control the 
type of development undertaken. These movements have recently been a driving 
force behind international law development, reflected most prominently in the 
adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants.
As I concluded in the context of agricultural research and development though, 
promotion of pro- poor and environmental considerations by human rights and 
environmental instruments is countered by a growing web of transnational 
trade and investment agreements focused on a neoliberal model of growth. The 
expanding sphere of application of international investment law, in 
combination with its enforcement potential and the asymmetry in capacities 
and power of the parties involved, has resulted in protection of the inter-
national capital, often to the detriment of national development priorities in 
developing countries, restricting states’ ability to regulate for the public 
interest and increasing the risk of dispossession for vulnerable rural 
populations. The troubled relationship between investment and human rights 
has attracted the attention of human rights bodies, including the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, who highlighted the need to balance com-
peting objectives related to seeking higher investment levels while pursuing 
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national development objectives. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Victoria Tauli- Corpuz further noted that the conditions 
required for the host country to benefit from such investment, and the extent to 
which international investment agreements enable such conditions, are still 
open to debate, drawing attention to three legal considerations: the lack of ref-
erences to human rights obligations in investment agreements; the fear of 
dispute settlement arbitration, which may restrict the host state’s regulatory 
activity for the public interest; and the lack of public participation in drafting, 
particularly with regard to the groups that are affected the most, as is the case 
of indigenous peoples and rural communities in land deals.
In this context, I selected farmers’ rights and governance of public lands as 
focus areas, because they offer the most solid legal basis for benefit- sharing, in 
the ITPGRFA and VGGT respectively.
Farmers’ rights provide a preferential field for the study of benefit- sharing, 
as they are situated at the interface between the regulation of agricultural 
research and development, and land and human rights. Discussing their origin 
and rationale, legal basis in the ITPGRFA and the recently adopted UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and implementation challenges in a 
complex policy context which fails to support user- based innovation and poses 
a host of obstacles to smallholders, I propose a broad construction of farmers’ 
right to benefit- sharing. This would encompass not only the outcome of benefit- 
 sharing as a process, but also a series of supporting elements and enabling con-
ditions. Such elements and conditions would include secure land tenure and 
access to seeds, as well assistance in the organization of cooperatives and local 
seed banks, legal recognition of customary agricultural practices, training and 
access to markets.
This understanding stems first from the ITPGRFA multilateral approach to 
benefit- sharing, aiming both to reward and to enable farmers’ contribution to the 
conservation and sustainable use of agricultural biodiversity and thus to sustain-
able agriculture and global food security, as global public goods. Through this 
twin ‘reward and enable’ approach, benefit- sharing is linked to farmers’ and 
peasants’ rights in their broad sense, and suggests that farmers should not only 
be rewarded in monetary terms for their contribution, but should also be enabled 
to continue their practices. In this sense, benefit- sharing appears to operate in 
two arguably distinct but interlinked forms. The first is the sharing of the bene-
fits arising from the past and present contribution of farmers to the utilization of 
genetic resources for research and development purposes, and the possible 
commercialization of the resulting varieties or products. In this form of benefit- 
 sharing, farmers are the beneficiaries, entitled to part of the monetary and non- 
 monetary benefits arising from research and development efforts. The second 
form relates to the benefits arising from the continued contributions of 
smallholder farmers, indigenous peoples and local communities as users and 
stewards of agricultural biodiversity on- farm. These benefits flow to humanity 
at large as global public goods, and may be considered as part of a set of rights, 
which would enable farmers’ continued contribution to the stewardship of the 
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resources in the future. This broad understanding of farmers’ right to benefit- 
 sharing as integrating enabling and supporting measures seems to be supported 
by national- level implementation efforts documented by the ITPGRFA 
Secretariat and academic literature, which range from monetary support through 
the Treaty’s Benefit- sharing Fund and domestic programmes, to training, 
support to community structures and participatory plant breeding efforts. It also 
resonates with the conclusions of the field work under BeneLex explored by 
Louisa Parks (2019), who highlighted that the involved communities more often 
raised concerns linked to the conditions that need to be in place for discussions 
on benefit- sharing to begin, with recognition being identified as a central theme, 
along with community organization and procedural guarantees, among other 
elements.
Finally, such broad interpretation is further supported by the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Peasants, which puts forward a comprehensive approach 
regarding the rights of rural populations, linking their vulnerabilities, their special 
relationship to land, water, seeds and natural resources and their contribution to 
global food security, through rights already protected in international law and 
new – individual and collective – rights. Importantly, the Declaration includes a 
series of provisions elaborating on the right to land and to the sustainable use 
of natural resources, including fair and equitable benefit- sharing in any case of 
exploitation affecting such natural resources. The outcome of a rare process of 
direct involvement of social movements in international lawmaking, the 
Declaration further integrates a series of new concepts, which could potentially 
impact the development paradigm by drawing attention to peasant autonomy and 
the broader agrarian struggles for social justice. References to food sovereignty, 
agrarian reforms to facilitate broad and equitable access to land and other natural 
resources and the social function of land represent important victories for La Via 
Campesina in the current neoliberal context shaped by the industrialization of 
agriculture, trade liberalization, large- scale agricultural investments, speculation 
in food commodities, the dismantling of public support and criminalization of 
activists.
When it comes to governance of public lands, application of benefit- sharing 
considerations may be used to promote fair and equitable use of public lands as 
follows: through systems of concessions for the use of uncontested public land 
by individuals or farmer cooperatives for food security and rural livelihoods 
objectives; and through procedural and substantive safeguards against arbitrary 
or unfair interference with local land rights, including in the case of large- scale 
agricultural investments. This conceptualization is supported by elements 
enshrined in the VGGT and other soft- law instruments, and illustrated by human 
rights jurisprudence.
The VGGT establish clearly (albeit in a broadly worded manner) a policy 
objective related to benefit- sharing from public lands, calling on states to strive 
to develop policies that promote equitable distribution of benefits from state- 
 owned land, fisheries and forests. In addition, redistributive land or agrarian 
reforms in accordance with the provisions of the VGGT and the UN Peasants 
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Declaration can be considered a tool for benefit- sharing, aiming to share not 
only the benefits arising from the resource but also the resource itself.
Benefit- sharing considerations have been forwarded in the form of safeguards 
in the case of large- scale agricultural investments, although questions remain 
regarding the relationship between benefit- sharing and land- use rights, particu-
larly customary ones. That is, empirical research shows that in many cases 
doubtful or strictly monetary benefit- sharing arrangements tend to replace 
legitimate land- use rights. Such failure to consider the broader benefits that 
people get from natural resources has detrimental effects for livelihoods and 
social cohesion, reproducing injustices and imposing dominant ideological, eco-
nomic and development models. Literature on the actual implementation of 
benefit- sharing arrangements via either policy interventions or contractual provi-
sions remains limited, illustrating the need to bridge the gap in legal commentary 
and provide a comprehensive picture of the socio- legal framework and its 
implementation on the ground, from the international to the national and the 
local level.
That said, two issues are of particular relevance for the study and 
conceptualization of fair and equitable benefit- sharing in the case of large- scale 
agricultural investments: the potential mismatch between macro- level benefits 
at the government level and negative impacts on local- level livelihoods, 
resulting in unfair distribution of risks and benefits; and procedural short-
comings in the design and implementation of such agreements, due to a series 
of structural considerations related to national frameworks characterized by 
poor governance. Traditional legal tools such as impact assessments including 
their participation requirements can be used to build the enabling conditions 
and allow for meaningful sharing of benefits arising from an investment or 
development.
In this context, benefit- sharing considerations can come into play as follows: 
as opportunities for meaningful participation and recognition of legitimate right 
holders in the decision- making process; in terms of safeguards for local land 
rights against arbitrary or unfair interference, to be included in the cost- benefit 
assessment process; and finally in the form of contractual arrangements for 
revenue- sharing and non- monetary benefits such as infrastructure development. 
Benefit- sharing thus relates to both its enabling conditions related to participa-
tion in the decision- making process, and the substantive outcomes. The concept 
thus again needs to be understood and constructed broadly in the context of the 
VGGT, which provide guidance both on the protection of legitimate tenure 
rights, and on mechanisms for transparency, participation and accountability in 
decision- making regarding land allocation.
Even in the case of legitimate agreements, however – that is, agreements 
which have respected the national laws in question and are in accordance with 
international human rights standards – the question of who retains the decision- 
 making authority, and thus control over land allocation and use, remains. Such 
authority would generally rest with the central government, and is usually 
accompanied by a broad definition of public purpose requirements. Imposition of 
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a decision in the context of diverging views with regard to livelihood choices and 
aspirations and the preferred development model may result in grassroots 
contestation of the project, and further socio- economic and cultural marginali-
zation of rural populations. Time will show whether the VGGT and the UN 
Peasants Declaration will build on their emancipatory potential and empower 
rural populations, including by influencing power structures and providing them 
with the necessary political leverage.
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system/files/european- consensus- on- development- final- 20170626_en.pdf (last accessed 
14.1.2020).
39 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2003) ‘Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding 
Observations on Ecuador’, UN Doc CERD/C/62/CO/2.
40 Order of the Inter- American Court of Human Rights (2018), ‘Case of the Saramaka 
People v. Suriname: Monitoring Compliance with Judgment’.
41 The Ikarian case study is based on the work of Louisa Parks (2019) and Maria Bareli 
(2018); the collaborative effort that resulted in Bareli et al. (2020); and interviews 
with local actors, including pastoralists, local authorities and civil society members, 
conducted by Louisa Parks and myself during the two visits to Ikaria as part of 
BeneLex field work.
42 Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the Protection of 
Animals at the Time of Killing; Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on Hygiene of Foodstuffs; and Regula-
tion (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 Laying Down Specific Hygiene Rules for Food of Animal Origin.
43 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the Protection of 
Animals during Transport and Related Operations and Amending Directives 64/432/
EEC and 93/119/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1255/97.
44 According to preambular paragraph 15 of the Regulation 1099/2009, the legislative or 
administrative provisions and customs of the member states relating, in particular, to 
religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage are to be respected. Cultural 
events are therefore excluded from the scope of the regulation, where compliance 
with animal welfare requirements would adversely affect the very nature of the event 
concerned.
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3  Moving beyond fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing
Trends and challenges
The preceding analysis provides useful elements for the conceptualization of fair 
and equitable benefit- sharing in agriculture, and leads to the identification of a 
series of trends and challenges regarding its application.
When it comes to agricultural research and development, benefit- sharing is a 
well- established, legally binding policy objective. Having emerged in 
conjunction with the principle of national sovereignty over natural and genetic 
resources as reaffirmed in the CBD, fair and equitable benefit- sharing aimed to 
balance the injustices enshrined in the IPR system by ensuring that some portion 
of the benefits arising from the use of resources flow back to their providers: 
biodiversity- rich developing countries and their indigenous peoples and local 
communities. It thus serves as a tool for the recognition of the stewards of these 
resources and their reward, in a context of global cooperation in the pursuit of 
solidarity and justice. It is also conceptualized as a development tool, and a 
conservation tool. Linked to development purposes and rural livelihoods, it 
would allow benefits from the emerging biodiversity market to flow to the 
providers of the raw material for this market; it would also serve as an incentive 
for biodiversity stewards to enable their continued contribution to biodiversity 
conservation.
Along these lines, the ITPGRFA has established a highly sophisticated multi-
lateral mechanism to serve the objective of fair and equitable benefit- sharing. Its 
MLS regulates access to a common pool of crops and forages considered vital 
for food security and agricultural research, and monetary and non- monetary 
benefit- sharing arising from the utilization of these resources. The terms for 
exchange of material in the MLS are provided in the SMTA, a standardized 
private- law contract between a provider and a recipient (user) of genetic 
resources, which has been adopted by the Treaty’s Governing Body following 
intergovernmental negotiations.
Under the Treaty, benefit- sharing refers both to the accumulation of benefits 
from users of the system, and the distribution of benefits back to providers, in 
this case farmers in developing countries, through projects financed via the 
Benefit- sharing Fund. This terminological confusion seems to persist across all 
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ABS- related fora, including the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol, obscuring the 
scope of the concept.
Another complication refers to the blurred lines between monetary and non- 
 monetary benefit- sharing. According to the Treaty, mechanisms for non- 
 monetary benefit- sharing include exchange of information, access to and transfer 
of technology, capacity- building, as well as facilitated access to genetic 
resources in the MLS, which is recognized as a benefit in itself. While these 
mechanisms are certainly economic in the sense that they involve financial and 
human resources, monetary benefit- sharing refers strictly to the return of a 
portion of the gains arising from commercialization of products developed on 
the basis of material accessed through the MLS. The operation of the Benefit- 
 sharing Fund itself serves as an illustration of the interlinkages between 
monetary and non- monetary benefit- sharing; the distribution of finances serves 
objectives related to capacity- building and technology transfer, among others, 
linked thus to non- monetary benefit- sharing. Non- monetary benefit- sharing 
mechanisms can therefore be used to build the capacities required for use of 
plant genetic resources and consequently contribute to monetary benefit- sharing. 
In addition, they are instrumental in addressing the unequal capacities of coun-
tries and communities to benefit from the ITPGRFA and use of genetic 
resources in general, and thus bridging the capacity, fairness and equity gap in 
agriculture and agrobiodiversity conservation.
Bridging the equity and capacity gap in agricultural research and 
development is only one of the aspects to be addressed in the struggle for endo-
genous agricultural development and agrarian justice. Land governance is also 
of vital importance, but the two fields are rarely studied together. Exploration of 
benefit- sharing applications offers an opportunity to map and assess inter-
national law of relevance to sustainable agriculture more comprehensively.
In this context, farmers’ rights provide a preferential field of study, as they 
are situated at the interface between the regulation of agricultural research and 
development, and land and human rights. Discussing their origin and rationale, 
legal basis and implementation challenges, I propose a broad construction of 
farmers’ right to benefit- sharing. This would encompass not only the outcome of 
benefit- sharing as a process, but also a series of supporting elements and 
enabling conditions for smallholder farmers, including secure land tenure and 
access to seeds, as well assistance in the organization of cooperatives and access 
to markets. Stemming from the ITPGRFA multilateral approach to benefit- 
 sharing, this understanding aims both to reward and to enable farmers’ contribu-
tion to the conservation and sustainable use of agricultural biodiversity and thus 
to sustainable agriculture and global food security, as global public goods. This 
twin ‘reward and enable’ approach to benefit- sharing suggests that farmers 
should not only be rewarded in monetary terms for their past and present contri-
bution, but should also be supported to continue their practices and contribution 
to global public goods in the future. Such broad interpretation is further sup-
ported by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants, which puts forward a 
comprehensive approach regarding the rights of rural populations, linking their 
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vulnerabilities, their special relationship to land, water, seeds and natural 
resources and their contribution to global food security, through rights already 
protected in international law and new – individual and collective – rights.
Looking for traces of benefit- sharing in land regulation is a challenging 
endeavour. Unlike the area of biodiversity- based research and development, 
where fair and equitable benefit- sharing is an established international law 
concept and policy objective, translated into tools and mechanisms for 
implementation, land governance is still mostly a matter for domestic law. Inter-
national law emerged relatively recently, mainly with regard to indigenous 
peoples’ rights and human rights in general, environmental sustainability and 
transnational investment. It was in the context of the 2008 global food crisis and 
the growing trend of large- scale agricultural investments that land governance 
became an issue of common concern, of particular importance for food security 
and human development. In this context, fair and equitable benefit- sharing lacks 
a consistent normative content and legal bearing across all international instru-
ments of relevance to sustainable agriculture. While still linked to notions of 
justice and solidarity to the vulnerable, benefit- sharing in land governance is 
sometimes framed as a policy objective while others as a safeguard. In addition, 
its international legal basis is usually to be found in non- binding instruments.
In addition to the scope of regulation, there are other fundamental elements 
that differentiate the regulation of benefit- sharing from land use compared to 
benefit- sharing from genetic resource use for research and development. The 
nature of the resource is of particular importance. Land is fixed in supply, and 
policies are required to accommodate competing uses, overlapping claims and 
potentially conflicting rights. Restrictions in land use come from both material 
and legal limitations. Genetic resources, on the other hand, are renewable and 
easily multiplied, while restrictions in their use stem solely from legal limita-
tions, such as IPRs and ABS laws. A crucial question concerning implementation 
of benefit- sharing from land use is its relationship with actual access to the 
resource; the benefit to be shared is often the land itself or the right to use it. 
Examination of benefit- sharing is thus inextricably linked to redistribution efforts 
for land or agrarian reform, in view of chronic inequality in land distribution in 
many countries, complex interactions between formal tenure systems and 
customary arrangements around the globe and the fundamental question of who 
has decision- making authority, thus control over land allocation and use.
In this context, the VGGT establish clearly (albeit in a broadly worded 
manner) a policy objective related to benefit- sharing from public lands, calling 
on states to strive to develop policies that promote equitable distribution of 
benefits from state- owned land, fisheries and forests. In addition, redistributive 
land or agrarian reforms in accordance with the provisions of the VGGT and 
the UN Peasants Declaration can be considered a tool for benefit- sharing, 
aiming to share not only the benefits arising from the resource but also the 
resource itself.
When it comes to governance of public lands, application of benefit- sharing 
considerations may be used to promote fair and equitable use of public lands 
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through systems of concessions for the use of uncontested public land by indi-
viduals or farmer cooperatives for food security and rural livelihoods objectives, 
and through procedural and substantive safeguards against arbitrary or unfair 
interference with local land rights, including in the case of large- scale 
agricultural investments. This conceptualization is supported by elements 
enshrined in the VGGT and other soft- law instruments, and illustrated by human 
rights jurisprudence.
Benefit- sharing considerations have been forwarded in the form of safeguards 
in the case of large- scale agricultural investments, although questions remain 
regarding the relationship between benefit- sharing and land- use rights, particu-
larly customary ones. That is, empirical research shows that, in many cases, 
doubtful or strictly monetary benefit- sharing arrangements tend to replace 
legitimate land- use rights, with detrimental effects for livelihoods and social 
cohesion. Contrary to its original intent, benefit- sharing can thus be used to 
reproduce injustices and impose dominant ideological, economic and 
development models. Literature on the actual implementation of benefit- sharing 
arrangements via either policy interventions or contractual provisions remains 
limited, illustrating the need to bridge the gap in legal commentary and provide 
a comprehensive picture of the socio- legal framework and its implementation on 
the ground, from the international to the national and the local level.
That said, two issues are of particular relevance for the study and 
conceptualization of fair and equitable benefit- sharing in the case of large- scale 
agricultural investments: the potential mismatch between macro- level benefits at 
the government level and negative impacts on local- level livelihoods, resulting 
in unfair distribution of risks and benefits; and procedural shortcomings in the 
design and implementation of such agreements, due to a series of structural con-
siderations related to national frameworks characterized by poor governance. 
Traditional legal tools such as impact assessments can be used to build the 
enabling conditions and allow for meaningful identification and sharing of bene-
fits arising from an investment or development.
In this context, benefit- sharing considerations can come into play as follows: 
as opportunities for meaningful participation and recognition of legitimate right 
holders in the decision- making process; in terms of safeguards for local land 
rights against arbitrary or unfair interference, to be included in the cost- benefit 
assessment process; and finally in the form of contractual arrangements for 
revenue- sharing and non- monetary benefits such as infrastructure development. 
The concept thus again needs to be understood and constructed broadly in the 
context of the VGGT, which provide guidance both on the protection of 
legitimate tenure rights and on mechanisms for transparency, participation and 
accountability in decision- making regarding land allocation.
The overall analysis supports that the concept of fair and equitable benefit- 
 sharing has the potential to contribute to sustainable agriculture and rural 
livelihoods objectives if constructed broadly to cover both the process for its 
achievement, including supporting elements and enabling conditions, and the 
substantive outcome. In this sense, benefit- sharing should be understood as 
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integrating mechanisms for information sharing, technology transfer and 
capacity - building, dubbed as non- monetary benefit- sharing in the research and 
development realm, and mechanisms for transparency, participation and 
accountability in decision- making regarding land allocation and use. Enabling 
conditions, including an inclusive process, are prerequisites for a fair and equit-
able outcome. Focusing only on expectations for monetary benefits, 
intergovernmental negotiations, including under the ITPGRFA as well as other 
ABS- related fora, seem to lose this point. This is, however, easily explained, 
within the current neoliberal context and the resulting growing global inequities 
associated with trade liberalization, expansion of IPRs and corporate control 
over agriculture.
The legal architecture supporting application of fair and equitable benefit- 
 sharing lies in environmental treaties, and human rights- and agriculture- related 
instruments. It co- exists with a series of trade- and investment- related 
agreements which do not support benefit- sharing considerations, within an 
increasingly hostile and inequitable political and economic landscape which 
promotes a neoliberal model of growth. Adoption of the TRIPS Agreement 
weakened the gains associated with the CBD, while an ever- growing web of 
bilateral and multilateral free- trade and investment agreements reduces policy 
choices for developing countries through IPR- related standards and land- related 
developments.
The gradual strengthening of plant breeders’ rights and the expansion of 
patents aggravate the asymmetry between modern and farmers’ varieties, and 
limit the discretion of states that wish to safeguard agricultural systems that rely 
upon small- scale farming with well- documented impacts on local food security 
and rural livelihoods. But it is large- scale investments in farmland that are con-
sidered among the main factors threatening rural livelihoods, radically 
transforming not only customary tenure systems but also formally recognized 
ones. One of the key trends that emerged out of the 2008 global food crisis, 
large- scale land investments by both national and international corporations 
have been increasing the risk of dispossession for vulnerable rural populations. 
The expanding sphere of application of international trade and investment law, 
in combination with its enforcement potential and the asymmetry in capacities 
and power of the parties involved, has resulted in protection of the international 
capital, often to the detriment of national development priorities in developing 
countries, restricting states’ ability to regulate for the public interest. Imbalances 
in the law raise questions about whose rights are being prioritized and why.
As long as 15 years ago, the Sub- Commission on Human Rights had already 
drawn attention to the primacy of human rights obligations over economic pol-
icies and agreements and requested the TRIPS Council to take fully into 
account existing state obligations under international human rights instruments. 
In the meantime, the international community seems to be taking the opposite 
direction. The WTO dispute settlement system is being used at full speed to 
enforce implementation of multilateral trade agreements, often against 
developing countries’ efforts to provide food security for local populations; the 
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activities of multinational companies remain largely outside the scope of inter-
national law (De Jonge 2011); a complex web of bilateral and regional trade 
and investment treaties build a WTO- plus legal order enforced through arbit-
ration tribunals, which limit national governments’ regulatory choices outside 
whichever guarantees of equity and legitimacy multilateralism provides (Cotula 
2014). Trade- and investment- oriented policies are gaining a de facto 
supremacy over human rights and environmental treaties, because of their 
enforcement potential and the underlying power of actors and interests 
involved. At the same time, the dramatic extent of patent expansion and market 
concentration means that enforcement of IPRs is not even needed, as ‘the 
dominant oligopolists are in a position to dictate to farmers the very conditions 
of access to seed’ (Kloppenburg 2014: 1229), at the same time making public 
research on novel technologies virtually impossible (Tsioumani et al. 2016).
Lessons from the grassroots
While the overall picture of international law appears rather gloomy at the moment, 
with the dominant growth model being coupled with growing nationalisms, 
rising authoritarianism and a mistrust of multilateralism, the escalation of civil 
society and grassroots movements provides rays of hope.
The preceding analysis has showcased the role of movements in the 
development not only of national but also of international law. Several land 
rights movements around the globe demand land redistribution, claim recogni-
tion of customary, in cases communal, rights to land and assert the right to 
control the type of development undertaken as a means towards social and 
agrarian justice. In Brazil, a country with chronic problems related to extreme 
land concentration, policy developments were shaped by the struggles of the 
Brazilian Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST), one of the most active 
social movements in the region, known for its massive land occupations. MST 
has launched the Popular Agrarian Reform, a new model of agrarian reform 
which links land distribution demands with governance based on food sover-
eignty and agro- ecology (Azevedo 2016), with documented impact on the 
country’s land governance profile.
Agrarian movements have recently been a driving force behind international 
law development. Lorenzo Cotula (2016) notes, for instance, the significant 
contestation against land acquisitions, which has given rise to local- to- global 
alliances of affected people, social movements and NGOs opposing the deals. 
The impact of such movements to the development of international law has been 
reflected most prominently in the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Peasants. La Via Campesina had a leading role in the negotiations, 
representing a rare case of direct involvement of social movements in inter-
national lawmaking. In fact, Priscilla Claeys and Marc Edelman (2019: 1) 
characterize the process of development of the Declaration as ‘a new kind of 
people’s diplomacy and an innovative, bottom- up process of building alliances, 
lobbying, and authoring international law’. Importantly, the Declaration 
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elaborates on the right to land and to the sustainable use of natural resources, 
including fair and equitable benefit- sharing in any case of exploitation affecting 
such natural resources. Further integrating references to seed- related rights, food 
sovereignty and agrarian reforms to facilitate broad and equitable access to land 
and other natural resources, the Declaration, alongside the VGGT, could 
potentially impact the development paradigm, by building upon their emancip-
atory potential to draw attention to peasant autonomy and the broader agrarian 
struggles for social justice.
In this context, in the next chapter I explore a series of case studies 
illustrating community- level understandings of benefit- sharing. Of diverse 
origin, size, focus and visibility, these initiatives illustrate the sharing ethos at 
the heart of the concept of fair and equitable benefit- sharing, which could affect 
the acceptability and legitimacy of policy action, within or beyond strict legal 
frameworks.
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4  Exploring grassroots initiatives 
from the seed to the landscape
Introduction
This chapter explores four examples coming from the grassroots, which enrich 
the concept of fair and equitable benefit- sharing, offering ideas for institutional 
and legal innovation:
– the concept of participatory plant breeding, aiming to re- involve farmers in 
plant breeding;
– open- source applications in agricultural research and development, with a 
focus on the Open Source Seed Initiative;
– the Peliti community in Greece, a network of local groups working on the 
conservation and exchange of traditional varieties; and
– the case of the Potato Park in the Peruvian Andes, which is an indigenous 
biocultural heritage area based on a sui generis legal system combining 
customary laws with concepts of international environmental law.
The four selected case studies seek to cover a broad range of aspects, actors and 
approaches involved in agricultural biodiversity conservation, agricultural 
research and development and land management for sustainable agriculture and 
food security. They range from the seed to the landscape and from amateur 
gardeners and indigenous peoples to professional farmers and public- sector 
researchers.
Participatory plant breeding
Participatory plant breeding is a general term used to describe a broad range of 
collaborative programmes involving both scientists and farmers in plant 
breeding (Westengen and Winge 2019). The approach was developed in 
response to the shortcomings of scientific, professional plant breeding, which 
was evolved to support the objectives of the green revolution and was 
centralized around the international agricultural research centres of the CGIAR 
(Morris and Bellon 2004). As explored in the first and second chapters, the 
emergence of professional plant breeding and the commercial seed sector led to 
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the marginalization of farmer practices and seed systems. As a result of a series 
of trends, including the professionalization of plant breeding, formalization of 
seed markets and structural adjustment programmes, farmers became more 
dependent on commercial seed providers and vulnerable in view of higher seed 
prices; importantly, they also became mere end- users of seed, rather than 
innovators, gradually lost knowledge and confidence in their capacities and were 
disempowered vis- à- vis other sectors of society (Westengen and Winge 2019; 
Salazar et al. 2019).
At the same time, the largely centralized modern plant breeding system failed 
to address the enormous diversity of environmental conditions and the needs of 
farmers around the world, particularly when it comes to subsistence- oriented 
farming systems. Especially in the context of reduced public investment in agri-
culture in many countries around the world (Manzella and Louafi 2019), efforts 
focused more on major food crops of economic and political importance such as 
wheat and rice, leaving aside traditional food crops consumed mainly in 
developing countries, such as minor grains, tubers and pulses (Morris and 
Bellon 2004), which, however, are of great value for food security and nutrition, 
and the needs of subsistence farmers living in marginal environments. Recogni-
tion of this reality led to the establishment of a number of pilot projects in the 
1990s, including under the umbrella of the CGIAR, which involved farmers in 
various stages of the breeding process: from setting objectives, and testing and 
selecting breeding materials in their own fields, to building farmers’ skills to 
breed their own varieties (Almekinders and Hardon 2006).
In an early analysis of participatory plant breeding research, Michael Morris 
and Mauricio Bellon (2004) underscored the benefits of integrating global and 
local plant breeding efforts through participatory plant breeding programmes 
with regard to agronomic outputs. They noted that the international plant 
breeding system has largely bypassed the needs of farmers in marginal environ-
ments in developing countries who grow mainly non- commercial food crops, 
leaving them vulnerable to periodic production shortfalls and chronic food 
insecurity. Participatory plant breeding methods, they argue, have the potential 
to deliver better varieties to address their needs. More recent research, however, 
has pinpointed the objectives of participatory plant breeding in areas much 
broader than improved and more focused productivity. Daniele Manzella and 
Sélim Louafi (2019) note that participatory plant breeding involves a com-
promise between utilitarian and fairness- oriented views of collaboration; it 
implies balancing the interests of different stakeholders and relates to 
the effectiveness of legal measures for safeguarding those interests. Pointing to the 
unfair distribution of benefits and costs of the green revolution and arguing there 
is no such thing as an apolitical agronomy, Ola Westengen and Tone Winge 
(2019) argue that plant breeding must address dimensions of sustainability and 
farmer empowerment, in addition to productivity, in order to relate to the 2030 
Sustainable Development Agenda with regard to the development of sustainable 
agri- food systems. Rene Salazar and colleagues (2019) go further; exploring 
human development and social reform perspectives of participatory plant 
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breeding, they argue it should not address only the technical challenges of man-
aging and improving the local crop and variety portfolio used by farmers. It 
must take into account the socio- economic and political context, to address 
social inequities, improve livelihoods and aim for greater empowerment. For 
Salazar and colleagues, participatory plant breeding should focus on maintaining 
not the traditional cultivars per se, but farmer- based innovation and seed 
systems as a structural component of agricultural development, centred around 
gender sensitivity and co- development of knowledge. Farmers should participate 
in the creation of new varieties that are best adapted to their socio- economic 
realities and agro- ecological conditions, reducing dependency, building 
confidence and inserting diversity in the production system (Salazar et al. 2019; 
African Centre for Biodiversity 2018). Participatory plant breeding thus cannot 
be assessed solely in terms of new varieties produced, but also in terms of social 
benefits, including empowerment and organizational capacity (Manzella and 
Louafi 2019).
Challenges regarding participatory plant breeding involve a host of 
 participation- related issues such as inclusiveness, choice of participants, 
addressing gender issues and building a common language to accommodate the 
knowledge and experiences of all participants, farmers and conventional plant 
breeders alike. With regard to outcomes, designers and participants would also 
need to address the type of monetary and non- monetary benefits to be achieved, 
including, for instance, more resilient or more productive varieties, higher 
incomes or new knowledge – agronomy- or policy- related (Winge 2019). In 
addition, a series of legal, institutional and financial challenges are of particular 
importance for the purposes of this analysis.
Although the literature has gradually acknowledged the potential of 
participatory plant breeding programmes towards improved productivity, sustain-
ability and empowerment outcomes, recognition of such potential by policy fora 
remains limited. The FAO Voluntary Guide for National Seed Policy Formula-
tion,1 developed to assist governments in formulating policies which help create 
an enabling environment for seed sector development, recognizes the role of 
informal seed systems, and calls for building linkages between variety 
development, seed production and distribution, as a means to ensure that farmers 
have easy access to new and adapted varieties. This can be achieved through 
participatory plant breeding and participatory varietal selection and the active 
involvement of farmers, particularly women, in these processes. Participatory 
plant breeding has also been attracting attention under the ITPGRFA as an 
approach promoting implementation of farmers’ rights, including to fair and 
equitable benefit- sharing, as well as the Treaty’s provisions on sustainable use of 
plant genetic resources. Tone Winge (2019) notes that participatory plant 
breeding utilizes farmers’ traditional knowledge, thus contributing to its 
protection through use, brings benefits to farmers and can empower them to parti-
cipate in decision- making and get familiar with legislation and policies that affect 
them. In her examination of resolutions and other instruments adopted under the 
Treaty, she draws attention to references to participatory plant breeding as a 
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means towards sustainable use of plant genetic resources in a resolution adopted 
by the Treaty’s Governing Body (Resolution 4/2015) as well as in the Toolbox 
for Sustainable Use of PGRFA. This toolbox is an online system developed to 
assist countries in designing and implementing measures to promote sustainable 
use of PGRFA, built to reflect the needs of all stakeholders involved in different 
aspects of PGRFA utilization.2 She further highlights recognition of participatory 
plant breeding as a tool for realizing farmers’ rights, alongside community seed 
banks, biodiversity registers and seed fairs ( Resolution 7/2017), adding that the 
Global Consultation on farmers’ rights undertaken in the Treaty framework in 
2010 revealed that it was among the most widely employed and favourably 
viewed measures for benefit- sharing (Winge 2019).
In practice, however, many participatory plant breeding programmes receive 
little or no official policy or legal support for production and distribution of vari-
eties. Most countries’ seed laws and regulations fail to recognize the importance 
of informal seed systems and do not support participatory plant breeding efforts, 
due to requirements related to seed certification and marketing, limitations in seed 
exchanges and strict variety registration procedures for seed producers excluding 
farmers (De Jonge et al. 2019). Bram De Jonge and colleagues (2019) draw atten-
tion to policy measures implemented in some countries to accommodate such 
efforts, including exemptions to general seed legislation, opportunities for 
registering farmers’ varieties and the introduction of an ‘alternative seed class’, 
which is regulated specifically to support the production, use and marketing of 
seed of farmers’ varieties resulting from participatory plant breeding pro-
grammes. As explored in detail in the second chapter, however, implementation 
of both opportunities for registration and exemptions to seed certification and 
marketing requirements for farmers’ varieties is largely problematic. De Jonge 
and colleagues also conclude that such alternative approaches aiming to support 
farmers’ varieties need further development, upscaling and investment.
Supportive legal measures are thus needed, with regard both to access to 
source germplasm and recognition of the outcome of participatory plant 
breeding as collective innovation, including keeping it available for further 
research and development (Manzella and Louafi 2019). When it comes to access 
to source material, participatory plant breeding programmes need to ensure its 
legal status allows its use in the programme. If this material is protected by 
IPRs, this means either benefiting from the breeder’s exemption or requesting 
the holder to waive them for the purposes of the programme, which may involve 
significant challenges as noted under the case study on open- source applications. 
If the material comes from a public or CGIAR collection, rules under the CBD 
or the ITPGRFA may apply. Legal recognition of the outcome of participatory 
plant breeding in the current IPR context is also complicated, because of dif-
ficulties associated with applying the criteria of plant variety protection and 
granting rights to a community for collective innovation, particularly in view of 
the diversity in forms of collaboration and outputs experienced in participatory 
plant breeding projects. An additional challenge would be to maintain the avail-
ability of the outcome for further research and breeding. This could be achieved 
Exploring grassroots initiatives  139
by either making it available to the ITPGRFA Multilateral System voluntarily, 
as practised by participatory plant breeding programmes funded by the Treaty’s 
Benefit- sharing Fund (Toledo 2019), or using open- source models (Manzella 
and Louafi 2019), which are explored in more detail below in this chapter. 
Manzella and Louafi (2019) argue that the open- source logic may be particularly 
appropriate for participatory plant breeding programmes, as it focuses on com-
munity management for both the creation and the sharing of intellectual and cul-
tural resources not necessarily incorporated in the final biological output – the 
improved variety.
In view of lack of legal and institutional support, and decreasing public 
investment in agriculture, financial sustainability is another crucial challenge for 
participatory plant breeding programmes. Participatory plant breeding projects 
feature prominently in the grant portfolio of the ITPGRFA Benefit- sharing Fund, 
as they support the Fund’s priorities regarding on- farm management, sustainable 
use, information exchange, capacity- building and technology transfer (Toledo 
2019). Álvaro Toledo (2019) reports that 27 participatory plant breeding projects 
have been funded during three project cycles of the Benefit- sharing Fund, further 
noting that partners have highlighted the multi- sectoral and community- based 
nature of such projects, which work directly with targeted rural communities to 
ensure that interventions are based on local needs, collective strengths and 
shared resources.
While funding from the Benefit- sharing Fund is certainly an acknowledge-
ment of the value and contribution of participatory plant breeding projects to the 
Treaty’s objectives, and may eventually promote institutional recognition and 
policy support, it cannot cover funding needs in a predictable and sustainable 
manner. For years, the international agricultural research centres of the CGIAR, 
along with donor countries, NGOs and national research institutes, have also 
played a key role in supporting such projects with varying specific objectives, 
ranging from increased production and enhanced adoption of suitable varieties to 
biodiversity conservation and enhancement of farmers’ own breeding efforts. 
Conny Almekinders and Jaap Hardon (2006) record and assess several relatively 
early case studies. Some of them, they note, are more focused on varietal 
improvement and design of breeding activities, while others prioritize supporting 
farmers’ capacities to manage their own genetic resources as a form of 
empowerment. A project in Mali was initiated by plant breeders of the Inter-
national Crops Research Institute for the Semi- Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), a 
CGIAR centre, and aimed at creating a breeding programme that could more 
effectively develop varieties that are attractive to farmers. It involved setting 
breeding objectives based on farmers’ priorities and developing materials for 
variety selection on community lands. Farmers were involved in selecting 
material for on- farm testing trials, which they then managed and recorded. These 
trials led to a number of promising varieties which were selected for larger- scale 
trials, while farmers outside the project areas also showed great interest.
The Community Plant Genetic Resources Conservation and Development 
Project in Vietnam was one of the projects under the Community Biodiversity 
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Use, Conservation and Development in Asia Programme (BUCAP), coordinated 
by an NGO, the Southeast Asian Regional Institute for Community Education 
(SEARICE) and funded by Norway’s Development Fund. The main objective of 
BUCAP was providing farmers with knowledge and methodology to conserve 
and diversify plant genetic resources at community level, through farmer field 
schools and field studies. Implemented in Vietnam, Laos and Bhutan, its focus 
was to address the narrowing rice genetic diversity in Asia and the inadequate 
participation of farmers in agricultural development. The Vietnam programme is 
recalled as an example of a participatory plant breeding approach where farmers 
have the most control over the process. Implemented in a range of environments, 
including both rain- fed and irrigated rice production, reports account participa-
tion by 2519 farmers (1169 women and 1350 men) in 48 villages (Almekinders 
and Hardon 2006). Successes included the development of four varieties in two 
different villages. More generally, increase of farmers’ access to a wider range 
of varieties and of variety diversity in farmers’ fields led to rehabilitation of 
local varieties through mass selection and yield increases of more than 20%, 
increasing the diversity and quality of national rice production. The high level of 
farmers’ organization in communes and their familiarity with farmer field 
schools are mentioned as important factors contributing to the programme’s 
success. Almekinders and Hardon (2006) note that, despite problems with regard 
to access to suitable parental materials for crosses and compliance with national 
rules and regulations, the ability of farmers and their organizations to play a 
meaningful role in breeding, selecting and producing seed is well established, 
and needs to be integrated in national policies.
The Bhutan programme also focused on empowering farmers and 
strengthening farmer seed systems. It was linked to a prior breeding programme 
aimed at developing resistance against a severe rice blast epidemic at 
high altitudes, which involved crosses between modern varieties and local 
landraces and screening in various rice growing regions. Adopting a farmer field 
school approach as in Vietnam, the programme promoted self- reliance in 
decision - making and revitalized farmers’ confidence in managing their genetic 
resources (Almekinders and Hardon 2006). Farmers were first involved in 
screening breeding lines for blast resistance and local adaptation. The project was 
then expanded to improving uniformity and productivity of local landraces of 
rice and maize, leading to a real partnership between farmers and plant breeders.
Farmer field schools have been successfully used in many cases and proved 
to be a highly suitable instrument for socially and gender- inclusive participatory 
plant breeding and method for empowering farmers, giving recognition to their 
knowledge and affirming their capacity for innovation. Farmer field schools 
allow farmers to collectively learn to define problems, seek solutions and set 
targets, and, with the support of scientists and extension staff, learn breeding 
and selection approaches, test the seeds of new varieties and share their 
observations on these seeds. In Vietnam, for instance, largely as a result of 
participatory plant breeding efforts in farmer field schools, farmers have estab-
lished over 400 seed clubs, providing some 25% of certified rice seeds of the 
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Mekong Delta (Salazar et al. 2019). Farmer field schools are also the main tool 
used by the Oxfam- coordinated Sowing Diversity = Harvesting Security pro-
gramme,3 which is one of the largest programmes currently facilitating 
participatory plant breeding projects. Rather than simply sharing technology, or 
training farmers to produce seeds for distribution to other farmers, the pro-
gramme claims its focus is on people’s capacities for self- organization and 
mutual learning in order to create locally adapted crop varieties and engage in 
changing government policies. Working towards a ‘fair, sustainable and gender- 
 just global food production system’, the programme is organized around four 
interconnected pillars. It scales up its impact by promoting free use of its 
outcomes; it also promotes farmer seed enterprises in the form of seed 
production and marketing cooperatives of various sizes, organizational structure 
and market engagement, which aim at providing smallholders in diverse and 
stressful production areas with well- adapted appropriate varieties of high- 
 quality seeds, improving the diffusion of farmers’ varieties and increasing avail-
ability of plant genetic diversity in wider seed markets. Community seed banks 
are set up, to keep seeds available at the community level over growing seasons, 
while seed fairs serve as platforms for sharing seeds, knowledge and experi-
ences. The programme further empowers women to reclaim their role in food 
and nutrition security through strengthening their capacity in seed management 
and global policy engagement, and strengthens the knowledge base with regard 
to relevant policy and legislation, by connecting experiences from the com-
munity level with national and global policymaking to empower farmers’ 
engagement with relevant policymaking.
Open- source applications in agriculture
As noted above, plant breeders need to ensure the legal status of the source 
material they use in their research programmes.4 Researching and negotiating 
the IPRs that potentially surround the material and methods of their work in 
order to obtain ‘freedom to operate’ may be a substantial transaction cost for 
breeders (Kloppenburg 2014). This is particularly due to the breadth of patents 
currently granted, as explored in the first chapter, and the uncertainty generated 
by patent applications that are still pending, as well as the fees usually required 
for searching patent databases. The obscurity of the patent landscape is further 
exacerbated by the fact that, while ownership of the patent is usually a matter of 
public record, ownership of the rights transferred through licenses is not. Most 
jurisdictions do not impose a responsibility on licensees to disclose, making it 
almost impossible for a researcher to assemble all the licenses needed to 
proceed with her research (Jefferson 2006). In an inversion of their intent, IPRs 
are used to obstruct research and impede innovation; in the possibility only of 
patents and pending patent applications on material and methods they may use, 
breeders are advised not to proceed with their work out of fear of litigation and 
the cost involved, even if the patent claims are likely not defensible in court 
(Kloppenburg 2014).
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The effects of the widespread patenting of germplasm, research technologies 
and breeding methods have been characterized as a ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ 
(Heller 1998; Heller and Eisenberg 1998). As noted in the second chapter, 
Heller’s tragedy of the anticommons refers to a situation where too many parties 
hold a right to exclude with respect to a particular property or resource, leading 
to the need to obtain several permissions for use.
An often- cited example illustrating the complexity and obscurity of the 
patent landscape is that of Golden Rice, a genetically modified rice variety 
heralded as a potential solution to vitamin A deficiency. A detailed analysis of 
the intellectual property dimensions documented approximately 70 patents and 
pending patent applications implicated in its development. The high media 
profile of the case facilitated negotiations with the patent holders. Humanitarian - 
 use licensing was applied, an otherwise rarely used tool which allows for 
humanitarian uses of proprietary technologies to support international 
development objectives (Aoki 2009).
Such multi- level complexity has devastating consequences for public 
breeders, particularly in developing countries, including for underfunded 
research on neglected crops relevant for local food security. In the context of a 
complex and contradictory international legal framework, characterized by 
primacy of trade- related concerns and IPR enforceability, as explored in the 
previous chapters, and a socio- economic reality defined by the power of the 
commercial agro- chemical sector, certain initiatives started experimenting with 
novel tools inspired from developments in the sector of information 
technologies (ΙΤ), in particular open- source.
Open systems have long been associated with the practices of science and 
academia. ‘Open- science’ systems facilitate knowledge production through 
disclosure, sharing and reciprocal exchange, while relying on a system of public 
expenditures (Louafi and Welch 2014). In the current increasingly proprietary 
environment for material and non- material resources of scientific significance 
(Benkler 1999; Boyle 2003), the open- access movement promotes public- sector 
values by advocating the removal of access barriers to academic research. In 
synthesizing a wealth of relevant literature, Sélim Louafi and Eric Welch 
usefully argue that the open- access movement represents a political response, 
seeking to democratize access to knowledge and innovation; it has been 
expanded by more recent open- data initiatives, which refer more specifically to 
data and information that can be used for research purposes. Open- source, on the 
other hand, refers to an economic response to information enclosures, and 
proposes an alternative model aiming to implement and manage open systems, in 
order to enhance production and innovation. Open- source is thus linked to legal 
and organizational rules meant to control activity and outcomes (Louafi and 
Welch 2014). In this context, open- access systems and concepts are closer to the 
idea of the public domain, in the sense that nobody is excluded from use, while 
open- source models are closer to the concept of protected commons, as they are 
open to a group of users and specific rules for access and sharing, including 
restrictions, apply (Louafi and Welch 2014). Similarly, while open- access efforts 
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maintain a flexible approach to the systemic inclusion of IPRs, open- source 
relies on IPRs and licensing terms to establish and operationalize open systems.
The open- source concept has its origin in the IT sector. When software was 
produced mainly by academia, it was distributed freely under the principle of 
cooperation, together with the source code – the human- readable version of a 
programme. By the late 1960s, increased complexity led to increased production 
costs, which in turn led to commercialization and imposition of restrictions upon 
redistribution. By the early 1980s, charging for software licenses had become 
mainstream and copyrights and trademarks were widely enforced (Weber 2004). 
In addition, to prevent software from being used on their competitors’ com-
puters, most manufacturers stopped distributing the source code and began using 
copyright and restrictive software licenses to limit or prohibit copying and 
redistribution.
While many online communities were still building and sharing software, in 
1983, Richard Stallman published the GNU Manifesto. With this, he started act-
ively defending knowledge- sharing practices against the rise of software as a 
commodity. The GNU Project that was launched simultaneously had the goal of 
creating an open- source operating system. Two years later, Stallman had created 
the Free Software Foundation to support the free- software movement, which was 
based on the philosophy that use of computers should not prevent cooperation. In 
practice, this means rejecting proprietary software, which imposes such 
restrictions, and promoting free software (Stallman 2004). To protect the result 
of the work of free- software communities and the GNU Project, Stallman 
published the GNU General Public License (GPL) in 1989. The GPL is the most 
widely used free- software license (Black Duck Software 2015), which 
guarantees end users the freedom to run, study, share (copy) and modify the soft-
ware. It is a copyleft license, which means that derived works can only be dis-
tributed under the same license terms.
As evident by the existence and content of the manifesto, the free- software 
movement was a political response to the diminishing freedoms of computer 
users. Stallman deems IPRs to be an overgeneralized term including different 
sets of rights under one umbrella, and carrying ‘a bias that is not hard to see: it 
suggests thinking about copyright, patents and trademarks by analogy with 
property rights for physical objects’ (Stallman 2006). Along the same line of 
thought, in their seminal work, economists Michele Boldrin and David Levine 
prefer the term ‘intellectual monopoly’ as a more appropriate and clear 
definition of the concept, which, they argue, is very dissimilar from property 
rights (Boldrin and Levine 2005). Thus, according to Stallman and contrary to 
the IPR philosophy, free software will promote rather than hinder progress in 
technology (Stallman 1985).
Many members of sharing communities, however, did not share Stallman’s 
vision. Distancing themselves from the notions that non- free software is a social 
problem or unethical, they argued that sharing practices should continue for 
reasons rather related to technological superiority, innovation and economic 
growth. In this context, members of the free- software movement founded the 
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Open Source Initiative in 1998, shortly after the announcement of the release of 
the Netscape source code. They believed that the pragmatic, business- case 
grounds that had motivated Netscape to release their code illustrated a valuable 
way to engage with potential software users and developers, and convince them 
to create and improve source code by participating in an engaged community. 
They created the ‘open- source’ label to identify this approach and distinguish it 
from the philosophically and politically focused ‘free software’ (Open Source 
Initiative 2012). Currently, the term ‘Free and Open Source Software’ (FOSS) is 
commonly used to include both practices. FOSS is produced and distributed 
either by informal communities and non- profit organizations or as commercial 
products by corporations, with Linux, Android and Firefox as notable examples. 
Despite the free- software- versus- open- source ideological schism, the over-
whelming majority of open- source programmes are also compatible with the 
free- software modalities and vice versa.
As awareness was growing that the FOSS paradigm is not limited to software 
and that ‘it can potentially be applied in any domain that requires a team of 
thinkers to tackle a problem’ (Schweik 2007: 302), several analysts proposed 
applying the open- source principles and practices to plant breeding and the seed 
sector. The idea emerged more or less independently from a variety of discip-
lines, as Jack Kloppenburg notes on the basis of a literature review: plant 
breeding, molecular biology, sociology and law (Kloppenburg 2014). The main 
rationale was that in a legally defined space in which sharing is unimpeded by 
IPRs, farmers can continue to apply their local knowledge, in equitable 
cooperation, and public researchers can continue with scientific plant breeding in 
the face of global challenges. The open- source idea was considered promising, 
both as a defense against IPRs and as a potentially successful commercial model 
leading to sustainably funded projects.
The extent to which open- source models can be applied to agriculture is 
subject to debate. An open- source model in the agricultural sector would be 
based on the idea that farmers are both users and developers of both plant vari-
eties and the related information, knowledge and technology. New plant varieties 
and related technology developed using a participatory process could be made 
available to farmers and plant breeders with a GPL- styled license with the same 
viral effect; any subsequent modifications must be openly accessible under the 
GPL terms, on a contractual promise that there would be no downstream 
restrictions on the rights of others to experiment, innovate, share or exchange the 
plant genetic resources. Application of the model would entail an inclusive user 
community of farmers, plant breeders and researchers through which information 
and technology may be exchanged freely via decentralized commons- based peer- 
 production networks (Aoki 2009). Keith Aoki (2009) optimistically argues that 
such a model would lead to increased capacity of users, rather than creating 
passive consumers of technologically advanced but legally inaccessible crop 
technology systems. It would also enable farmers to continue developing plant 
varieties adapted to particular local situations, and thus prevent genetic erosion. 
In addition to creating a system allowing for open exchange of knowledge and 
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innovation, the motivations for using an open- source model in the agricultural 
context are further linked to addressing global challenges related to food 
security, conservation of agricultural biodiversity and rural development.
Following the proposal for a GPL for ‘Plant Germplasm’ by plant breeder 
Thomas Michaels in 1999, the Open Source Seed Initiative (OSSI) represents 
one of the most notable examples of application of the open- source concept in 
plant breeding. The idea for OSSI emerged from two meetings held in the USA 
in April 2010 and May 2011, which were attended by a small number of public 
and private plant breeders, farmers and NGOs’ and indigenous groups’ 
representatives. The idea was to encourage and reward the sharing rather than 
the restriction of germplasm, revitalize public plant breeding and integrate the 
skills and capacities of farmer breeders with those of plant scientists. OSSI was 
eventually founded in 2012 as a USA- based not- for- profit organization, 
focusing on establishing a protected commons of open- source varieties and on 
educational and outreach activities associated with the development of this 
open- source seed commons, seed rights and issues related to the control of seed.
The initiative’s basic aims included: development of a germplasm licensing 
framework with no breeding restrictions on the germplasm released through its 
auspices other than that derivatives must also be released with the same 
license; participatory plant breeding through integration of the skills of farmers 
with those of plant scientists; respect for the rights and sovereignty of indi-
genous communities over their seeds and genetic resources; development and 
maintenance of a plurality of sources from which farmers and breeders can 
obtain seed; and support for a public and community plant breeding sector 
(Kloppenburg 2014).
A key tool for achieving these goals was the development of open- source 
licenses, modelled on legal arrangements successfully deployed in the software 
realm, which preserve the right to use material for further breeding and the right 
of farmers to save and replant seed (Kloppenburg 2014). Arrangements pro-
ceeded on the basis of two such licenses, with the accompanying copyleft 
requirements: one was ‘free’ with the only restriction that licensees may not 
restrict the freedom of others to use the seed in whatever way they wish; and the 
other was ‘royalty- bearing’, allowing collection of royalties on the seed but not 
restricting usage in any other way. These two licenses aimed to accommodate 
two tendencies manifest within the Initiative: one supporting completely free 
access to seed and rejecting any commodification of life forms, coming mainly 
from farmers from the Global South; and one interested in some returns or 
rewards through royalties, coming mainly from breeders in the North, who 
looked for revenues to maintain their programmes, in view also of the declining 
public financial support. This schism between farmers and breeders reflected not 
only the different needs between two societal sectors, but also the difference 
between still existing subsistence- based agricultural economies of the South and 
market- based economies of the North.
According to Jack Kloppenburg, one of OSSI funders, one of the immediate 
difficulties was a technical legal one. The initiative struggled over repurposing 
146  Exploring grassroots initiatives
contract law and drafting copyleft licenses that would be maximally defensible 
in court, resulting in ‘seven pages in language that none but an attorney can 
understand’ (Kloppenburg 2014: 1240). The need for such a license to accom-
pany every package of seed sold or exchanged resulted in inflexibilities, and a 
failure to virally propagate, negating the most powerful feature of the open- 
 source approach. OSSI eventually decided to use an informal pledge printed on 
every seed packet or transmitted along with the seed.
You have the freedom to use these OSSI- Pledged seeds in any way you 
choose. In return, you pledge not to restrict others’ use of these seeds or 
their derivatives by patents or other means, and to include this Pledge with 
any transfer of these seeds or their derivatives.5
The OSSI would thus continue to implement a protected commons mechanism 
through a chain of bilateral commitments (Manzella and Louafi 2019), but in the 
form of a pledge not to restrict use of the material or derivatives thereof rather 
than licenses. The OSSI pledge would operate rather as an ethical commitment 
from seed users to comply with the open- source rules and engage in the sharing 
of plant genetic resources (Kotschi and Horneburg 2018). This arrangement 
bypassed the undisputable difficulties of repurposing contract law and increased 
the viral potential of OSSI seeds, but arguably reduced the legal enforceability 
of the copyleft requirement (Hamilton 2014).
Johannes Kotschi and Bernd Horneburg (2018) draw attention to other 
attempts to apply the open- source concept, including the Open Source Seed 
License, developed by a working group of agricultural scientists, plant breeders 
and lawyers under the auspices of the German NGO Agrecol. The license was 
developed and published in 2016 following a comparison of ethical approaches 
based on a pledge and legal approaches based on a license, and with the aim to 
promote enforceability in the EU.
The Peliti community
The Peliti community was established in 1995 as a non- profit organization under 
Greek civil law.6 Its aims include: the collection, conservation and distribution 
of traditional agricultural varieties; the non- monetary exchange of goods and 
services; and the creation of a community focusing on conserving traditional 
varieties, including the preservation of seed saving- related knowledge, as well as 
local animal breeds. Based in Messochori, in the area of the virgin forest around 
Paranesti in northern Greece, and founded by Panagiotis Sainatoudis, it started 
as a personal effort that gradually got bigger, resulting in the creation of 20 local 
seed groups operating in various locations around Greece, one in Bulgaria and 
one in the USA. It unites both food producers and amateurs with an interest in 
seed collection and preservation and the objectives of the community in general. 
Members may join for different reasons, such as the passion for the seed, the 
quest for healthy food, or the desire for participation in general.
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Peliti’s activities include seed collection expeditions in mainland and island 
Greece, free distribution of seeds by post and yearly festivals for seed exchanges 
and seed distribution. These festivals are considered to be among the most 
popular globally, with thousands of visitors every year coming from Greece and 
abroad. The community is also engaged in awareness raising activities, 
developing publications and conducting seminars and international exchanges. 
International networking intensified as a result of the increasing popularity of 
seed festivals, as well as the recognition of Panagiotis Sainatoudis among the 
‘Guardians of Diversity in the Mediterranean’ by Bioversity International in 
2009.7 Since 2012, Peliti has also created a community seed bank, in an old 
school provided by a local municipality. The community considers the seed bank 
to serve as a safety net but not replace conservation and the use of agricultural 
varieties on- farm, which it actively supports. It is also increasingly involved in 
struggles for the legal recognition of farmers’ rights at the national and EU  level. 
While the non- monetary exchange of goods and services is an important 
 ideological basis of the community, it strongly supports farmers’ right to save, 
use, exchange and sell farm- saved seed if they so wish.
The community operates on the basis of donations, the income from the sale 
of publications, and volunteer work. Members are ideologically opposed to 
selling seed and reject even the idea of providing seed in exchange for annual 
subscriptions – a solution which could potentially bypass the prohibition of sale 
of seeds of varieties not included in the national and the European catalogues. 
The community distributes solely traditional seeds in the public domain free of 
charge. This saves them a host of legal challenges, but adds to financial ones. The 
limited finances pose obvious obstacles to its activities, for instance, regarding 
the operations of the seed bank. However, the range of its activities appears to be 
disproportionately large with regard to its finances, with 50,000 seed pockets dis-
tributed yearly by post, several dozens of thousands distributed in planned events 
and seeds sent to countries in crisis, including Palestine and Syria.
Ironically, the Greek financial crisis had an asymmetrical effect on the com-
munity; while its finances plummeted and continuation of the work relied almost 
exclusively to donations from like- minded organizations and individuals abroad, 
its seed- sharing activities started attracting an ever- increasing degree of atten-
tion. This is arguably linked to the rise of bottom- up initiatives, which provided 
solutions based on solidarity economy at times of crisis in the country. Such 
diverse initiatives, embodying different political tendencies and operating in 
different ways, include food and agricultural cooperatives, ‘no intermediaries’ 
markets, communal and municipal gardens promoting food self- sufficiency, eco- 
 communities covering also access to land and natural resources and community- 
 supported agriculture schemes supporting networks of consumers and producers 
(Backes et al. 2018). Peliti can be situated within this wave of mostly self- 
 organized responses to crisis, further collaborating with many of these initiatives 
providing seed. This wave also points to the emergence of a food sovereignty 
movement in the country, at times when austerity measures generally increased 
rural poverty particularly for smallholders.
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According to community member Vasso Kanellopoulou, the distribution and 
thus utilization and development of genetic resources is among the community’s 
biggest accomplishments. The community has a strong belief in farmer- based 
innovation, and highlights that recognition of such innovation is lacking in 
Greece. This is reflected in farmers denied access to genetic resources stored in 
the national genebank and lack of legal support for traditional varieties. Participa-
tion in law and policymaking processes at the national and European level is also 
becoming increasingly important, aiming at the increased recognition of farmers 
as innovators and farmers’ rights, including the seed- related rights explored in 
detail in the second chapter.
At the latest general assembly in 2019, the community decided to 
decentralize administration of local groups and transform itself into a network, 
maintaining regular collaboration and communication activities. Following 
intense discussions, local groups became independent with a focus on seed- 
 saving and distribution, while the original Peliti non- profit organization, still 
coordinated by Panagiotis Sainatoudis together with an administrative board, 
would focus on networking with international groups and creation of an 
eco- community.
The Potato Park
The Potato Park is an indigenous biocultural heritage area in the Peruvian 
Andes.8 It is one of the few successful examples of a self- organized and self- 
 managed indigenous territory, promoting a rights- based approach to biodiversity 
conservation and agricultural production in general. Built on a unique 
governance system combining customary laws with concepts inspired from 
international environmental law, it has attracted the attention of practitioners and 
academics, as well as international organizations, leading to a significant body 
of academic commentary and grey literature.
The park covers an area spanning 8240 hectares of communal land in Pisaq, 
the Sacred Valley of the Incas, between 3400 and 4500 metres above sea level in 
the Peruvian Andes. It currently incorporates the communal land of six Quechua 
communities, the Amaru, Chawaytire, Cuyo Grande, Pampallaqta, Paru Paru 
and Sacaca, with approximately 6000 residents (Argumedo 2012). The initiative 
was established in 1998, on the basis of communities’ wish to preserve their 
knowledge and agricultural biodiversity particularly regarding native potato 
varieties, while securing their right to self- determination (Montenegro de Wit 
2011). In developing the agreements that set up the Potato Park governance 
structures, the communities were supported by a Peruvian non- profit association 
(Asociación ANDES), and an international non- governmental organization (the 
UK- based International Institute for Environment and Development – IIED).
The agreements that form the basis of the Potato Park operate from the 
territorial to the genetic level (Montenegro de Wit 2011) and address a range of 
relations and arenas, from the establishment of the community as an autonomous 
legal entity and its institutional relation with the regional government and the 
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Peruvian state to its relation with outsiders who want to use the Park’s resources, 
as well as intra- community relations.
At the territorial level, the Park communities worked together to devise a 
communal land- sharing arrangement based on the indigenous ayllu concept, 
overcoming previous territorial disputes over contested boundaries between their 
lands (Nabhan 2008). A holistic territorial approach still thriving in the Andes, 
the ayllu is formed by three interconnected and interdependent communities, 
creating the conditions for ecological sustainability: humans and domesticated 
species; wild and semi- domesticated species; and the sacred and the ancestors. 
The main objective of ayllu is the attainment of wellbeing or Sumaq Causay. The 
overall objective of self- determined development, Sumaq Causay refers to the 
positive relationship between humans and their social and natural environments, 
which is achieved through maintaining reciprocity, duality and equilibrium, the 
three key customary Quechua principles, explored below as basis for the 
development of the inter- community agreement on benefit- sharing (ANDES, 
Potato Park Communities and IIED 2012; Tapia and Tobin 2013). This 
revitalization of traditional Andean systems promotes a reciprocal relationship 
between people and their environment in the Park.
Agricultural activities in the area are considered to fall under the concept of 
common- field agriculture (Godoy 1991). In great similarity with traditional land 
use in Ikaria as explored in the second chapter, private land in the Cusco valley 
was scattered among common fields; villagers had grazing rights in common 
fields after harvesting and during the years they were fallow; they also had the 
right to gather timber and firewood from the common fields, and they regulated 
and supervised land use collectively (Godoy 1991). These practices, based on 
subsistence activities and diversified land use, have been crucial in developing 
and maintaining a high degree of agricultural biodiversity.
Sustainable management of the Park’s agricultural biodiversity within a self- 
 determined land- use and governance system is the focus of the initiative. The 
Potato Park is located at the centre of origin of the potato; the region is home to 
approximately 2300 of the 4000 known potato varieties in the world, while the 
genetic diversity found within one plot of land in the area can reach up to 150 
varieties. The potato has been cultivated by Andean farmers for over 7000 years, 
and the area of the Park serves as a genetic reserve, with 700 local cultivars, 
including 410 varieties repatriated from the International Potato Centre (CIP), 
one of the international agricultural research centres of the CGIAR Consortium 
(Argumedo 2012). Traditional farming also includes: the cultivation of other 
native Andean crops, such as olluco, beans, maize, quinoa, wheat, tarwi, mashua 
and oca (Loong Wong and Argumedo 2011); the raising of domesticated animals 
such as guinea pigs and llamas; the use of wild species for food and medicinal 
purposes; and practices including community labour, the use of traditional tools, 
complementary plantings and ritual offerings to Mother Earth (Argumedo 2008).
By transforming these traditions into a customary legal framework as the 
basis for territorial arrangements at the intra- community level, the indigenous 
peoples living in the Park asserted their biocultural diversity as the legal basis 
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for self- determination (Montenegro de Wit 2011). At the same time, the Park’s 
representation towards the Peruvian state needs to be within the boundaries of 
Peruvian laws, to ensure formal legitimacy. Establishment of the Potato Park 
was made possible because Peru’s legal framework created enough openings to 
allow such expression of self- determination. In line with ILO Convention no. 
169, the Constitution guarantees the right to land, whether private or communal 
(Art. 88), and recognizes that peasant and native communities are legal entities, 
autonomous in their organization, and have the right to use and dispose freely of 
their lands (Art. 89). In 1974, the Law of Native Communities and Agrarian 
Regional Promotion in the Lowlands Forests and Valleys (Decree 20653) was 
the first piece of legislation to explicitly recognize indigenous groups as entitled 
to legal protection and recognition, as well as to collective land rights. Since 
then, Peru has formalized property rights for 1200 indigenous communities. In 
1978, to comply with a series of reforms, a new law for titling native com-
munities (Decree 22175) was approved. This law added land- use classification 
to the procedures required to title native communities; communal rights would 
only be granted to agricultural or pasture lands, while for land classified as 
forest, indigenous communities could only claim usufruct rights (Monterroso 
et al. 2017). The complexities of the system represent another illustration of the 
challenges associated with land governance; they are, however, beyond the 
scope of this case study. Under this territorial system, the Potato Park com-
munities have formal legal recognition and communal land titles. Recognition 
of the Potato Park as a protected area within Peru’s National System of Pro-
tected Areas, however, has not been achieved, despite repeated efforts 
(Argumedo 2008).
In accordance with Peruvian legislation (Law of Peasant Communities 
no. 24656/1987), the communities have organized themselves under the umbrella 
of the ‘Association of the Communities of the Potato Park’, with common goals 
including the conservation of agricultural biodiversity, the development of indi-
genous territoriality based on solidarity economy and innovations associated with 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge and the promotion of traditional 
resource rights. Governance of the Association, in accordance with the law’s 
requirements, is based on a general assembly, made up of the authorities of each 
of the six communities, a community board and specialized activity committees. 
This formal governance and representation system co- exists with traditional 
governance structures, corresponding to three levels of administration at the land-
scape, the community and the family scale (ANDES, Potato Park Communities 
and IIED 2012).
In this context, the Potato Park communities had the necessary legal space to 
develop a territorial development strategy autonomously, establishing economic 
initiatives based on the interlinkages between biological and cultural diversity 
and creating novel local products and services based on their traditional know-
ledge and natural resources and genetic diversity. Establishing an alternative, 
inclusive development model in support of cultural identity and biocultural heri-
tage was one of the objectives of the Potato Park. Based on reciprocity and 
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solidarity, a series of economic collectives were established in the Park, aiming 
at conserving and using sustainably biological resources. These included 
collectives on seed repatriation and conservation, crafts, gastronomy, agro- 
 ecotourism and medicinal plants, as well as a women’s video collective, in which 
women are trained in making and digitally editing videos in the local language, 
to record and share knowledge about the management of local resources. Finally, 
a women’s collective on medicinal plants addressed specifically marginalization 
of indigenous women through education and training, while promoting the use 
and transmission of indigenous knowledge associated with the conservation and 
sustainable use of local medicinal plants, including development of natural 
products (ANDES, Potato Park Communities and IIED 2012).
Passing from the landscape to the seed level, it was the signing of the repatri-
ation agreement with CIP in 2004 that provided the impetus for developing the 
inter- community agreement on benefit- sharing that lies at the heart of the Potato 
Park. CIP has been collecting potato varieties from the area since the 1960s. 
Following deliberations, in view of indigenous stewardship of genetic resources 
of a key food crop, customary laws on reciprocity and changes in international 
law with regard to plant genetic resources, an agreement for the ‘Repatriation, 
Restoration and Monitoring of Native Potato Agrobiodiversity and Associated 
Knowledge of Indigenous Communities’9 was signed (ANDES 2010). The 
agreement provides for the repatriation of seeds and commitments for sharing of 
benefits derived from their use, as well as from the use of associated traditional 
knowledge. It recognizes that the ITPGRFA provisions are fundamental for its 
effective implementation, further noting that the Potato Park ‘forms an innov-
ative bridge between traditional concepts of in situ and ex situ conservation’.
The objectives of the repatriation agreement include ensuring that genetic 
resources and knowledge remain under the custody of the communities and do 
not become subject to any form of IPRs, and promoting, through collaborative 
research, the role of in situ and ex situ strategies for the conservation of 
agricultural biodiversity. As part of their joint responsibilities, the parties agreed 
to support the Potato Park communities’ right to benefit- sharing and to promote 
collaborative research and development activities, including the recording and 
protection of relevant community knowledge systems, as well as to implement 
the agreement in accordance with the principle of open sharing for mutual 
benefit and for the benefit of the humanity. The Park is further responsible for 
maintaining access to the genetic material, including providing it for distribution 
and sowing by members of the Potato Park and third parties. CIP was required 
to prepare and make available the genetic material for its repatriation, guarantee 
that it is free of pests and diseases and provide technical assistance to the Park 
for its maintenance, monitoring, multiplication and management. CIP thus took 
over the cost of repatriation. The parties further recognized the role of the Potato 
Park in developing a community protocol, as explored below.
The repatriation agreement was of crucial importance for the Potato Park 
experiment. First, it marked the Park’s existence as an autonomous entity, to be 
respected under Peruvian law, and with the capacity to sign an agreement with a 
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CGIAR centre – an act which acquires relevance also for international environ-
mental law. The agreement highlighted the beginning of a consistent engagement 
of the Park in international deliberations on plant genetic resources, as explored 
below. Second, the agreement with CIP served as a registry of local varieties and 
legal protection against the claiming of IPRs on them. Finally, it was a driver of 
the participatory process among the Potato Park communities, which led to the 
development of the inter- community agreement on fair and equitable benefit- 
 sharing (ANDES, Potato Park Communities and IIED 2012); a mechanism was 
needed to ensure the equitable sharing of the repatriated seeds and of monetary 
benefits derived from this agreement, as well as of revenues derived from other 
economic activities in the park, to avoid potential conflicts among the 
communities.
The inter- community agreement on benefit- sharing, established among the 
six communities that manage the Park, holds a central position in its structure 
and governance system. Developed following a three- year- long participatory 
process, it is rooted in conservation and equity values enshrined in customary 
laws, and is regulated by the community and inter- community authorities. The 
governance structures aim to minimize the risk of conflicts over resources and of 
elites unfairly benefiting from revenues, while a percentage of the revenues is 
reinvested into a communal fund which is used to sustain and manage the Park’s 
agro- ecosystem and provides a safety net for the poorest people in the Park com-
munities (Swiderska et al. 2006). At the same time, the agreement serves as a 
biocultural community protocol for outsiders, for access to genetic resources and 
benefit- sharing in the sense of the Nagoya Protocol on ABS, mentioned in 
previous chapters. In the following paragraphs, based on records published by 
project participants, I am exploring in further detail the participatory process that 
led to the agreement, as a rare bottom- up example of benefit- sharing that speaks 
both to the international and the local level, as well as the agreement itself.
The process that led to the agreement was a complex one, illustrative of the 
challenges that accompany an endogenous benefit- sharing exercise. Challenges 
involved: designing a culturally sensitive participatory process combining 
Western and indigenous tools; articulating the results in a specific way to 
respond to communities’ needs while contributing to environmental sustain-
ability; and linking the oral Andean traditions with written instruments 
(ANDES, Potato Park Communities and IIED 2012; Swiderska et al. 2009). 
Guided by ANDES, IIED and indigenous researchers of the Park, participants 
started from identifying the customary norms that guide Andean practices of 
reciprocity and allow for redistribution of wealth among communities, as well as 
any potential new mechanisms that would be required to adapt these norms to 
current realities, before getting into several rounds of consultations on the actual 
rules and mechanisms of the agreement, in order to develop equitable models for 
access and benefit- sharing.
Alejandro Argumedo (2012) analyses in detail the methodological challenges 
encountered and process followed, so that development of the agreement con-
tributes to the empowerment of the communities involved and their institutions, 
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enabling effective control of decision- making. The selected methodology was 
designed and implemented collaboratively with indigenous community partners, 
and involved use of indigenous methods such as myths and drawings, combined 
with Western participatory methods, regarding engagement of all relevant stake-
holders. Focus was put on emancipatory/decolonization approaches to access 
and benefit- sharing, based on critiques of colonial relations in past research 
involving indigenous peoples. Quechua ways of learning were integrated as a 
way of resisting dominant discourses and addressing explicitly issues of power 
and rights. Indigenous researchers acted as a bridge between Western and indi-
genous knowledge systems and methods, and capacity- building for all involved 
was an important part of the process.
The process included three phases: identification of relevant community norms 
and customary laws; consultation, drafting and revision of the inter- community 
agreement; and final decision- making and validation of the agreement. The three 
key Andean principles of reciprocity, duality and equilibrium considered to 
underpin all natural resource management practices were used as a basis, in addi-
tion to other customary rules and practices, including on community- level conflict 
resolution. The principle of reciprocity, which includes the principles of equity 
and fairness and provides the basis for exchange between people and nature, is 
based on complementarity and redistribution, as opposed to competition and 
accumulation inherent to capitalist systems. It is applied, for instance, to the 
exchanges of seeds and knowledge. The principle of duality is reflected in the 
division of labour between men and women with mutual interdependence, as 
translated, for instance, in the transmission of knowledge related to agricultural 
practices, or the balance between rights and obligations, both of which should be 
met to achieve harmony. Finally, the principle of equilibrium refers to harmony 
between community members, and to respect for nature and the sacred world. It is 
applied to decision- making and conflict resolution, as well as the fair and equit-
able distribution of profits in relation to needs, capabilities, responsibilities, con-
tributions and efforts (ANDES, Potato Park Communities and IIED 2012).
The consultation, negotiation and drafting process aimed to identify the 
common interests of the communities, the objectives and the scope of the 
agreement. Community participation thus needed to be expanded to ensure 
control of the process for development of the agreement. A broad consultation 
was initiated throughout the Park, involving community members and local 
authorities in 30 consultation groups. These groups met several times to discuss 
different aspects of the draft agreement, while additional feedback was acquired 
through semi- structured interviews. Traditional practices were used to maintain 
flows of dialogue; as an illustration, the gastronomy collective served traditional 
potato dishes to consultation groups, both as an expression of reciprocity and to 
facilitate discussion about biocultural heritage.
Differences related to varying degrees of use of biocultural heritage and links 
with markets, expectations regarding the benefits to arise from the Potato Park, 
as well as the decision- making authority communities were willing to delegate 
to the Association. Discussion regarding distribution of the benefits accrued and 
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funds generated by activities in the Park resulted in development of criteria 
reflecting different levels of participation and contribution and what constitutes 
fair and equitable distribution. At the final stage, community participation was 
expanded further to identify gaps in the draft, before its review by a group of 
experts and continued work by study groups for simplification and 
conceptualization in Quechua terms. Following traditional decision- making pro-
cedures, the final draft was presented and discussed in community assemblies, 
and put to a vote. All Potato Park communities approved the agreement by a 
large majority (Argumedo 2012).
The Potato Park inter- community agreement for benefit- sharing provides a 
framework for the sharing of the benefits received by the Potato Park, derived 
directly or indirectly from its biocultural resources, with its communities and 
residents. It also serves as a biocultural community protocol in the sense of the 
Nagoya Protocol, with regard to the relation of the Potato Park as a collective 
entity with outsiders seeking access to its genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge. The agreement thus deals with two facets of benefit- sharing: the 
internal aspect, rarely discussed in academic and grey literature, whereas a com-
munity (or as in the case of the Potato Park a collective of communities) seeks to 
redistribute fairly and equitably among itself the benefits derived from its 
resources; and the external aspect, which is usually discussed in international 
environmental law scholarship with regard to both its inter- state and its intra- 
 state dimensions, as explained in the introduction. In the context of this external 
aspect of benefit- sharing, the community as a provider of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge seeks to agree on terms for providing access to its 
resources to outsiders, in exchange for part of the benefits arising from access to 
its resources. As noted above, it is also unique in that it links an endogenous 
development process and rules based on customary norms with elements derived 
from international environmental law, promoting thus the recognition both of 
customary law as a source of legitimacy and justice, and of indigenous peoples 
and peasant communities as subjects of sovereignty in different degrees under 
international environmental law. Furthermore, the process for its development 
has inherent value for contributing to the autonomous construction of an indi-
genous governance model among the Park communities, identifying principles 
and resolving conflicts as needed.
When it comes to relations with outside users requesting access to the Park’s 
resources and traditional knowledge, the agreement provides that traditional 
knowledge is collectively owned, and access to it requires the prior and 
informed consent of the six communities. The Park’s general assembly makes 
all decisions regarding access to the Park’s resources and expected terms for 
benefit- sharing.
In accordance with community traditions, supported also by the Nagoya 
Protocol provisions (Art. 12(4)), community resources and knowledge are freely 
accessible to all members of all communities in the Park; everyone has the right 
to access knowledge and resources and use them in accordance with customary 
practices, and everyone has the obligation to maintain this flow by transmitting 
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knowledge. Benefits that are to be distributed within and between the Potato 
Park communities and their members may derive from agreements for third- 
 party use of the Park’s genetic resources and traditional knowledge, repatriation 
of seeds, including, for example, under the agreement with CIP, activities under-
taken by the Park’s collectives and projects or donations.
The Potato Park Association has functions related to implementation of the 
agreement, including allocation of benefits between the Park communities and 
regulation of the Park’s collectives. Each community has three types of bene-
ficiaries: those directly involved in Park’s activities; indirect beneficiaries, who are 
involved in conservation and maintenance activities or belong to the communities 
who benefit from redistribution of the Park’s funds; and potential ones, including, 
for instance, future generations. Each community determines the terms for sharing 
of benefits among the different types of beneficiaries. Distribution of benefits is 
operated by a specific committee created by the Association, the Benefits Alloca-
tion and Oversight Committee, as well as the Papa Arariwa, the Potato Collective, 
which was created specifically to address the distribution of repatriated potato 
seeds. The criteria for distribution of monetary and non- monetary benefits provide 
that such distribution should be fair and proportionate to the needs, capabilities, 
responsibilities, contributions and efforts of the communities and their members. A 
percentage is used to develop and maintain a social safety net on the basis of solid-
arity; in addition, the Inter- Community Fund for Benefit- Sharing receives 10% of 
the collectives’ earnings, as well as contributions from Park admission fees 
associated with tourism and educational activities. These funds are redistributed 
among the Park’s communities, as a contribution towards the maintenance of the 
collective biocultural heritage and on the basis of principles of solidarity (ANDES, 
Potato Park Communities and IIED 2012). The agreement further provides for a 
conflict resolution mechanism at three levels: the family, traditional authority and 
the community’s general assembly. When conflicts involve more than one com-
munity, they are resolved by the Park’s general assembly. The system has a 
restorative focus, so decisions aim at restoring social balance.
The case of the Potato Park is illustrative of the possibility for autonomous 
community- based land and resource management, in light of constructive inter-
actions between customary, national and international law. Established on the 
basis of customary law, the Potato Park has taken advantage of openings in 
national and international law to strengthen and support its structures and 
governance system, showcasing the importance of legal empowerment. Engage-
ment of Potato Park representatives with decision- making processes from the 
local to the international level has increased awareness of available rights and 
opportunities, and has promoted mutual recognition as a result. Involvement of 
the Potato Park at international- level processes of relevance to plant genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge is particularly impressive. In addition to the 
repatriation agreement with CIP, which was renewed in 2010, the Potato Park 
has been among the beneficiaries of funding from the ITPGRFA Benefit- sharing 
Fund. Notably, the Potato Park communities do not only receive benefits from, 
but also contribute to international mechanisms; they are one of the very few 
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non- state entities to have voluntarily placed their potato collections in the 
ITPGRFA Multilateral System (ITPGRFA Secretariat 2013), and they have sent 
duplicates of all samples to the Svalbard Global Seed Vault, a backup storage 
facility of seed samples, to secure availability of their varieties for future 
generations (Kinver 2011; Tapia and Tobin 2013). In addition, the participatory 
process that led to the inter- community agreement enabled the development of 
governance structures, empowering the community to build its own vision of 
development and thus decision- making ability, in order to inform about and 
negotiate with outside users the terms for access to its genetic resources and 
knowledge and benefit- sharing under the provisions of the Nagoya Protocol.
Discussion: identifying trends and questions
The account of these case studies illustrates the creation of new, value- based 
communities involved in the conservation and sustainable use of agricultural 
biodiversity. Operating within a wide range of circumstances and contexts, they 
are indicative of the variety of approaches used to re- imagine creatively their 
legal environment and specific legal tools or to circumvent legal obstacles and 
continue sharing benefits and resources. A full analysis is beyond the scope of 
this endeavour, which serves mostly to outline areas for future research. Some 
trends can be discerned, however, to serve as guidance.
The first remark concerns the need for recognition and promotion of farmer- 
 based innovation. All of these initiatives aim at empowering the farmer and 
affirm her capacities for innovation on- farm, against the full professionalization 
of breeding and the corporate control of agricultural development. Participatory 
plant breeding projects have used farmer field schools as a suitable instrument 
for empowering farmers and giving recognition to their knowledge. The Open 
Source Seed Initiative aimed to integrate the skills and capacities of farmer 
breeders with those of plant scientists and encourage and reward the sharing 
rather than the restriction of germplasm. The Peliti community distributed 
traditional seeds for free to amateur gardeners and urban gardens, as part of a 
larger movement building a solidarity economy and a food sovereignty network 
at times of financial crisis in Greece, declaring at the same time that recognition 
of farmer- based innovation is among its main objectives. At the uniquely 
successful case of the Potato Park, indigenous farmers managed potato diversity 
in an illustration of the potential of autonomous community- based land and 
resource management. While many fora recognize farmer- based innovation and 
seed systems as a structural component of agricultural development and sustain-
able food systems, the mainstream paradigm still excludes them, resulting in 
lack of institutional and legal support.
Second, the legal context is of vital importance and is also linked to concerns 
regarding financial sustainability. Participatory plant breeding programmes 
struggle due to lack of legal support, and need to address challenges regarding 
legitimate access to source material and legal recognition and protection of 
the outcomes of collaborative processes. The Peliti community bypasses legal 
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obstacles to farmers’ rights by distributing seed for free; however, it prioritizes 
its efforts to change the national legal framework for recognition of farmers’ 
rights to seed and farmers as innovators. The open- source experiment was born 
out of the desire to ensure a legally safe space for continued innovation within a 
hostile legal framework defined by patents, and still struggles between copyleft 
licenses and ethical commitments through pledges.
On the other hand, an enabling legal framework was key to the success of the 
Potato Park, the communities and representatives of which used openings in 
national and international law to organize and strengthen customary structures 
and governance systems. Establishment of the Potato Park was possible because 
Peru’s legal framework created the necessary legal space to allow such 
expression of self- determination; the Potato Park communities have formal legal 
recognition and communal land titles. In addition, international recognition and 
support provided the impetus for the development of an autonomous territorial 
development strategy, including biocultural conservation and economic initi-
atives on the basis of the biodiversity, natural resources, traditional knowledge 
and customary values. The repatriation agreement with CIP was the driver of the 
participatory process that led to the development of the inter- community 
agreement on fair and equitable benefit- sharing. As such, the Potato Park is a 
rare example of constructive interactions between customary, national and inter-
national law.
Third, the question of underlying values should be finally acknowledged and 
discussed. All of these initiatives, each to varying degrees, involve a collective 
endeavour to achieve a common goal and social benefits beyond strictly material, 
individual or even collective gain. Participatory plant breeding projects do not 
aim at simply producing improved agronomic outputs for marginalized farmers, 
even though that would be a noble objective in itself; they also address objectives 
related to environmental sustainability, empowerment and improved livelihoods. 
The Peliti community bypasses all considerations regarding remuneration and 
monetary exchanges as a matter of principle, inspired by the seed and working for 
conservation, similar to many collectives around the globe, to which community 
members feel connected through their common objectives. Participants in open- 
 source initiatives are united in the resistance against IPR- related restrictions on 
innovation and their faith to the efficiency of the sharing of knowledge to address 
global challenges. That said, participants in the Open Source Seed Initiative had 
principled diverging opinions on the use of licenses and genetic engineering 
(Kloppenburg 2014), indicating the wealth of political and moral issues relevant 
for agricultural production on top of IPRs that need to be addressed and resolved 
in a specific societal context. The Potato Park communities finally managed to 
build an endogenous development model adapting Andean traditions and 
customary norms on reciprocity, duality, equilibrium and solidarity to their 
current circumstances to develop a model benefit- sharing agreement. Choices 
related to agricultural research, development and production are politically and 
culturally charged. A community may take a different path to another, and this 
largely depends on its political predispositions and socio- cultural context.
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The question of underlying values brings us to the fourth issue. Community 
organization and building is key for the creation and sustainability of bottom- up 
benefit- sharing mechanisms. As the case studies illustrate, communities 
involved in conservation of biodiversity and agricultural innovation vary greatly 
in participation, are rarely homogeneous and can be either local or virtual and 
globalized. In addition, communities should not be taken for granted. The 
lengthy and complex participatory process that led to the development of the 
Potato Park benefit- sharing agreement is a testament to that fact, despite parti-
cipants all being members of neighbouring, culturally close communities. 
Designing and conducting a culturally sensitive participatory process combining 
Western and indigenous tools, in light of centuries of colonial history and 
disempowerment of indigenous peoples is no easy process. Addressing 
participation - related issues is more challenging in less homogeneous groups. 
Participatory plant breeding projects, for instance, encountered a host of issues 
related to inclusiveness, choice of participants, addressing gender issues, 
defining the desired outcomes and building a common language to accom-
modate the knowledge and experiences of all participants, farmers and 
conventional plant breeders alike. Inspiration, however, can come from unlikely 
sources; in the current highly interconnected world, an indigenous peasant com-
munity can find links with an anti- capitalist urban movement and vice versa. 
The most popular distribution under the Linux open- source software is called 
Ubuntu, named after the African Nguni philosophy of ubuntu to reflect the 
belief in a universal bond of sharing that connects all humanity.10
Considerable time, effort and good faith is necessary to allow for recognition 
and empowerment of participants and enable control of the decision- making 
process, particularly if they come from different backgrounds, and this is a lesson 
also for international processes of relevance to benefit- sharing. In addition, struc-
tures facilitating participation, such as collectives and cooperatives, are a valuable 
tool for empowerment. The high level of farmers’ organization in communes and 
their familiarity with farmer field schools were important factors contributing to 
the success of participatory plant breeding programmes in Vietnam, and pre- 
 existing traditional community authorities served as the basis for building the 
Potato Park Association. The Potato Park experiment can provide a wealth of 
lessons to international processes, from the effort and organization put into the 
participatory process for setting up the agreement, which has also empowered the 
community to negotiate with outsiders seeking access to its genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge, to the actual design of the agreement, leading to a sophist-
icated scheme for intra- community distribution of benefits in relation to needs, 
capabilities, responsibilities, contributions and efforts.
Communities are certainly dynamic, built around values but also around 
specific resources or needs. It can be argued that a novel community based on 
new collaborations requires a longer experimentation stage in order to, first, build 
trust among its members and, second, develop its own cooperative management 
strategies. Particularly when it seeks to address complex, globally important 
problems such as biodiversity conservation and food security, linked to long 
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histories of colonial and neocolonial domination (Aoki 1998), it is important to 
address equity- and redistribution- related concerns (Hess and Ostrom 2007), 
including through building the differentiated capacities of its members. Such 
governance approaches may delay operation and might impact efficiency; they 
may, however, be instrumental for the long- term sustainability of the project and 
the community itself. Further research would help identify the critical factors that 
lead to success, including a governance system that leads to sustainability and, as 
Charles Schweik puts it, those pre- conditions that ‘somehow establish a situation 
where participants and/or organizations are willing to devote time, energy, and 
resources to building these commons’ (Schweik 2007: 303).
Notes
 1 FAO Voluntary Guide for National Seed Policy Formulation, endorsed by the 
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture in 2015.
 2 The Toolbox for Sustainable Use for PGRFA is available at: www.fao.org/plant- 
 treaty/tools/ toolbox- for- sustainable- use/sustaining- local- crop- diversity/en/ (last 
accessed 26.1.2020).
 3 Information available at: www.sdhsprogram.org/ (last accessed 26.1.2020).
 4 This case study is based on reworked and updated abstracts from: Tsioumani, E., 
Muzurakis, M., Ieropoulos, Y. and Tsioumanis, A. (2016) ‘Following the Open 
Source Trail outside the Digital World: Open Source Applications in Agricultural 
Research and Development’, TripleC: Communication, Capitalism and Critique, 
14(1): 145–162.
 5 OSSI Pledge, available at: https://osseeds.org/the- open- source- seed- initiative- growing- 
 access- to- a- liberated- domain- of- plant- genetic- diversity/ (last accessed 20.1.2020).
 6 This case study is based on an interview with Peliti’s member Vasso Kanellopoulou, 
to whom I am deeply grateful, and a review of the information offered on Peliti’s 
website, available at: https://peliti.gr/ (last accessed 20.1.2020).
 7 Bioversity International (2009) Geneflow 2009, available at: www.bioversity inter 
national.org/e- library/publications/detail/geneflow- 2009/ (last accessed 20.1.2020).
 8 This case study is based on a literature review and several conversations I’ve had 
over the years with Alejandro Argumedo, co- founder of ANDES Association, to 
whom I am deeply grateful.
 9 The agreement is available at: www.grain.org/fr/entries/2165 (last accessed 28.1.2020).
10 I am grateful to Mike Muzurakis for this observation.
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5  Conclusions and a research 
agenda
Conclusions
The preceding legal analysis provided useful elements for the conceptualization 
of fair and equitable benefit- sharing in agriculture, leading to the identification 
of trends and challenges regarding its application.
Fair and equitable benefit- sharing is a well- established, legally binding 
policy objective in the field broadly known as ‘access and benefit- sharing’ 
(ABS) for biodiversity- based research and development, as explored in the first 
chapter. It has been established in accordance with the rules of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD), which reaffirmed the principle of national 
sovereignty over natural and genetic resources. Aiming to establish a system 
for bilateral exchanges of genetic resources between providers and users, and 
with fair and equitable benefit- sharing featuring prominently among its object-
ives, the CBD subjects access to the prior informed consent of the country 
providing such resources, and to mutually agreed terms for benefit- sharing. 
Linked to the principle of national sovereignty, fair and equitable benefit- 
 sharing aimed to ensure that some portion of the benefits arising from the use 
of their resources flow back to the providers, as a balancing tool against the 
privatization of genetic resources via intellectual property rights. Benefit- 
 sharing can further be conceptualized as a tool for the recognition of the 
stewards of these resources and their reward, in a context of global cooperation 
in the pursuit of solidarity and justice, as well as a development and 
conservation tool, allowing part of the benefits from the emerging biodiversity 
market to flow to the stewards of biodiversity and providers of the raw material 
for this market, to improve their livelihoods and enable their continued contri-
bution to biodiversity conservation.
In response to adoption of the CBD as well as the specificities of agricultural 
biodiversity and the needs of the agricultural community to continue exchanges 
of genetic material for objectives linked to global food security and sustainable 
agriculture, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (ITPGRFA) was adopted. The Treaty has established a highly 
sophi sticated multilateral mechanism to serve the objective of fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing. Its Multilateral System (MLS) regulates access to a common 
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pool of crops and forages considered vital for food security and agricultural 
research, and monetary and non- monetary benefit- sharing arising from the 
utilization of these resources. The terms for exchange of material in the MLS 
are provided in the Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA), a 
standardized private- law contract between a provider and a recipient (user) of 
genetic resources, which has been adopted by the Treaty’s Governing Body 
following intergovernmental negotiations. Accumulation of benefits from users 
of the system towards the common pool of resources is conducted according to 
the terms of the SMTA, while distribution of benefits back to providers, in this 
case farmers in developing countries, proceeds through projects financed via the 
Treaty’s Benefit- sharing Fund.
The MLS has been successful in many ways. It has been facilitating hundreds 
of thousands of exchanges of genetic resources every year, mainly to enable 
public agricultural research; it has further provided valuable support, particularly 
through non- monetary benefit- sharing to build the capacities required for facilit-
ated access to, and use of, PGRFA. It is thus instrumental in building endogen-
ously defined needs and capacities of countries and communities, and bridging 
the fairness and equity gap in agricultural research and development. These 
successes, however, have been overshadowed by expectations for monetary 
benefits, in the context of growing inequities due to trade and IPR- related poli-
cies, highlighted below.
As a result of challenges that have arisen with regard to the ability of the MLS 
to generate and share monetary benefits, as analysed in the first chapter, very 
limited user- based payments have been realized since the Treaty’s entry into 
force. The Benefit- sharing Fund has been operating solely on the basis of donor 
country voluntary contributions. Consequently, a working group was specifically 
mandated in 2013 to ‘enhance the functioning of the Multilateral System’. 
However, following six years of deliberations, including an immense amount of 
work on complex legal and policy issues, time and financial resources spent on 
the effort and tentative agreement reached on several important matters, 
including expanding the list of crops in the MLS and devising a system for 
access to MLS crops mainly upon subscription, negotiations collapsed at the 
Governing Body session in November 2019. The collapse marked a missed 
opportunity for the Treaty, sustainable agriculture and multilateralism in general. 
For the time being, benefit- sharing will continue under the Treaty as originally 
established.
Despite the shortcomings, I argue that the objective of fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing introduces both legally binding obligations for parties to the 
treaties that establish it, and a sharing ethos in international environmental law, 
with the potential to affect the acceptability and legitimacy of policy action 
beyond strict legal frameworks.
In the second chapter I explored applications of fair and equitable benefit- 
 sharing in the field of land governance, a vital field of law in the struggle for 
endogenous agricultural development, rarely studied in conjunction with the field 
of ABS for research and development. In this context, farmers’ rights provide a 
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preferential field of study, as they are situated at the interface between the regula-
tion of agricultural research and development, and land and human rights. 
Following a detailed analysis, I propose a broad construction of farmers’ right to 
benefit- sharing, to encompass not only the outcome of benefit- sharing as a 
process, but also a series of supporting elements and enabling conditions for 
smallholder farmers, including secure land tenure and access to seeds, as well 
assistance in the organization of cooperatives and access to markets. Stemming 
from the ITPGRFA multilateral approach to benefit- sharing, this understanding 
aims both to reward and enable farmers’ contribution to the conservation and sus-
tainable use of agricultural biodiversity and thus to sustainable agriculture and 
global food security. In line with the conceptualization of fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing under research and development as outlined above, this twin 
‘reward- and- enable’ approach suggests that farmers should not only be rewarded 
in monetary terms for their past and present contribution, but should also be sup-
ported to continue their practices in the future. Such broad interpretation is further 
supported by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants, which puts forward a 
comprehensive approach regarding the rights of rural populations, linking their 
vulnerabilities, their special relationship to land, water, seeds and natural 
resources and their contribution to global food security through rights already 
protected in international law and new – individual and collective – rights.
Unlike the area of biodiversity- based research and development, where fair 
and equitable benefit- sharing is an established international law concept and 
policy objective, land governance is still mostly a matter for national law. Inter-
national law emerged relatively recently, mainly with regard to indigenous 
peoples’ rights and human rights in general, environmental sustainability and 
transnational investment. Following this exploration, I conclude that fair and 
equitable benefit- sharing lacks a consistent normative content and legal bearing 
across all international instruments of relevance to sustainable agriculture. While 
still linked to notions of justice and solidarity to the vulnerable, benefit- sharing 
in land governance is sometimes framed as a policy objective and at other times 
as a safeguard. In addition, its international legal basis is usually to be found in 
non- binding instruments.
A crucial question concerning implementation of benefit- sharing from land 
use is its relationship with actual access to the resource; the benefit to be shared 
is often the land itself or the right to use it. Examination of benefit- sharing is 
thus inextricably linked to redistribution efforts for land or agrarian reform, in 
view of chronic inequality in land distribution in many countries, complex 
interactions between formal tenure systems and customary arrangements around 
the globe and the fundamental question of who has decision- making authority, 
and thus control over land allocation and use.
In this context, the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food 
Security (VGGT) establish a clear (albeit broadly worded) policy objective 
related to benefit- sharing from public lands, and include detailed provisions on 
redistributive land or agrarian reforms, which can be considered a tool for 
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benefit- sharing, aiming to share not only the benefits arising from the resource 
but also the resource itself. Systems of concessions thus may be used as benefit- 
 sharing tools, to promote fair and equitable use of uncontested public land by 
individuals or farmer cooperatives for food security and rural livelihoods object-
ives. When it comes to contested use of public land, including in the case of 
large- scale agricultural investments and/or arbitrary or unfair interference with 
local land rights, benefit- sharing considerations come into play in the form of 
procedural and substantive safeguards, in accordance with elements enshrined 
in the VGGT and as illustrated by human rights jurisprudence. Questions, 
however, remain regarding the relationship between benefit- sharing and land- 
 use rights, particularly customary ones. That is, empirical research shows that, 
in many cases, doubtful or strictly monetary benefit- sharing arrangements tend 
to replace legitimate land- use rights, with detrimental effects for livelihoods and 
social cohesion. Benefit- sharing can thus be used to reproduce injustices and 
impose dominant ideological, economic and development models. Literature on 
the actual implementation of benefit- sharing arrangements via either policy 
interventions or contractual provisions remains limited, illustrating the need to 
bridge the gap in legal commentary and provide a comprehensive picture of the 
socio- legal framework and its implementation on the ground, with focus on two 
particular issues: the potential mismatch between macro- level benefits at the 
government level and negative impacts on local- level livelihoods, resulting in 
unfair distribution of risks and benefits; and procedural shortcomings in the 
design and implementation of such large- scale agricultural investments, due to a 
series of structural considerations related to national frameworks characterized 
by poor governance.
In this context, application of benefit- sharing should include: opportunities for 
meaningful participation and recognition of legitimate right holders in the 
decision - making process; safeguards for local land rights; and contractual 
arrangements for revenue- sharing and non- monetary benefits such as 
infrastructure development. The VGGT provide guidance both on the protection 
of legitimate tenure rights and on mechanisms for transparency, participation and 
accountability in decision- making regarding land allocation.
The overall analysis supports that the concept of fair and equitable benefit- 
 sharing has the potential to contribute to sustainable agriculture and rural 
livelihoods objectives if constructed broadly to cover both the process for its 
achievement and the substantive outcome. In this sense, benefit- sharing should 
be understood as integrating mechanisms for information- sharing, technology 
transfer and capacity- building, dubbed non- monetary benefit- sharing in the 
research and development realm, and mechanisms for transparency, participation 
and accountability in decision- making regarding land allocation and use. 
Enabling conditions, including an inclusive process, are prerequisites for a fair 
and equitable outcome.
This potential, however, needs to be assessed in the context of the entire inter-
national legal architecture affecting land, food and agriculture. Instruments 
supporting application of fair and equitable benefit- sharing include environmental 
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treaties, and those related to human rights and sustainable agriculture. On the 
other hand, a series of trade- and investment- related agreements promote a 
neoliberal model of growth within an increasingly hostile political and economic 
landscape, defined by growing nationalisms, rising authoritarianism and a mis-
trust of multilateralism. The expanding sphere of application of international 
trade and investment law, in combination with its enforcement potential and the 
asymmetry in capacities and power of the parties involved, has resulted in 
protection of the international capital, often to the detriment of national 
development priorities in developing countries, restricting states’ ability to regu-
late for the public interest. Trade and investment- oriented policies, including 
IPRs, are gaining a de facto supremacy over human rights and environmental 
treaties, because of their enforcement potential and the underlying power of 
actors and interests involved.
Adoption of the TRIPS Agreement weakened the gains associated with the 
CBD, while an ever- growing web of bilateral and multilateral free- trade and 
investment agreements reduces policy choices for developing countries through 
IPR- related standards and transnational investments on land. The gradual 
strengthening of plant breeders’ rights and the expansion of patents aggravate the 
asymmetry between modern and farmers’ varieties, and limit legitimate possibil-
ities for policy support towards small- scale farming. Large- scale investments in 
farmland threaten rural livelihoods, radically transforming tenure systems, with 
well documented impacts on local food security. The activities of multinational 
companies remain largely outside the scope of international law.
While the general picture of international law appears gloomy at the moment, 
examples from the grassroots offer rays of hope. The preceding analysis has 
showcased the role of movements in the development not only of national, but 
also international, law. Several land rights movements around the globe have 
been central in land redistribution efforts, as a means towards agrarian and 
social justice. Agrarian movements have recently been a driving force behind 
international law development, as illustrated most prominently in the adoption 
of the UN Declaration of the Rights of Peasants, with La Via Campesina having 
a leading role in the negotiations. It remains to be seen how the Declaration will 
be implemented by national governments and applied by courts and whether 
movements will build on its emancipatory potential to draw attention to agrarian 
struggles for social justice.
In this context, looking for inspiration at the grassroots level, I explored a 
series of case studies illustrating community- level understandings of benefit- 
 sharing. Of diverse origin, size, participation, focus and visibility, these initi-
atives illustrate the sharing ethos at the heart of the concept of fair and equitable 
benefit- sharing, which could affect the acceptability and legitimacy of policy 
action, within or beyond strict legal frameworks.
Their preliminary analysis provides the background for the research agenda 
outlined below. The identified trends relate to different aspects of fair and equit-
able benefit- sharing as a process and an outcome, and aim to enrich its 
conceptualization to ensure its contribution to addressing global challenges.
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The case studies explored highlighted that the need to empower farmers and 
affirm their capacities for innovation on- farm, against the full professionalization 
of breeding and the corporate control of agricultural development, is required for 
agricultural, environmental and social reasons alike. The legal and institutional 
context is of vital importance in this regard, and support or lack thereof may 
have direct impacts on the sustainability of the initiatives. That said, the question 
of underlying values should be acknowledged and addressed. Choices related to 
agricultural research, development and production are politically and culturally 
charged. One community may take a different path to another, and this largely 
depends to the political predispositions of the members and the socio- cultural 
context. Furthermore, community organization and community- building is key 
for the creation and sustainability of bottom- up benefit- sharing mechanisms, as 
illustrated by the lengthy and complex participatory process that led to the 
development of the Potato Park benefit- sharing agreement. Addressing 
participation - related issues is more challenging in less homogeneous groups. 
Considerable time, effort and good faith is necessary to allow for recognition and 
empowerment of participants and enable control of the decision- making process, 
particularly if they come from different backgrounds, and this is a lesson also for 
international processes of relevance to benefit- sharing. In addition, structures 
facilitating participation, such as collectives and cooperatives, are a valuable tool 
for empowerment.
The Potato Park experiment can provide a wealth of lessons to international 
processes: from the effort and organization put into the participatory process for 
setting up the agreement, which has also empowered the community to negotiate 
with outsiders seeking access to its genetic resources and traditional knowledge, 
to the actual design of the agreement, leading to a sophisticated scheme for 
intra- community distribution of benefits in relation to needs, capabilities, 
responsibilities, contributions and efforts.
A research agenda
How could this analysis fit into the larger idea of agrarian justice? At this stage, 
the sharing ethos enshrined in the concept of fair and equitable benefit- sharing is 
in direct conflict with a political and economic system that is increasingly 
transforming genetic and natural resources and knowledge into commodities. 
Are there any narratives that link this sharing ethos, as broadly constructed 
above but poorly applied in practice, with rural struggles for social justice? In 
the section below, I explore preliminary ideas for future research in the quest for 
such linkages. I refer to agrarian justice in the general sense proposed by the 
Transnational Institute, as the political struggles in rural areas around access, 
control and ownership of resources and land, including international movements 
struggling against dispossession and working towards alternatives.1 A series of 
narratives have been proposed to frame such struggles, but they are rarely linked 
to the role of law, from the negotiation and creation of international law to its 
implementation on the ground.
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The literature on the commons offers a wealth of specific frameworks to be 
applied, from agricultural research and development and the common pool of 
genetic resources under the ITPGRFA (Halewood 2013; Frison 2018) to land and 
natural resource management more generally. The framework on the robustness 
of social- ecological systems (Anderies et al. 2004) seems to be particularly 
appropriate for the analysis of social and production systems in rural areas.
The narrative of food sovereignty is another one of these framings. Now 
enshrined in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants as linked to the right to 
define food and agriculture systems, and the right to healthy and culturally appro-
priate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods that 
respect human rights, food sovereignty was first introduced by La Via Campesina. 
A comprehensive term, it refers to the agricultural production, distribution and 
consumption of food, as well as the democratic control of mechanisms for food 
production and distribution. Integrating environmental sustainability and social 
justice concepts, food sovereignty creates openings for enriching the still- dominant 
productivity paradigm stemming from the green revolution, with the need to move 
towards more biodiverse agricultural production, as a tool for improved nutrition 
but also agricultural and social resilience, as explored in the second chapter. The 
impact of the food sovereignty paradigm on the global discourse surrounding rural 
livelihoods, agricultural development and the right to food stands to be explored, 
also in light of the implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants. 
The quest for a transformative vision needs to address also gendered and racialized 
divisions of farm labor, a topic rarely addressed by scholars working on food and 
seed sovereignty. In this vein, the impact of regressive, populist and authoritarian 
national politics on rural areas, and how rural populations are shaped by and 
interact with these politics, should not be avoided.
Finally, as international lawyers we need to engage with the literature on 
political ecology and on social movements and to develop the sensibility to take 
a stance. A prerequisite for this is engaging with theories of justice beyond 
distribution, to address questions of recognition, difference and political parti-
cipation. The practices of social movements show the limits of the mainstream 
human rights discourse and challenge mainstream concepts of international law 
and politics by emphasizing the autonomy of communities and reinvigorating 
democracy. As Balakrishnan Rajagopal argued back in 2003, a theory and 
practice of international law that takes social movements seriously as actors is 
urgent and essential.
Note
1 Available at: www.tni.org/en/page/agrarian- justice- works (last accessed 25.2.2020).
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